





A HISTORY OF THE DECCAN

RAMA VARMA RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
TRICHUR, COCHIN STATE.



HIS EXALTED HIGHNESS
THE NIZAM OF HYDERABAD, 1923.

A HISTORY OF THE DECCAN

BY

J. D. B. GRIBBLE

EDITED AND FINISHED BY MRS. M. PENDLEBURY



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
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DEDICATED
TO
H.E.H. THE NIZAM
OF
HYDERABAD



PREFACE

THE author of this History of the Deccan, my father, J. B. D. Gribble, I.C.S., died before completing this work, which originally appeared in a series of articles in an Indian periodical, entitled "Tales of a Deccan Grandfather."

The task of editing and completing my father's work has fallen on me.

The second volume deals principally with an important alliance entered into between the Nizam and the British, in order to afford His Highness the necessary protection required to defend him from the turbulent foes that surrounded his dominions.

From this resulted the formation of the little army known as the Hyderabad Contingent that won fame and distinction in several campaigns. Then followed the Nizam's financial embarrassment incurred by the upkeep of the troops in question. Finally on account of the debt thus incurred several districts were ceded to the British under certain conditions as security for money advanced by them.

For ten years Mr. Gribble had keenly and closely studied this question and was considered an expert on the same. His death occurred just before he had finished dealing with these matters in the chapter entitled the Berar Trust which was to be one of the most important in the second volume. Unfortunately I have had to cast this

chapter from a few notes and the substance of certain articles which the author had written for the *Pioneer* and the *XIX Century Review*. It was through these very articles that public attention was first drawn to the question of the Berar Trust, and to the fact that the Nizam's claims had not been dealt with adequately. Later through Mr. Gribble's efforts a debate was held in Parliament. Subsequently a settlement was arrived at in 1902, which, however, did not cause universal satisfaction as it did not meet the claims in question.

My thanks are due to H.E.H. the Nizam, who has graciously accepted the dedication of this volume.

It has been a great pleasure to go over matters relating to Hyderabad, with the life of which I have been intimately connected for more than twenty years.

My one regret has been that the author did not live to complete his own work and that the points on which he was an expert should have been dealt with by another hand wielding a pen less able than his own.

MARY PENDLEBURY.

ROME, 1924.

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
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4. Berar Trust. "Administration Report."
5. British and Native Administration. "Moral and Material Progress."
6. Compton (H.). "Military Adventures in Hindustan."
7. Dalhousie. "Lord Dalhousie's Letters to General Fraser."
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11. Kaye. "History of Mysore."
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16. Talboy. "Diary when in Madras."
17. Wellesley. "Dispatches."

CHAPTER I

THE REIGN OF ASAF JAH. 1723-1748



PREVIOUS chapter in the first volume dealt with the accession of Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah to the Dominion of the

Deccan, and in the present chapter the fortunes of the Asaf Jah dynasty will be followed, which will constitute a history of Hyderabad rather than of the whole of the Deccan. At the period at which we have now arrived,

the Mahrattas had acquired a considerable portion of what was originally known as the Deccan and which was ruled over by the Bhamanee Kings and the other Mahomedan dynasties, the history of which has been given in previous chapters. The history of the

Mahrattas, however, has already been written and therefore it is not proposed to go over the same ground in the present work, but to refer to them only in so far as they are brought into direct relationship with the Subahdar of the Deccan, or, as he was afterwards called, the Nizam of Hyderabad.

When Asaf Jah compelled the Delhi Emperor to recognize him as the Governor of the Deccan, his jurisdiction extended over a far larger extent of territory than is now covered by the Hyderabad State. With the exception of the comparatively narrow strip of country on the western coast, which belonged to the Mahrattas, his jurisdiction reached from the river Taptee, west of Aurangabad, Ahmednagar and Bijapur over the Mysore country and the Carnatic right down as far as Trichinopoly and probably also to Madura. The incident of the slipper narrated in a previous chapter shows clearly that, although on one occasion the Raja of Trichinopoly refused to pay tribute to the Ambassadors of the Mogul Emperor, still it had for some time, at all events, been the custom to acknowledge the overlordship of the Delhi Emperor. In the Carnatic proper, there was a Nawab with his head-quarters at Arcot who acknowledged the supremacy of the Deccan Viceroy and was, indeed, appointed by him. On the East Coast the whole of the country from Chicacole right down to the south acknowledged the suzerainty of the Deccan Viceroy, and the semi-independent Rajas paid him their tribute as the representative of the Emperor at Delhi. For the purpose of receiving their tribute, the Nizam had a Governor stationed at the town of Rajahmundry. It will thus be seen that the Viceroyalty of the Deccan extended over almost the whole of the peninsular south of the Taptee. To the north of this river and in the province of Malwa, of which

he had been Viceroy previous to his coming to the Deccan, Asaf Jah held or laid claim to a number of jaghirs and fiefs, but here he already had come in contact with the Mahrattas who had commenced to spread over Guzerat, Malwa, and Nagpur, levying *chouth* wherever they could and acquiring for themselves territorial possessions. The Mahratta generals thus employed were the ancestors of the afterwards great houses of Scindia, Holkar, Nagpur and Baroda, who eventually made themselves independent of the Peshwa at Poona, although they professed to regard him as their overlord.

For the first few years after his accession, Asaf Jah was engaged in reducing his dominions to a state of order. It will be remembered from the previous volume that, when Syed Hoossein was Viceroy of the Deccan in 1714-15, he acknowledged the right of the Mahrattas to levy *chouth* in some of his western districts. For the next sixty or seventy years the Poona Mahrattas were constantly striving to enlarge the sphere over which they levied this oppressive tax and Asaf Jah was as constantly employed in endeavouring to repel their aggression without coming to open war.

The following extract from *Orme* shows how the Mahrattas built up their claim to this tax. The matter is of importance since a great deal of the history of the next fifty years turns upon it, and no apology is therefore necessary for introducing it here:

"The country of the Mahrattas lies between Bombay and Golconda; its limits are not known with any degree of certainty to Europeans, and we are equally ignorant of the origin of the people. It is now a century that they have made a figure as the most enterprising soldiers of Hindustan, and as the only nation of Indians which seems

to make war an occupation by choice; for the Rajputs are soldiers by birth. Of late years they have often been at the gates of Delhi—sometimes in arms against the throne, at others in defence of it against the Afghans or Pathans. The strength of their armies consists in their numerous cavalry, which is more capable of resisting fatigue than any in India, large bodies of them having been known to march 50 miles in a day. They avoid general engagements and seem to have no idea in making war but that of doing as much mischief as possible to the enemy's country. This they effect by driving off the cattle, destroying the harvest, burning the villages and by exercising such cruelties as makes the people of the open country take flight on the first rumours of their approach. The rapidity of their motion leaves the prince with whom they wage war little chance of striking a decisive blow against them, or even of attacking with effect any of their detachments. Hence the expense of maintaining an army in the field, also of very little probability of even fighting such an enemy, and the greater detriment arising from the devastations they commit, generally induce the governments they attack to purchase their retreat with money. Great parsimony in their expenses and continued collections of treasure by the means now described have been the principal causes of raising them in less than a century, from a people of inconsiderable note, to a nation which at present strikes terror into all the countries between Delhi and Cape Comorin. They often let out bodies of men, and sometimes whole armies, but the hiring of them is a dangerous resource; for the offer of better terms seldom fails to make them

change sides, and they seldom relinquish their practice of plundering, even in the countries which they are hired to defend. But, notwithstanding their warlike character, they are, in other respects, the most scrupulous observers of the religion of Brahma—never eating of anything that has life, nor even killing the insects which molest them; however, a buffalo sacrificed with many strange ceremonies, atones for the blood of their species which they shed in war.”—(Orme’s “Description of the Mahrattas,” Volume I, Chapter 2.).

Asaf Jah had brought with him from Malwa a number of followers, Mahomedans and Hindus, who were attached to his person and fortunes. To the Mahomedan nobles he granted jaghirs or estates on military tenure and employed them as his generals. In this way he was enabled to raise, when necessary, an enormous army amounting on some occasions to as many as 300,000 men. They were, of course, very primitively armed, according to our modern notions, but as the enemies they met were similarly equipped, this did not so much matter. The time had not yet arrived when the superiority of small highly disciplined forces, thoroughly equipped, was recognized over these huge rabble-like hosts which devastated the country over which they passed and which were unwieldy from their very numbers. The Hindus whom Asaf Jah brought with him, he employed principally in administrative work in the departments of revenue and finance. To them he also granted jaghirs as a remuneration for their services, and all these jaghirs, whether granted for civil or military purposes, came to be considered as hereditary in the different families. The vast majority of the population of the Nizam’s dominions consisted of course of Hindus; and scattered

over the country was a large number of indigenous Rajahs and Chiefs who held, most of them, sunnads or grants from former kings, many of which had been confirmed subsequently by the Delhi Emperors. The Rajahs were all recognized and confirmed in their possessions on payment of tribute, being allowed to exercise a kind of semi-independent jurisdiction within the limits of their estates. The whole of the Hyderabad country was divided into three distinct portions, consisting, first, of these feudal jaghirs; secondly, of scattered portions of territory reserved for the Nizam's privy purse, now known as Sarf-i-khas lands; and, thirdly, of the so-called Dewani or Government lands, the revenues of which were devoted to the expenses of administration. A great many of these districts were farmed out to noblemen and others who paid large nazars or tribute for the privilege. These persons were supposed to retain a certain proportion (2 to 4 annas in the rupee) for administrative charges, and to remit the balance to the central treasury. There was, of course, considerable laxity in this respect, and it depended upon the personal character of the deputy whether the people were oppressed or not. No attempt was made to spend any money on roads or communications; almost all traffic was carried on quadrupeds, generally by the indigenous nomadic tribes. Even the old Hindu irrigation works were allowed to fall into neglect and disrepair, for very few of the local deputies ever dreamt of spending public money on such objects. They kept for themselves as much as they could out of the revenues, and when subterfuges would no longer answer, they sent the remainder to head-quarters. Still, however, the revenue which the Nizam derived from such an enormous extent of territory was very large and his court was the most splendid in India after that of Delhi.

It is difficult to ascertain with anything like correctness what the actual revenues of the Nizam's large province were, but Grant Duff, in his *History of the Mahrattas*, has compiled from the original Mahratta records a statement showing the revenues of the six Deccan Subahs or Divisions over which the Mahrattas claimed the right of levying *chouth* at 25 per cent. and *Surdeshmookee* at 10 per cent. The six Subahs which constituted the Hyderabad Dominion proper and the revenue they yielded are given below :

	Rs.
Aurangabad	12,376,042
Berar	11,523,508
Beejapur	78,508,560
Bedar	7,491,879
Hyderabad	64,867,483
Candeish	5,749,819
	<hr/>
	180,517,291
Say	£18,000,000

It was upon these revenues that the Mahrattas demanded their *chouth* of 25 per cent., which was supposed to be a payment for the protection of the villages from raid and rapine. This protection was given by irregular horse, which, when the *chouth* was not punctually paid, raided the villages on their own account until it was produced. In other words, it was a species of blackmail. But the right to levy this *chouth* had been previously sanctioned by an imperial order at the time when Syed Hussein was Viceroy of the Deccan (1714-1719). The *Surdeshmookee* had also been sanctioned at the same time, but was not levied with the same regularity ; in fact, it was part of the Mahratta policy to allow these taxes to fall into arrears so as to give them a *casus belli*

on some future occasion, when possibly they might have an opportunity of acquiring more than their just dues by virtue of the sword. For the first few years after Asaf Jah's accession, his time was fully employed in arranging these complicated affairs. In so doing, he was on several occasions brought into collision with the Mahrattas. This occurred in 1727 and subsequently in 1729, and in both campaigns the Nizam was only partially successful, but such was his astuteness that he contrived to draw as much profit out of a reverse as he did from a victory. He was also frequently assisted by the internal dissensions amongst the Mahrattas, for, although the Rajah at Satara was still the virtual King of the Mahrattas, his authority was gradually being overshadowed by that of the Peishwa, whilst the different prominent chiefs and generals were in their turn jealous of the Peishwa's growing influence. Grant Duff (*History of the Mahrattas*, Volume I, Chapter 13) has described the policy of the Nizam in a few well-chosen words which are here reproduced :

"On a general view, his plans were calculated to preserve his rank at court, and his power in the Deccan ; to keep alive the old, and to create new dissensions amongst the Mahrattas : to preserve a connection with that nation in case it should ultimately be useful to direct their attacks from his own to the imperial territories ; and, however inconsistent some of these designs may seem, in this system of political artifice through the remainder of a long life Nizam-ul-Mulk not only persevered but generally prospered."

In 1731 the dissensions between the Mahrattas reached a climax, and Trimbuk Rao Durbari came to open conflict with the Peishwa. The Nizam secretly supported

the former, thus forsaking an alliance he had previously formed with the Peishwa. A battle was fought in Guzerat in which Trimbuk Rao was defeated and killed, and Baji Rao was left supreme with all but a nominal control of the Mahratta sovereignty. The Peishwa then returned to Poona, and, highly indignant with what he considered the treachery of the Nizam, was prepared to proceed against him with the whole of his available force—a crisis which Asaf Jah would have found it difficult to overcome. But this crafty politician found a means of escaping from this danger; and of saving himself and his dominions from the devastating inroads of the Mahrattas. He managed to persuade the Peishwa to turn his arms against the Emperor at Delhi, he himself promising to remain neutral. In consequence of this arrangement, the Mahratta armies overran the province of Malwa, crossed the river Chembul, and threatened the imperial capital itself. The fighting continued from 1734 until 1738, when, overtures having been made to him by the Emperor Mahomed Shah, the Nizam proceeded to Delhi and threw his support upon the imperial side. But even with this support the Emperor was only able to buy off the Peishwa at a heavy price. He had in fact to comply with the whole of Baji Rao's demands, which now exceeded all bounds. "At different stages during the discussions, he required the whole province of Malwa in *jaghir*; the Rohillas, who had established themselves, to be dispossessed; the forts of Mandoo, Dhar and Raiseen; the *jaghir* and *fouzdaree* of the whole tract south of the Chambul; fifty lakhs of rupees from the royal treasury, or an equivalent assignment on Bengal, Allahabad, Benares, Gya and Muttra in *jaghir*; and a hereditary right as Surdeshpandya of the Soobah of the Deccan." (*Grant Duff*.) For the moment the

Emperor managed to evade all these concession with the exception of the last, to which he acceded on Baji Rao's agreeing to pay him a nuzzer of six lakhs of rupees. This was a stroke levelled by the Delhi minister against the Nizam, and had the immediate effect of arousing the latter's jealousy and of deciding him to actively support the Emperor in order to overthrow the minister, Khan Dowran. Several skirmishes occurred in front of Delhi with varying success, but ending generally in favour of the Peishwa, who, having received the concessions which he had asked for of the Government of Malwa, at length returned to the Deccan, where for some time he was engaged in military operations with the Portuguese.

In the meantime, taking advantage of the Peishwa's absence, the Emperor prevailed at last upon the Nizam to repair to his court, and bestowed upon him the governments of Malwa and Guzerat in the name of his eldest son, Ghazi-ud-Din, but on the condition that he should drive the Mahrattas out of these provinces. Baji Rao at once returned with an army of 80,000 men, and crossing the Nerbudda met the Nizam near Bhopal in January, 1738. No pitched battle ensued, but by means of a series of skilful manœuvres he managed to hem the Nizam into such a position that he was practically helpless, and in the following month had to sign a convention in which he granted to the Peishwa the whole of Malwa and the complete sovereignty of the territory between the Nerbudda and the Chambul. But here again, we have an example of Asaf Jah's diplomacy and ability: the price by which the peace was bought was in reality paid by the Emperor and not by the Nizam. He gave away the province of Malwa, which had never been really in his possession, whilst his own dominions remained intact. In 1735, Nadir Shah invaded

Hindustan and after having sacked Delhi returned to Persia on the 5th May. The Nizam Asaf Jah had been with the Emperor throughout these proceedings but had been powerless to help him. Indeed, Orme says that he himself invited Nadir Shah to come to India, but he cites no authority for this assertion and all the probabilities are in the opposite direction ; for it was much more in the interests of the Nizam that there should be a weak ruler like Mahomed Shah on the throne than a man of the stamp of the Persian conqueror ; but, after Nadir Shah had retired and had taken with him the accumulated treasures of Delhi, Asaf Jah must have seen that any further attempt to uphold the Emperor's authority was hopeless. Accordingly he resolved to devote the rest of his life to the consolidation of his own kingdom in the Deccan. He must now have been nearly 90 years of age, but was still endowed with an immense amount of energy and physical strength. Affairs in the Carnatic urgently required his presence, for the French under Dupleix had already begun to interfere, and Safdar Khan, the Nawab of the Carnatic, had been assassinated by his brother-in-law. Everything in the south was in confusion, and to add to this confusion the Mahrattas had come down with a large army with the object of taking Trichinopoly. In spite therefore of his advanced age, Asaf Jah marched down to Arcot with a large army, which Orme refers to as 80,000 horse and 200,000 foot. His presence served to restore order and for the present he appointed Anwar-ud-Din as Nawab (1744). It is narrated that so great was the confusion in the Carnatic and so many the rivals who put forward their claims to the Nawabship, calling themselves Nawab in anticipation of success, that the old Nizam gave orders to his attendants that eighteen Nawabs having been to see

him that day, the next person who presented himself under the style of Nawab should be beaten out of his camp with whips. (*Orme*, Volume VII, Chapter 1.) It was whilst engaged on this expedition that the Nizam first came into contact with the English merchants of Madras, who despatched an embassy to him whilst he was in camp near Trichinopoly. The chief of this embassy was Mr. Eyre and a very interesting diary of what occurred is preserved in the records of the Government of Madras. From this diary I quote an extract :

“ *March 30th.*—About 8 this morning the Nawab's officer came to us with a guard of horse and foot and two elephants with drums and colours, and told us the Nabob was glad to hear of our arrival in camp, and had ordered him to conduct us to him. After the usual compliments, we presented him as by the list of presents. After his taking betel, we proceeded with him and were carried to the public Durbar, where the Nabob was sitting attended by his Omrahs, Nawabs, Rajahs, and other great men ; and, making our obeisances in front at a considerable distance, we were shown a place on the carpets and to sit down there. About an hour after, when the Nabob rose from the Durbar, he sent for us into private apartments, whereupon his speaking our welcome we paid the Governor's respect to him ; and he bade us sit down and then honoured us with a great deal per discourse on indifferent matters. Coffee was also served to us with the honour of the fans. This being the first audience nothing was said of the presents, and in something more than an hour he gave us betel and we withdrew and returned to our tents, where the Nabob and Imam Saheb each sent us a dinner. In the afternoon

received a list from Imam Saheb of what goods he had assigned for the presents to the Nizam, which we got unpacked and sorted that night and sent early next morning to the Nabob.

"31st.—The goods being sent and opened in the Nabob's tents, went to wait on him at the Durbar, and, that business being over, the Nabob sent for us to a private tent where the goods lay opened and we were desired to sit. The Nabob observed them very nearly and took many of the parcels in hand and said they were very good, and of the painted looking-glass and some others that he would keep some himself and send also some of them to the Mogul (Emperor) and would tell him that he had them of the Government of Chennapatnam.* Coffee was served and after an hour's discourse we retired."—(Talboys Wheeler's "Madras in the Olden Time.")

Mr. Eyre remained in the Nizam's camp for seventeen days and then returned to Madras. This appears to have been the first introduction to the Nizam of the English merchants, and for many years afterwards there was an interchange of courtesies, if not with the Nizam himself, at all events with his deputy, the Nawab of Arcot, so much so that, when three years later hostilities broke out between the French and the English, the Nawab not only wrote to the former asking them why they had made war without his permission, but also sent a body of troops to assist the latter. The connection thus formed led to most important results. The English merchants in Madras regarded themselves as under the special protection of the Nizam and of his deputy the Nawab and, although the latter was at first inclined to side

* The old name for Madras.

with the French, when in 1746 La Bourdonnais attacked and took Madras, he ultimately sent an army under his eldest son, Mahfug Khan, to oppose them. An engagement took place at St. Thome, in which the French, under Paradis, marked a new departure in Indian warfare by signally defeating the whole of the Nawab's army with a few battalions of sepoys or native soldiers, trained, disciplined and officered by Europeans.

From this time, however, the connection between the rightful Nawab of the Carnatic, Anwar-ud-Deen, and the English became more intimate, especially when, as we shall see in the next chapter, the French openly espoused the cause of a rival Nawab.

In the meantime, the Nizam Asaf Jah returned to Hyderabad (1744), and for the next four years his life was passed in comparative quiet. Orme says that he was now over 100 years old, and his various enemies were content to wait until his death, when a general cataclysm seemed to be inevitable. This actually occurred in 1748, a few months after the death of the Emperor Mahomed Shah, and thus passed away one of the most notable of Empire-builders to be found in the annals of Indian history.



CHAPTER II

ASAF JAH'S SUCCESSORS

ASAF JAH left six sons and one daughter. The eldest of these sons was named Ghazi-ud-Din, and in the ordinary course would have succeeded his father. But for the present, at all events, Ghazi-ud-Din had no wish to come to Hyderabad. He was in high office in Delhi, and, a new Emperor having ascended the throne, he preferred remaining at court. The next son was Nasir Jung, and he at once placed himself on the *musnud*, seized the treasury and proclaimed himself Nizam. The other sons were Salabut Jung, Asad Jung, Basalut Jung and Nizam Ali, of whom the first, the fourth, and the fifth eventually became Nizams. The daughter had a son named Muzaffer Jung, who had been the old Nizam's favourite, and was generally supposed to have been designated as his heir.

For some time before his father's death Nasir Jung had been in disgrace. In 1841 he had broken into open revolt and had actually met his father in battle. At the last moment, however, he surrendered, and, after being kept in confinement for some time in the fort of Nander, was afterwards retained near the Nizam's person. Muzaffer Jung, the favourite grandson, had been

appointed Governor of the upper or Balaghaut portion of the Carnatic, with his head-quarters at Bijapur, the ancient capital of the Adil Shahi kings. Muzaffer Jung resolved to oppose the succession of his uncle, Nasir Jung, and for this reason made a combination with Chanda Saheb, who was then a prisoner of the Mahrattas and kept in honourable confinement at Sattara. In order to explain who Chanda Saheb was it will be necessary to go back somewhat, but this retrospect is of the utmost importance, since it was owing to Chanda Saheb's connection with the French that European interference in the politics of the Deccan originated.

In 1732 Saadut Ullah, the Nawab of the Carnatic, died. He had ruled since 1710 before the time that Asaf Jah made himself independent. Although nominally the Carnatic was a portion of the Deccan, Saadut Ullah had always exercised a certain amount of independence, and, when he died, having no sons, he appointed his eldest nephew Dost Ali, to succeed him in the Nawabship. This appointment, however, was never recognized by Asaf Jah and no *sunnad* confirming him was ever despatched. Dost Ali however remained in power and practically ruled the whole of the Southern Carnatic. Dost Ali had a son named Safdar Ali and one of his daughters was married to his Dewan Chanda Saheb. At this time (1736) Trichinopoly was an independent Hindu kingdom, but, the Rajah having died, Dost Ali resolved to endeavour to attach it to his dominions. Accordingly he sent an army under his son Safdar Ali and Chanda Saheb to lay siege to the town. Chanda Saheb managed to persuade the Rancee to admit him into the fort with a body of troops and then treacherously seized the queen, put her in prison, where she died, and took possession of the kingdom in the name of Dost Ali.

Chanda Saheb then remained in Trichinopoly as Governor and Safdar Ali returned to his father.

Asaf Jah was by no means pleased with these events in the Carnatic since they dangerously increased the power and influence of Dost Ali, whose object was to create an independent kingdom in the south of India and to throw off all allegiance to the Nizam. At that time, however, he was busily occupied at Delhi, whither he had been summoned by the Emperor on the occasion of the invasion of the Persian conqueror Nadir Shah. He therefore encouraged the Mahrattas to attack Trichinopoly, which they were only too willing to do, and in conjunction with the Hindu Kings of Mysore and Tanjore they marched upon Arcot. On its way the Mahratta army was met by Dost Ali, who however was defeated and killed. After this victory the Mahrattas came to terms with Safdar Ali, whom they recognized as successor to his father, but compelled him to pay a tribute of ten lakhs of rupees and then ostensibly returned to Mysore. Chanda Saheb had expected the Mahrattas to lay siege to Trichinopoly and had made every preparation for defence and had also sent his wife and family to Pondicherry, the French settlement, where they were hospitably entertained as guests by the French Governor, M. Dupleix, of whom we shall hear a great deal later on. Chanda Saheb deceived by the retreat of the Mahrattas, and thinking himself to be safe, sold off his stores of grain and dismissed a large portion of his army. No sooner had he done this, however, than the Mahratta army returned and laid siege to Trichinopoly, which after a gallant defence had to yield on 26th March, 1741. It was at this siege that Hyder Ali, afterwards Sultan of Mysore, but then an officer in the Rajah's army, distinguished himself. Chanda

Saheb was taken prisoner and brought by the Mahrattas to Sattara, where he was kept in confinement until he could pay a heavy ransom. This he was unable to do, and remained accordingly a prisoner whilst his wife and family were still residing at Pondicherry. In the following year Safdar Ali, the Nawab of the Carnatic, was assassinated, and it was after this event that Asaf Jah proceeded to the Carnatic, as related, and left behind him Anwar-ud-Din as Nawab. Whilst the family of Chanda Saheb had been left at Pondicherry, Safdar Ali's family had been sent to Madras for safety. Anwar-ud-Din, although practically appointed as Nawab, was not confirmed in the appointment, but Asaf Jah sent for the young son of Safdar Ali from Madras and placed him under Anwar-ud-Din's guardianship with a view of his becoming the Nawab hereafter. In the following year, however, this unfortunate prince named Syed Mahomed was assassinated and then Anwar-ud-Din was confirmed as Nawab.

This, therefore, was the condition of affairs at the death of Asaf Jah. It will be seen that there were two rival claimants to the Nawabship of the Carnatic. Chanda Saheb who by marriage to Dost Ali's daughter represented the family which for many years ruled in the Carnatic, and Anwar-ud-Din, who having been appointed Nawab by the Nizam, was legally constituted ruler. Anwar-ud-Din was in actual possession and it is therefore clear that less was to be expected from a dispossessed pretender than from a man supported by the legally constituted authority. It was, however, hopeless to expect that the Nizam would allow his nominee to be displaced and accordingly it was necessary to find another Nizam who in return for being raised to the throne would support the appointment of Chanda

Saheb. The latter had a great reputation for bravery and military talents, and owing to his family being in Pondicherry he was in frequent communication with the French. The French Governor, M. Dupleix, was one of the ablest and most ambitious of Europeans who ever came to India. It was he who had first grasped the idea of assisting the native princes in their quarrels with each other and in return for that assistance to get power and influence for himself and his country. He was quick enough to see that an opportunity had offered itself and he was only too willing to take advantage of it. In the coming struggle between Nasir Jung and Muzaffer Jung he resolved to take the side of the latter, and if he could succeed in getting him to be made Nizam of the Deccan there could be no doubt that his reward would be a magnificent one. Accordingly he resolved to make use of Chanda Saheb, and, by promising the Mahrattas to be security for payment of the ransom, obtained his release. Chanda Saheb then joined Muzaffer Jung at Bijapur, and the two raised a small force with which they marched towards the Carnatic. Chanda Saheb promised to make Muzaffer Jung Nizam, and as a price for help obtained the promise of the Nawabship of the Carnatic. A small success at Chitteldroog attracted more followers to the flag of Chanda Saheb, and on the borders of the Carnatic they were joined by a force sent by Dupleix consisting of 400 Europeans and 2000 sepoys. On the 23rd July this army was met by Anwar-ud-Din at the fort of Amboor with the result that the latter was totally defeated and killed. Muzaffer Jung now openly proclaimed himself as Nizam of the Deccan, and appointed Chanda Saheb to be Nawab of the Carnatic. As the victory of Amboor had been gained principally by the valour of the French

force sent by Dupleix, the allies now proceeded together to Pondicherry in order to thank Dupleix in person. Dupleix gave them a magnificent reception, and after entertaining them for several days, urged upon them to at once march and obtain possession of Trichinopoly. This Muzaffer Jung promised to do, but unfortunately delayed on his way in order to get payment of a large sum of money from the Rajah of Tanjore.

The French had now openly espoused the cause of rebellion against the hitherto recognized authority of the Nizam in the Carnatic. It was probably this reason more than any other that induced the English to offer their services in support of the other side, that of law and order. Anwar-ud-Din was dead, but his second son, Mahomed Ali, escaped from the defeat at Amboor and took refuge in the fort of Trichinopoly. Here he collected a small army and was shortly joined by 150 English troops sent by the Governor of Madras. Everything depended upon crushing this small force as soon as possible before the Nizam could have time to march from the Deccan and vindicate his outraged authority. If instead of delaying at Tanjore Muzaffer Jung, as arranged with Dupleix, had at once marched to Trichinopoly, there is little doubt that he would have easily obtained possession of this important fort, and have thus rendered the task of the Nizam considerably more difficult. But an opportunity once lost seldom occurs again.

In the meantime the Nizam Nasir Jung had collected a large army, but delayed to march against Muzaffer Jung because he was afraid that in his absence his brother, Ghazi-ud-Din, would attempt some intrigue at the Emperor's court. In fact, he had resolved to go to Delhi himself when he received the news of the battle

of Amboor. For the time being this meant the conquest of the Carnatic and it therefore became necessary to quell this rebellion at all hazards. Accordingly he collected a large army and sent orders to his tributary chief to join him on the line of march. He was also accompanied by three bodies of Mahratta horse who were employed as advance scouts. Altogether the army consisted of 300,000 fighting men, of whom one half were cavalry; 800 guns and 1,300 elephants. This enormous force was the largest which had ever entered the Carnatic, and it struck awe into the hearts of all who had been inclined to waver in their allegiance. So unwieldy an army could only march by slow stages, and it was about the middle of March, 1750, before the different portions collected at the old fort of Gingee, which is situated about 40 miles to the west of Pondicherry. The French having taken the side of Muzaffer Jung, it was only natural that their rivals the English should support the other side, apart from the fact that Anwar-ud-Din's family, of whom Mahomed Ali was now the surviving representative, had received shelter at Madras. The first success, however, of Muzaffer Jung and Chanda Saheb had made them doubtful as to the real power of Násir Jung, but, now that the latter had shown himself to be thoroughly in earnest, they resolved to send a body of 600 Europeans under Major Lawrence to join him at Gingee. This fort is a very old and celebrated one. It is built on a number of hills in the form of a circle, each hill is connected by strong walls. Under the great Emperor Aurangzebe it had undergone a siege of about 12 years, and it was held to be the strongest fort in Southern India. Nasir Jung drew up his army under the walls of the fort, and there awaited the attack of Muzaffer Jung, who with

Chanda Saheb and the French force was at a short distance away. The French were under the command of M. Atenil who was the same officer who had so distinguished himself at Amboor.

On this occasion, however, he was suffering under very great disadvantages. A number of his officers were in a state of great dissatisfaction bordering upon mutiny, because they had obtained no share in the plunder which the others had brought from Tanjore. A cannonade was opened between the two armies, which, however, owing to the distance, did but little damage though it had the effect of still further discouraging the French who were convinced of Nasir Jung's superior strength. That evening thirteen of the French officers went in a body to their commanding officer and resigned their commissions, whilst at the same time others left the army and returned to Pondicherry. Muzaffer Jung and Chanda Saheb changed their plans, the former refused to retreat, so he remained alone, whilst Chanda Saheb, not daring to trust himself to the mercy of Nasir Jung, followed the French. One reason that induced Muzaffer Jung to remain was that for some days past he had received messages purporting to come from Nasir Jung in which he was promised forgiveness and protection. The overture he resolved to accept, and sent some of his officers to Nasir Jung's presence. Nasir Jung was of course delighted that the rebellion should be so easily put down and is said to have sworn on the Koran that he would neither make his nephew a prisoner nor deprive him of the governments he enjoyed during his grandfather's life.

Accordingly Muzaffer Jung left his camp and proceeded to make his submission, but no sooner had he arrived near his uncle's tent than he was seized, carried

off to a neighbouring tent and placed in chains. His camp was then attacked and his followers dispersed and put to the sword, the Mahratta cavalry following the French force up to the very wall of Pondicherry.

In this sudden and unexpected manner the short-lived rebellion of Muzaffer Jung had apparently come to an end. He himself was in captivity, his army dispersed, and his friends and allies compelled to retreat. His very life was in danger, for he had everything to fear from Nasir Jung's anger. Muzaffer Jung's career, however, was not yet over, and even a more sudden and unexpected change was destined to take place in his fortune.

Although Nasir Jung had been so successful there was a good deal of discontent amongst some of his chiefs. Three of the principal of these were the Nawabs of Cud-dapah, Kurnool and Savanur. From the commencement of this struggle between the son and the grandson of the Great Nizam-ul-Mulk, to whom they owed everything, these and other old officers of Asaf Jah had endeavoured to bring about a reconciliation. They were moreover greatly disappointed at Nasir Jung's breach of faith in seizing his nephew after promising his liberty, since, relying on this promise, they had been chiefly instrumental in persuading Muzaffer Jung to surrender. For the present, however, these chiefs took no open step, but when M. Dupleix, hearing of their discontent, commenced a correspondence with them, they did not hesitate to reply. M. Dupleix's conduct at this critical time showed what a remarkable man he was. All that was left of his army was a small body of Europeans. Almost the whole of his native allies and followers had been scattered or destroyed, and there was opposed to him the enormous army of the infuriated Nizam, which was now flushed with a victory in which it had scarcely

lost a man, and was further supported by a strong body of English allies. But Dupleix by no means despaired, and, although for the present he was unable to use open force, he arranged his plans with so much skill that ultimately he proved successful. Dupleix's first act was to send ambassadors to Nasir Jung's camp, ostensibly to obtain lenient terms for Muzaffer Jung and Chanda Saheb, but in reality to gain time and also to enter into closer conspiracy with the dissatisfied Nawabs. After eight days these ambassadors returned, and the plot was now approaching completion. This plot was further aided by Nasir Jung's own conduct. He first of all fell out with Major Lawrence by making delays in the appointment of Mahomed Ali as Nawab of the Carnatic, so that, in disgust, Major Lawrence retired with his force to Fort St. David about 50 miles distant. At the same time, Nasir Jung, considering the campaign to be practically over, retired with the whole of the army to Arcot, where he himself remained whilst he sent back the greater part of his army and two of his generals to Hyderabad. This was an opportunity which Dupleix was not slow to seize. He resolved to attempt a daring enterprise, which if successful would establish the French name over the whole Carnatic. Nasir Jung was at Arcot enjoying himself with hunting and other amusements. Mahomed Ali and the English force was further south and were fully occupied by the army of Chanda Saheb, and so he resolved to attack the so-called impregnable fort of Gingee. A small force of 250 Europeans and 4,200 sepoy was sent out under the command of M. Bussy, who was afterwards to become so celebrated in Hyderabad itself. This small force did not attempt a regular siege, but simply carried the place by storm at night supported by only four guns. The defenders.

not expecting so bold an attack from so small a force, were taken by surprise and surrendered, so that next morning this handful of Frenchmen found to their surprise that they were in possession of an historical fort that years had held powerful armies at bay and had now yielded without inflicting a loss of more than two or three men.

The news of this daring feat aroused Nasir Jung from his indolence and lethargy. Summoning as many of his discharged forces as he could reassemble, he at once marched to Gingee, accompanied by 60,000 infantry, 40,000 horses, and 350 guns. He had resolved to crush the daring Frenchman who had struck his prestige so serious a blow. It was, however, in the middle of the rainy season, and his progress was delayed by flooded rivers, so that it took him almost two months to march 50 miles. During this time Dupleix had opened out negotiations for peace, and, being now in a more advantageous position owing to his success at Gingee, his demands were that Muzaffer Jung should be released, his estates restored to him, and Chanda Saheb should be appointed Nawab of the Carnatic. At first Nasir Jung would not hear of these conditions, but as, owing to the rains, disease had broken out, and supplies were running short, he resolved at last to grant the demands, the only condition being that Duplex and Chanda Saheb should acknowledge his sovereignty. But Dupleix was carrying on a double game. At the same time that he was negotiating with the Nizam he was also corresponding with the discontented Nawabs in his camp. In fact, when Nasir Jung's officers arrived in Pondicherry with the news that the Nizam would sign the required treaty, at the same time as he delivered to the officers the treaty to be taken back for ratification, Dupleix sent

secret instructions to his force in Gingee to march against Nasir Jung, leaving it to chance to decide which event should happen first, the return of the ratified treaty or the carrying out of the long-planned conspiracy.

As soon as they received Dupleix's letters, the French numbering 800 Europeans and 3,000 sepoys marched out of Gingee to where the Nizam was encamped 16 miles away. The advance guards of the Hyderabad army fell back and then the small French force came upon the whole of the army drawn up in line, in front of which was an elephant with a white flag. This being the signal agreed upon with the conspirators, the French halted. The troops in front were those of the Nawabs of Cuddapah and Kurnool who remained stationary. On this being reported to the Nizam he came upon his elephant and riding up to the Nawab of Cuddapah called him a coward for not advancing against the enemy. The Nawab in reply rose in his howdah and shot the Nizam through the heart. His guards dispersed and then after cutting off Nasir Jung's head the Cuddapah Nawab went to Muzaffer Jung's tent and hailed him as Nizam of the Deccan (14th December, 1750). Nasir Jung's assassination was brought about by his unpopularity and his breach of faith towards Muzaffer Jung, but the plot to which he fell a victim was a very treacherous one and was the more unexpected by him since he had only the day before sent the treaty to Dupleix duly signed and ratified. As regards the army the change of masters appears to have been welcomed. It was known that Muzaffer Jung was the favourite grandson of the great Nizam-ul-Mulk and all hastened to pay him their respects.

CHAPTER III

THE FRENCH IN HYDERABAD



AFTER this sudden change from a prison, threatened hourly with death, to a throne and the undisputed command of an enormous army, Muzaffer Jung was transported with joy. He looked upon Dupleix as his deliverer and at once marched to Pondicherry to thank him in person. Here for several days there was an endless series of festivals. The new Nizam

appeared everywhere with Dupleix in public and showed him every honour and respect. The whole of the treasure found in the camp of Nasir Jung was handed over to the French Governor who was asked by Muzaffer Jung to

decide all cases of disputes between himself and his chiefs, and a promise was given that in all matters Dupleix's advice would be asked for. A grand Durbar was held in Pondicherry in which Muzaffer Jung was installed as Subadar of the Deccan and Dupleix's chair was placed next to that of the Subadar so as to show that he was of equal rank. At this Durbar the Subadar declared Dupleix to be Nawab of all the country south of the river Krishna down to Cape Comorin including Mysore and the whole of the Carnatic, besides bestowing upon him a personal present of a Jaghir worth one lakh of rupees every year. He was also made a Mansabdar of 7,000 horse with the right to bear the ensign of the fish, and the Nizam further promised never to grant a favour without his previous approval, and to be guided in all things by his advice. But Dupleix was too wise to accept all these favours. He knew that if he did so he would only create enemies amongst his former friends, and so he presented Chanda Saheb to the Nizam and asked that he should be appointed the actual Nawab of the Carnatic. This was done, but the real power remained in the hands of Dupleix. Muzaffer Jung now expressed his intention of returning to Hyderabad and asked Dupleix to send with him one of his trusted officers and a force of Europeans to act as a body-guard. This Dupleix was very glad to do because by this means he would be able to maintain his influence with the Nizam, when far away in the Deccan. Accordingly M. Bussy was appointed with a force of 300 Europeans and 2,000 sepoy to form the Nizam's personal guard. This having been arranged, Muzaffer Jung accompanied by his French escort and followed by his army, commenced his march back to Hyderabad. But Muzaffer Jung was not destined to see his capital again. After a march of only a few weeks,

whilst passing through the Jagirs of the Nawab of Cuddapah, a disturbance occurred in that part of the army where the ladies travelled, which was attacked by some of the Cuddapah ryots. The Nawab supported his ryots and when Muzaffer Jung came up and reproached him for the disturbance an engagement took place. Bussy's troops soon decided the quarrel, and the Nawab commenced to retreat. Muzaffer Jung instead of waiting for his cavalry followed on his elephant, the Nawab of Kurnool who had also taken part in the engagement, but fell dead, pierced through the brain by a spear thrown by the Kurnool Nawab, who was immediately afterwards cut to pieces. It is probable that the whole of this incident was a pre-arranged conspiracy ; for the three Nawabs of Cuddapah, Kurnool and Savanoor, all of whom took part in it, and who had also been implicated in the assassination of Nasir Jung, were dissatisfied with the rewards they had received and were jealous of the influence of the French. Savanoor and Kurnool were both killed and Cuddapah escaped grievously wounded. Muzaffer Jung's reign had only lasted about six weeks and now everything was again in confusion. The presence of Bussy, however, with his small but disciplined force soon set matters right. Nizam-ul-Mulk's third son, Salabut Jung, was following his brother in a sort of honorary confinement. Bussy being in charge of the royal camp at once had him brought forward and publicly installed as Subadar. The other chiefs presented their nuzzers and before the day was over order was restored and the march resumed (March, 1751.)

This change of Nizams made no difference to the position occupied by the French. If anything, their influence was made stronger than it was before, because the Nizam saw how valuable was this disciplined force

and he felt that it was due to Bussy's prompt action that he had been placed on the *musnud* without any further disturbance. Besides he knew also that there was further trouble to be expected; for his elder brother Ghazi-ud-Din had published his intention of asserting his right to the Subahship of the Deccan. He felt therefore that it was necessary to have near him a force that could be trusted and an officer who by interest was attached to his person.

Salabut Jung's first act was to confirm all the concessions and privileges that had been granted by his brother to the French, and in addition he gave them the towns of Masulipatam and Chicacole. The march was then resumed. On the way Kurnool was stormed and taken; Hyderabad was reached on the 12th April and a triumphal entry was made into Aurungabad on the 29th June. It is necessary now that a glance at the state of affairs generally should be taken. At this period the most powerful man in the South of India was the French Governor, Dupleix. He was regarded by all as the maker of Subahdars and Nawabs. His fame reached as far as Delhi, and the Emperor himself sent him a *sanad* confirming all that had been granted by the Nizam. The English influence seemed to be at its last gasp. Chanda Saheb was generally acknowledged as Nawab throughout the Carnatic, and his rival Mahomed Ali was besieged in the fort of Trichinopoly, supported by a small army of only 7,000 or 8,000 men and a small body of some 300 Englishmen. It was believed that it was only a question of time before the chief power in the South of India would be that of France. As a matter of fact, however, this was not the case. The power of Dupleix had now reached its height, and from this time commenced to decline. The English

determined to make every effort to support Mahomed Ali. A strong force was thrown into Trichinopoly and an army, to which was attached a young lieutenant named Robert Clive, who was a few years hence to become so famous, was sent to take the field. It is not intended to follow the history of events in the south; for the object of this work is to trace the connection of Hyderabad with the European powers, and it will therefore be sufficient to say that the siege of Trichinopoly by Chanda Saheb and the French continued for 18 months more (June, 1752) when the French general, Law, was at last compelled to surrender. Chanda Saheb was taken prisoner and handed over to the Mahrattas by whom he was put to death, and Mahomed Ali, the protégé of the English, was recognized as Nawab of the Carnatic.

But the losses which the French prestige suffered in the south were more than compensated for by the immense influence which Bussy succeeded in gaining by the side of the Nizam. Salabut Jung was a man who had been brought up more or less in confinement. He had not enjoyed a soldier's training and now that he was raised to a throne he devoted himself to pleasure. In order to do this in safety he put his whole trust in Bussy and his French force, and Bussy did everything to justify that trust. His force of 300 Europeans and 2,000 sepoy was kept in the strictest discipline. The men were lodged in the Aurungabad fort and no soldier was allowed to leave his barracks except at a fixed time. There were no quarrels or disturbances with the townsmen, and the French troops really acted as the police of the town, so that the richest and most valuable goods were freely displayed under their protection. The first against whom Bussy had to defend the Nizam Salabut Jung was Nizam-ul-Mulk's eldest son, Ghazi-ud-Din. In order

to recover the kingdom of his father, Ghazi-ud-Din made an alliance with the Mahrattas, and, whilst the latter under Balajee Baji Row advanced from Poona with 100,000 men, the former marched with 150,000 from Delhi. Bussy had managed to increase his force to 500 Europeans and 5,000 sepoys in a high state of discipline, and in addition there was the large but irregular army of Salabut Jung. Bussy resolved to deal with these two invading forces separately, before they could effect a junction. As the Mahrattas were the nearest, he dealt with them first, and then, marching via Bidar, continued on towards Poona as if he were going to attack the Mahratta capital. By this move Balajee was compelled hastily to return, or else he would have been cut off from his base. This he did with 40,000 of his best horse, and met the Nizam with his French contingent soon after he left Bidar. An engagement followed in which the Mahrattas for the first time met a disciplined force of Europeans and trained sepoys. The Mahratta horse charged with their usual dash and gallantry, but were met by Bussy's steady ranks armed with muskets and bayonets. These were immovable, and, unable to stand the withering fire of the artillery, the Mahrattas retreated broken and in disorder. Bussy continued his march, and again came across Balajee at Rajapur on the river Gur. Taking advantage of an eclipse of the moon when the Hindus were engaged in worship, Bussy made a night attack, surprised their camp, and scattered them in all directions, gaining at the same time an immense amount of booty. (November 12th, 1751.) This victory not only greatly increased Bussy's reputation, but also marked an epoch in the methods of Deccan warfare. For the first time in regular battle had a small, but highly disciplined and well-equipped force, succeeded in annihilating an

army ten times its strength ; and henceforward it will be seen that all the states of Southern and Central India endeavoured to organize contingents drilled and disciplined according to the European system. Bussy continued his victorious march till within 20 miles of Poona, and, after inflicting another defeat some five days later, peace was made with the Mahrattas and the Nizam, and Bussy was at liberty to return to Aurungabad in order to meet Ghazi-ud-Din. It was not until September, 1752, that the latter arrived in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad with an army of 150,000 men. Instead of hostilities, negotiations were commenced, and, whilst these were in progress Ghaz-ud-Din suddenly died. The story of his death is thus told by Colonel Malleeson (*History of French in India*, p. 367) : " The right of Ghaz-ud-Din as the eldest son of his father gave him a moral influence which was not without its effect on the nobles of the Deccan, and which very much disturbed Salabut Jung himself. It is possible that, under the circumstances, and in the face of the Mahratta alliances which Ghaz-ud-Din had at length cemented by the offer of a considerable sacrifice of territory, he might have been inclined to listen to a compromise, when an event occurred which removed the necessity for further negotiation. Living at Aurungabad in the ancient palace of the Subahdar was one of the widows of Nizam-ul-Mulk ; she had borne him but one son, the next in order to Salabut Jung, Nizam Ali. All the hopes of this lady were concentrated in the ardent desire to see this son sitting on the viceregal seat of his father. Between that wish and its accompaniment, however, there were two obstacles. One of these, Salabut Jung, was out of her reach, the other Ghazi-ud-Din, was at Aurungabad. To thrust him out of the path she wished her son to

follow, she had no scruple as to the means by which such a result might be obtained. She accordingly invited Ghazi-ud-Din to a feast and in a dish of which she had persuaded him to partake, telling him truly that it had been prepared by her hands, she poisoned him. Ghazi-ud-Din died that night."

His rival being removed, it was not difficult for Salabut Jung to make terms with the Mahrattas. Balajee Row had collected another army and had been joined by the Holkar and Bhonsla, Rajah of Nagpur. Balajee had had one experience of the quality of the Nizam's general, Bussy, and had probably little desire for another, as long as he could get something out of the negotiations. Accordingly, he agreed to retire himself and to make his allies evacuate the Nizam's dominions on the cession of some territory to the west of Berar between the rivers Taptee and Godavery and situated in the province of Khandesh. At Bussy's advice this was granted, since it was deemed wiser to cede this outlying portion than to risk a war. This occurred at the end of the year 1752.

At this time, as has been briefly noticed, Chanda Saheb had been captured and killed at Trichinopoly, and in his place Dupleix had been nominated by the Nizam as the Nawab of the Deccan. The appointment was, however, more or less a nominal one. The English army was still in the field, and their protégé, Mahomed Ali, was recognized as Nawab over a large portion of the Deccan. There was still occasional fighting with varying results, but on the whole the ascendancy appeared to be passing away from the French. Moreover, Dupleix's period of office was drawing to a close. Peace had been proclaimed between France and England, and the French authorities, instead of being grateful to Dupleix for the enormous results which he had obtained, were getting

alarmed at the growth of his sphere of influence, and were about to make a change of policy.

In Hyderabad, also, a change of feeling had taken place. Although the Nizam was still as warmly attached to Bussy as ever, his power and influence were regarded with jealousy by many of the noblemen at his court. Amongst these was the Dewan Syed Lashkar. This noble had been appointed a year previously at Bussy's recommendation, who believed that he was his friend and supporter; in reality, however, he was determined, if possible, to get rid of the French, and was on the side of the mother of Nizam Ali, whom he hoped some day to raise to the Deccan throne. But whilst Bussy was present his personal influence was sufficient to put an end to all intrigues and so the Dewan had to wait for a better opportunity. This opportunity was not slow in coming. Soon after the conclusion of the peace with the Mahrattas, Bussy fell ill, and leaving his second in command at Hyderabad, whither Bussy had come together with the Nizam from Aurungabad early in the year 1753, he himself went for a change of air to Masulipatam, about 150 miles distant, on the eastern coast. This was Syed Lashkar's opportunity.

One of the principal reasons why Bussy had been able to maintain the discipline of his troops at so high a standard was that he never allowed their pay to fall into arrears. His personal influence with the Nizam was so great that he was always able to draw regular supplies from the treasury, whilst the greater portion of the irregular army of the Nizam was often left for months in arrears. No sooner was Bussy's back turned than Syed Lashkar began to raise difficulties in the matter. Remittances only came very irregularly and at last, pretending friendship, he told the commandant Goupil that he was

very sorry that there was no money in the treasury, and recommended that he should send bodies of troops into the districts in order to collect the revenue. In this way not only was the force scattered over the distant parts of the country, but the restraint of discipline was relaxed, and from time to time outrages were committed which were made use of to prejudice the Nizam against the French. But Syed Lashkar was not contented with this. He first of all induced the Nizam to move from Hyderabad to Aurungabad, leaving the main body of the French at the former city and taking only a small escort with a junior officer in command of the latter. At the same time the Dewan commenced a correspondence with Mr. Saunders, the Governor of Madras, in which he engaged to get Bussy and the French troops sent back to Pondicherry. Malleson gives an extract from one of the letters in which the Syed says : " Have no fear of the result ; for I have arranged the mode in which to rid myself of your enemies. The plan is in action and with the assistance of Providence the result will be what you wish. I expect to be with you at the end of the rains and to arrange then everything in a satisfactory manner."

In the meantime, the Dewan continued his policy with the French in Hyderabad and the districts. They were kept without money or supplies, and separated from each other they naturally fell into a state of despondency. Matters were rapidly coming to a crisis, and would probably have ended in a mutiny if suddenly Bussy had not appeared on the scene. When the condition of affairs in Hyderabad was reported to him, he saw at once how serious it was, and, although not yet entirely recovered, he resolved to return at once. He was also informed of Syed Lashkar's correspondence with the English ; for the letter, from which the above extract is taken, had

fallen into the hands of French agents. This news was at the same time sent to Dupleix at Pondicherry, and he at once wrote to Bussy begging him, even at the risk of his health, at once to return to Hyderabad in order to set matters right. Bussy saw that there was no time to be lost and sent orders that the whole of his force should assemble at Hyderabad, and himself started off to meet them and arrived at Hyderabad in May. His presence soon effected a change and the Government of the city, overawed by the threatening aspect of the troops, paid up some of the arrears due and furnished supplies. Bussy, however, was not satisfied with this, and resolved to go at once with the whole of his force to Aurungabad and there demand an explanation from the Dewan in presence of the Nizam. Although it was the middle of the hot weather, the long march of nearly 300 miles was performed in two months, a rate of progress which in those days was considered almost incredible. Syed Lashkar now became thoroughly alarmed and sent out messages to Bussy that he would act in every way in accordance with his wishes and, if he liked, would resign the Dewanship. This, however, was a step which Bussy did not like to take, but he took care to let the Syed know what his wishes were and told him that if he should assist him in carrying them out he would not interfere as regards the Dewanship. Syed Lashkar accordingly met Bussy outside Aurungabad and conducted him and his force to the presence of the Nizam who received them most cordially. In the negotiations that followed Bussy insisted that unless a proper guarantee were given for the punctual payment of his force, it would be impossible for him to maintain it in a state of efficiency. He, therefore, asked that the East Coast Districts should be given to him as Jaghirs, from the revenue of which he

undertook to pay the force himself. These districts, since known as the Northern Circars in the Madras Presidency, were for the greater part semi-independent Zemindarees extending over a sea-coast length of nearly 500 miles from Chicacole to Masulipatam. They were under the Nizam and were governed by his Deputy at Raj Mundry. Bussy now proposed to take the Governor's place, not as a tributary to the Nizam, but on account of the French Government, and in return to maintain the French contingent. This arrangement was an entirely new departure from any arrangement which as yet had been made between a native and European Power. Hitherto, the English and the French had been content with small coast-settlements to which were attached a few towns and villages, which were made use of for trading purposes. Now for the first time the French were made the practical rulers of a province the tribute from which amounted to 40 lakhs of rupees every year. The country itself was divided into numerous Jaghirs and Zemindarees, all of which were quasi-independent in the hands of Hindu Rajahs such as Vijayanagaram, Bobbili, Jaipur, etc. These had hitherto regarded the Nizam as their overlord and paid him tribute. Under the new arrangement the overlordship and the tribute were transferred to the French, and Bussy's position at the Nizam's court was almost that of an independent ally. But the intrigues against the French power did not cease. Syed Lashkar endeavoured to persuade the Nizam that Bussy, having obtained all he could get from him, would now intrigue to place one of his brothers Basalut Jung or Nizam Ali on the throne, in order to obtain fresh grants as a reward. He accordingly advised the Nizam to place these two princes in confinement, thinking that Bussy would probably interfere on their behalf. This was done, but Bussy was far too

clever to fall into the trap, although several of the noblemen tried to persuade him to do so. He said that the Nizam's family affairs were no concern of his; all that he had to do was to defend the prince against his enemies and leave him to settle his own private affairs. Thereupon, Syed Lashkar, disgusted at having again failed, sent in his resignation and was succeeded by Shah Nawaz Khan, a nobleman of high character and position, believed by Bussy to be attached to French interests (*Malleison*.)

Opportunity was taken at the same time to remove the French in India from office. All the adherents of the fallen Minister were replaced by others professing devotion to the French, but in reality being against them.

In the Deccan, therefore, for the time, everything in the middle of 1753 seemed to be in favour of the French. Bussy's influence was stronger than ever, and the Nizam regarded him as his principal protector against the intrigues of his brothers and his noblemen. In the Carnatic, however, the French influence received at this very time a most severe blow. The French directors, alarmed at the ever increasing circle of Dupleix's influence, had resolved to alter the French policy in Southern India, and with this object in view had sent out M. Godehen to replace Dupleix. This took place in August, 1753, and in October of the same year Dupleix left India disgraced and ruined in fortune. Although there was upwards of a crore of rupees due to him by his own Government and others in India, he received not a rupee, and died a few years afterwards in poverty. This was the unhappy fate of one of the most brilliant and daring Europeans who ever came to India. He had laid the foundations of a new empire for his country, and in

return he received nothing but ingratitude. The seed he had sown, however, was not thrown away ; for his rivals, the English, as we shall see, stepped in and reaped the harvest.



CHAPTER IV

BUSSY IN THE DECCAN AND THE DECLINE OF FRENCH INFLUENCE

WITH the fall of Dupleix and the change in the policy of the French in the Carnatic, there was a corresponding fall in their prestige. Chanda Saheb, whom the Nizam had recognised Nawab of the Carnatic, nominated by the Nizam to succeed him, was gone, and the new French Governor seemed to have no inclination to interfere in the politics of the various rival states. Mahomed Ali, the protégé of the English, was now universally acknowledged as the ruler of the Carnatic, and was therefore practically an independent rival of the Nizam, who by tradition was his overlord, but who in fact did not recognize him. But Mahomed Ali had to pay a price for his advancement. The Mysoreans had greatly helped towards his final victory, and Hyder Ali, who was then the leading chief of the Mysore army, utilized the position to increase his own power and influence, until, later on, he was able to depose the Hindu Rajah and make himself the independent ruler of Mysore. In this way two vassal states were detached from the rule of the Nizam, whose sphere of influence was confined entirely to the

Deccan, where, however, it was challenged by the yearly increasing power of the Mahrattas.

But whatever losses the French prestige may have suffered in the further south of India, ample compensation was obtained by the increase of their influence in Hyderabad and the Deccan. The possession of the extensive seaboard districts gave them, not only increased opportunities for trade, but also enormous prestige. But this prestige also brought with it the penalty of jealousy. The new French system of small but highly disciplined and equipped armies was entirely opposed to the traditions of the old nobility, whose enormous revenues were granted for the nominal upkeep of large forces, in the constitution and equipment of which quantity was more regarded than quality. Bows and arrows, spears and javelins were the principal weapons, and their victories were gained chiefly by numbers. If the new system of small but highly disciplined armies became general, not only would there be no occasion for their forces, but, even if they undertook to raise similar troops, smaller jaghirs would probably be required for their maintenance. In addition, a number of the nobles were jealous of Bussy's influence over the Nizam, and secretly wished to remove Salabut Jung and place his brother, Nizam Ali, on the *musnud*. The minister himself, although openly he pretended that Bussy was his friend and patron, was secretly working against him and Shah Nawaz Khan—for this was the minister's name—was in reality only waiting for Bussy to turn his back and absent himself in his newly granted province to put himself at the head of the conspirators. It was just at this time that Dupleix was recalled to France, and his successor, Godehen, agreed to recognize the English nominee as Nawab of the Carnatic. After a short visit

to the coast, Bussy returned to Hyderabad in January, 1755, and found that his enemies had not been idle in trying to prejudice the Nizam's mind against the French as allies. At the Durbar which was held on his arrival, Bussy explained the terms of the new treaty arrived at between the French and the English. Malleson thus describes the interview :

"The Subadar (Nizam), instructed beforehand by his advisers, inveighed bitterly against the new policy that had been inaugurated at Pondicherry. 'Your Sovereign,' said he, 'promised to support me against my enemies to establish my authority and to make it respected. Of this you yourself have given me assurances on which I have always depended. Yet now I hear that it is the King of England who especially concerns himself with the affairs of India, even with those that affect me.' Bussy endeavoured to put the best possible gloss upon the proceedings of Godehen. The Subadar and the Minister heard him but without being convinced. They were indignant that the fate of the Carnatic should have been settled without reference to the Subadar, its liege lord. 'You have put me,' said Salabut Jung, 'in the balance against Mahomed Ali; you have allowed to be placed at the head of one of my tributary provinces a man whom I have never employed and who has always rebelled against my authority. Nay, if I were to proceed to the Carnatic to drive him out of it, the English would support him; and you, on account of this truce, would hold back. You, who are engaged to support me on all occasions, would aid me neither against the English nor against Mahomed Ali.' He then went on to say, 'You know that the state of my affairs necessarily demands the support of a European power; on this condition I am able

to govern. Either you must remain here or I must enlist the English in my interest. Are you disposed to render me the services which you have rendered hitherto? I must do you the justice to say that I am grateful for them, but it would appear now that you have neither the power nor the inclination.' "

This is a very important conversation to remember, for it shows in how critical a state were Salabut Jung's affairs. With rivals in his own family and disaffection amongst his nobles, he was surrounded on all sides by enemies. The Mahrattas were yearly increasing in influence, and were stealing every inch of territory that they could lay hands on. In Mysore, Hyder Ali was rising to power, and was casting jealous eyes upon the Nizam's districts of Bellary and Cuddapah. Further south Mahomed Ali was his avowed enemy, and ready to take any advantage offered. Salabut Jung was therefore in a position of great danger, and feared that if forsaken by the French he would be attacked by all his enemies at once. For the present, however, Bussy was able to show that he had no intention of forsaking the Nizam, but on the contrary was able to give him active and useful support. The Nizam, as Subadar of the Deccan, was supposed to exercise authority, not only over the Carnatic, but also over Mysore, which was nominally bound to pay him the tribute as the representative of the Emperor of Delhi. This tribute was seldom paid and only when the Nizam was strong enough to compel its payment. Salabut Jung now determined to make use of his French troops to levy this tribute, and the opportunity was a good one, since the greater part of the Mysore army was employed at Trichinopoly. The only difficulty was that the French were on terms of alliance

with Mysore, so that Bussy had no right to take up arms against them. Bussy was therefore in an awkward position ; for, if he refused to help the Nizam, the latter's suspicions regarding him would be confirmed. He, therefore, wrote to the Mysore Dalwai or Minister and advised him to pay and in the meantime set out with Salabut Jung at the head of his 500 Frenchmen. Bussy marched with such despatch that the Rajah was unable to get any reinforcements, and, as the Mahrattas took the opportunity of threatening an invasion of Mysore from the west, he was only too glad to comply with the Nizam's demand. He paid seventeen lakhs of rupees in cash and jewels, and gave bills for thirty-eight lakhs more, whereupon the Nizam with Bussy returned to Hyderabad. For the moment, Bussy's influence over Salabut Jung was greater than ever, but at the same time the opposition against him increased. It was not long before an opportunity occurred of which Bussy's enemies took advantage. In February, 1756, the Nizam, having made peace with the Mahrattas, resolved to subdue the Nawab of Savanur, who, it will be remembered, had been one of the three leading Nawabs who brought about the assassination of Nasir Jung and the death of Muzafer Jung. Since the last event, the Nawab had been in open rebellion against the Nizam, who now resolved to reduce him to order. In this expedition the Nizam was helped by the Mahrattas, who were following out designs of their own and wished by helping the Nizam to prevent any attack on their recent conquest of Gooty. Morari Row was also playing a double game, and, recognizing the importance of the French contingent as a support to the Nizam's army, wished to attract Bussy to himself. The Nawab of Savanur, seeing that resistance was useless, at once came to terms. The Nizam left the negotiations to

Bussy, and there seems little doubt that he utilized his position to gain advantages for the French to the detriment of the Nizam. Savanur was in possession of a bond given to him by Dupleix for his services in the revolutions to which Nasir Jung had fallen a victim. Bussy, on behalf of his own nation, wished to have this bond cancelled, and in order to gain this end gave the Nawab favourable conditions, in which the Mahrattas also shared. This transaction could not remain long secret, and the minister, Shah Nawaz Jung, at once represented to the Nizam that his interests had been betrayed by his French general for his own private interests. Salabut Jung yielded to the advice of his minister and signed an order dismissing Bussy from his service. It seems difficult to defend Bussy in this matter, and there can be little doubt that in order to get back the bond he sacrificed the Nizam's interests and gave better terms to the Savanur chief and the Mahrattas than he otherwise would have done, although it does not appear that in the transaction he was in any way actuated by personal motive.

The minister, Shah Nawaz Jung, at once took steps to crush Bussy entirely. He wrote to the Madras Governor asking him to send up an English force, and to the Peshwas he suggested that Bussy should be assassinated (*Malleon*, p. 485). Bussy was in a very critical position. His communication with Pondicherry was cut off by the Carnatic. He had only a small force with him, and he was far away in the Gooty country from his supports on the eastern coast. His only communication with the Circars on the coast was through Hyderabad, which, under the circumstances, must be considered hostile country, since he was a disgraced and dismissed man. Bussy was quite equal to the occasion ;

as soon as he received his order of dismissal he at once started back via Hyderabad for Masulipatam. Shah Nawaz sent off a body of troops to intercept him, but the Mahratta general, who wished to gain Bussy over to himself, sent an escort of Mahratta cavalry to protect him. This enabled Bussy to cross the Krishtna river, just before a flood came down, which detained the Nizam's troops and enabled him to reach Hyderabad some fifteen days before they did. The Mahratta overtures Bussy refused. He dismissed the escort that was sent to protect him, with presents and compliments but said that he still regarded the Nizam as his master and should proceed to Hyderabad to await his further orders.

Arrived at Hyderabad Bussy established himself and his force which consisted of 200 European cavalry and 5,000 sepoy, on the north side of the River Musi, in an old palace known as Char Mahal,* and sent off an urgent message to Masulipatam for reinforcements. The flooded condition of the rivers delayed for several days the approach of the Nizam's army. When at last the main body appeared, Bussy had to undergo a regular siege. His sepoy gradually deserted him, and he was left with his Europeans only.

Bussy's appeal for help had been promptly attended to, and M. Law was despatched from Masulipatam with 160 Europeans, 700 sepoy and 5 guns on the 16th July, 1756, and his force was strengthened on the way by further reinforcements. Until within 15 miles of Hyderabad the relieving force met with little or no opposition, but here, on arriving at some hilly and difficult country, they found a large portion of the

* This must not be confused with the Chow Mahal where the Nizam now resides. This palace is in the city and the quarters occupied by Bussy were separated from the city by the River Musi.

Nizam's army together with 6,000 Mahratta horse, drawn up to meet them. Law was on the eve of giving up the attempt, but Bussy sent him an urgent order "in the name of the King," to push on at all hazards. This was done, and after three days of hard fighting, in which, however, the Mahrattas, who were secretly desirous of gaining the services of Bussy for themselves, took but little part, he managed to reach Haiatnagar, about six miles from Hyderabad. Here he was joined by a small force, and then marched into Bussy's camp in the Char Mahal. The minister, Shah Nawaz Khan, now saw that Bussy was master of the situation, and at once sent proposals for an amicable arrangement. Bussy's sole conditions, beyond the punishment of two of the principal deserters, were that he should be reinstated in his honours and dignities, and should, as hitherto, be regarded as the officer next in authority to the Nizam. This was agreed to, and on the 20th August, after having been besieged for nearly six weeks by the whole of the Nizam's army, Bussy was received in public Durbar and reinstated by the Nizam in all his titles, dignities and honours.

This incident is not only a remarkable instance of Bussy's marvellous courage and personal influence, but also serves as a striking proof of the great value of a small but highly disciplined force when opposed by large numbers, badly disciplined and badly armed. It was a lesson which the Mahrattas learnt, and henceforward we shall find them organizing similar forces themselves, and, as they were unable to detach Bussy from his allegiance to the Nizam, they looked round for others to take his place.

Bussy remained for three months and a half at Hyderabad, and then, on the 16th November, marched to Masuli-

patam with about 100 Europeans and 400 sepoy, in order to re-establish his authority, which had been considerably weakened by the occurrences at Hyderabad. This he did without difficulty, and during a stay of about nine months succeeded in capturing all the English settlements on that coast, and in establishing friendly relations with all the large Zemindars and Rajahs. There was, however, one exception, viz., the young Maharajah of Vizianagaram. The late Rajah had been very friendly with the French, and when Bussy was supposed to be in extremities in Hyderabad, and on the verge of ruin, had actually sent him a large supply of money.

When Bussy came to the coast in 1757, the Rajah persuaded him to accompany him in an expedition against his hereditary enemy, the Rajah of Bobbili, whose fort was captured, and he with almost the whole of his family and retainers were massacred. A day or two afterwards the Rajah of Vizianagaram was himself assassinated, and his son succeeded him. Bussy was himself disgusted at all this barbarous slaughter, and made some disparaging remarks to the young Rajah regarding his father's cruelty, which caused very great offence. The Rajah said nothing at the time, but the incident rankled in his mind, and subsequently led to important results.*

In the meantime, Bussy's long absence on the East Coast had left his enemies in Hyderabad leisure to revive their intrigues. Shah Nawaz Khan persuaded the Nizam to appoint one brother Nizam Ali to the government of Berar, and the other brother Basalut Jung to Bellary. He also managed to obtain possession of the

* My authority for this statement, which is not alluded to by other historians, is a monograph drawn up by the late Maharajah Ananda Gajpati Raj and given to me by him in 1895.

strong fort of Dowlatabad, where was the treasure of Syed Lashkar, the late minister, who had just died. His object was to confine Salabut Jung in Dowlatabad and proclaim Nizam Ali minister, and then to expel Bussy and the French from the Deccan. To help him in the conspiracy he did not hesitate to invite the Mahrattas, who, always ready to take a share in any quarrel out of which there was a chance of getting substantial profit, sent an army under the Peshwa's son, Wiswas Row, which took up a position not far from Dowlatabad. Shah Nawaz Khan now called Nizam Ali to Aurungabad, and invested him with the administrative work of the kingdom, while the other brother Basalut Jung was appointed keeper of the Great Seal. The whole of the power was now in the hands of the two brothers, and the real Nizam, Salabut Jung, was a mere puppet. It is probable that his life would have been sacrificed if it had not been for his faithful escort of 200 French soldiers, whom Bussy had left behind as his body-guard. As soon as Bussy heard of the critical position of the Nizam he resolved to come to his aid. Aurungabad was over 500 miles from Rajamundry, but Bussy, with 500 European infantry, 200 cavalry, 500 sepoy and 10 field pieces, managed to cover this distance in 21 days, or an average of nearly 20 miles a day. When he arrived at Aurungabad, he found himself in the midst of four armies gathered together like birds of prey. There were Nizam Ali from Berar, the Nizam's army of which Nizam Ali had assumed the command, Basalut Jung, with an army from Adoni, and finally the Mahrattas under Balajee Row who, as Orme remarks, had come as usual to take advantage of the confusions of the Government! Bussy's first step was to secure the safety of the Nizam's person, and, in order to do so effectually, surrounded him with

his Frenchmen. He then entered into negotiations with Nizam Ali and the minister Shah Nawaz Khan, employing for this purpose his most confidential Mahomedan Captain, Hyder Jung; whilst these negotiations were proceeding, Bussy, by a clever surprise, succeeded in seizing the fort of Dowlatabad, having been admitted by the Killedar, or Governor, together with 300 Europeans. This fort, together with the treasure of the late minister, Syed Lashkar Khan, had, it will be remembered, on the latter's death, been seized by Shah Nawaz Khan. In order to prevent the latter from resenting this bold act, at the same time as the fort was seized, a party of Bussy's force surrounded Shah Nawaz Khan's tents and took him prisoner.

Nizam Ali now found all his plans disconcerted by Bussy's bold action, but pretended that it was a matter of indifference to him who was in possession of Dowlatabad, and gave out that he would leave for Hyderabad, of which he had been appointed governor. On the day of his departure Nizam Ali held a large Durbar, at which Hyder Jung, who was Bussy's most confidential man, was present. After the Durbar had been dismissed, Hyder Jung was detained for a private interview, and, as he was rising to take leave, was assassinated by two of Nizam Ali's officers. This deed at once led to a great uproar; Bussy immediately placed all his troops under arms, and drew them up in order of battle; at the same time he despatched a strong body of horse to escort the Nizam, Salabut Jung, from Roza, whither he had gone to visit his father's tomb, and another to bring in Shah Nawaz Khan. The latter was found surrounded by armed followers, and some fighting took place in which Shah Nawaz Khan and one of his sons were killed. Nizam Ali was now so alarmed that he quitted the camp,

and followed by a small body of his best horse rode off in the direction of Burhanpor, a distance of 150 miles, which he is said to have accomplished in 26 hours.

On the following day Salabut Jung returned from Roza and found the conspiracy broken, owing to Bussy's promptitude, who had thus once again saved him from dethronement and probably from death. At first Salabut Jung wished to follow and punish Nizam Ali, but Bussy persuaded him that it would be safer to avoid a civil war and return to Hyderabad. This accordingly was done, and the Nizam accompanied by Bussy arrived at Hyderabad on the 15th July, 1758.

Here they were met by news which was destined to alter the whole condition of affairs, but to understand which it will be necessary to go back a little in the course of our history.

In the previous year, war had broken out between the French and the English, and the former determined to use every endeavour to regain their old influence in the Carnatic, and if possible to drive the English out of Southern India. Clive was then in Calcutta, and was busy in settling the affairs of Bengal after his victory at Plassey in the previous year, and it was not expected that he would be able to send any assistance to Madras. Accordingly large reinforcements were sent out to Pondicherry, together with a new Governor, Count Lally, who was ordered to concentrate the whole of his strength upon the capture of Madras. Lally arrived in Pondicherry early in May, 1758, and at once sent a letter to Bussy, warning him that he would soon be recalled. This letter reached Bussy on his march from Aurungabad to Hyderabad, and he took his precautions without telling the Nizam the real reasons. As soon as he had crossed the river Gaunga and had left the main body

of the army on the other side, he called a halt, and, saying that he could not march any further until he had been joined by the detachment of 150 Europeans and 400 sepoy whom he had left at Dowlatabad, he sent express orders to this body of troops to join him at once. On their arrival the march was continued, and therefore when the army arrived at Hyderabad Bussy had the whole of his force with him ready for any emergency. Here he found a letter from Lally ordering him to march at once with the whole of his force, leaving only sufficient for the defence of the coast settlements, and to join Lally immediately by way of Masulipatam.

It will not be difficult to understand the dismay and the disappointment with which Nizam Salabut Jung received this news. He had come to regard Bussy with his French army as his only help and saviour. He was surrounded by enemies, conspiracies and intrigues, and he knew that his own brother Nizam Ali was only waiting for an opportunity to make another attempt for his throne. But Bussy's orders were peremptory, and he could only obey. Before Bussy left, Nizam held a large Durbar, at which he embraced Bussy with every show of affection and grief; he called him the Guardian Angel of his life and fortune, and foreboded the unhappy fate to which he would be exposed by his departure. (*Orme*, Book IX.) This foreboding was unfortunately destined to prove true, as we shall see hereafter, and though Bussy promised that he would return, when the Nizam said good-bye to him, he did so for ever. Bussy never again set foot in the Deccan, and left the country where for nearly seven years he had enjoyed a series of victories and successes for another scene where the fortunes of war had reserved for him nothing but defeat and disgrace. The whole of the French forces left with Bussy

and Salabut Jung was left alone to face as best as he could the plots and intrigues by which he was surrounded. The French influence in the Deccan was thus broken, never to be revived except for a short period 30 years later. The door was now open for a new influence, that of the English, and we shall see how they availed themselves of the opportunity.



CHAPTER V

THE RISE OF BRITISH INFLUENCE IN HYDERABAD



THE coming struggle between the French and the English for supremacy in the Deccan was watched by all the Native States with the utmost interest. As soon as it was known on the East Coast that the greater part of the French troops were to be withdrawn from the Deccan and the Circars, there was a feeling of unrest. In particular, the Rajah of Vizianagaram, who had never forgiven the affront put by Bussy on his father's memory, as related in the last chapter, resolved to strike a blow. Raja Anandaraj—for this was his name—at once wrote to Calcutta and stated that the French were about to

be withdrawn, and, if Clive would send down to Vizagapatam a body of troops, he would assist with his own forces and would guarantee that the French would be cleared out of the Circars. These letters reached Calcutta in August and were at once laid before the Council. In the opinion of the majority of the Council the despatch of such an expedition would be very hazardous. Matters were by no means settled in Bengal, and the attitude of the new Subadar Meer Jaffer was not such as to inspire much confidence. A really effective army could not safely be spared, and, if it could be, the majority was of opinion that it would be better to send it to Madras. Clive, however, was of different opinion and thought that an invasion of the Circars would compel the French to divert a large portion of their army from the siege of Madras, and would thus indirectly help the garrison. Accordingly Clive resolved to accept Anandaraj's proposal, and without delay despatched an expedition under Lieutenant-Colonel Forde. This force consisted of 500 Europeans, 200 sepoys, six field-pieces, six 24-pounders, a howitzer, and an 8-inch mortar. The expedition left Calcutta towards the end of the September and reached Vizagapatam on the 20th October. As soon as Anandaraj knew that it would start, he attacked the fort of Vizagapatam, which had formerly belonged to the English, but which was then in possession of the French, reduced it without difficulty, and then handed it back to the English, whilst he with his army encamped at Cossimkota, a small fort five miles inland. On the 1st November, Colonel Forde moved off from Vizagapatam and joined the Rajah and, after some days' delay spent in arranging the terms of alliance, the two armies moved on towards Rajamundry, distant about 130 miles. Forty miles from this town the combined armies came in sight of the

French under M. Conflans, who were strongly encamped near the village of Condoor. The two forces were of about equal numerical strength, though the French had the greater number of guns. Here a battle was fought in which the French were completely beaten and fled in disorder, not halting until they had crossed the Godavery, after which they proceeded more leisurely until they reached Masulipatam. Forde was not able to follow them at once, for a disagreement had arisen between him and the Rajah, which took some time to settle. It was the 6th of February before the combined armies reached Ellore, some 50 miles from Masulipatam, and it was not until 3rd March that Colonel Forde was able to invest Masulipatam. In the meantime, after his defeat at Condoor, M. Conflans, the French commander, had despatched a letter to the Nizam Salabut Jung begging him to come to his assistance. This Salabut Jung did, and together with his brother, Basalut Jung, marched with an army of 35,000 men to Bezwada, where he arrived about the same time as Colonel Forde commenced the siege of Masulipatam. With this force threatening him, Colonel Forde pushed on the siege as quickly as possible and with such success that on the 4th April, after nine days' hard fighting, the town had to capitulate. It is a remarkable fact that the prisoners taken in this brilliant feat of arms exceeded the number of the assailants.

Too much importance cannot be attached to these two events, the battle of Condoor and the taking of Masulipatam. The latter particularly was the crowning blow to French influence on the Coramandel Coast. Nor did it occur a day too soon. The French, alarmed at this unexpected invasion from Calcutta, had detached a body of troops from Madras, and no doubt this weaken-

ing of their main body was one of the causes which had led to Lally being compelled to abandon the siege of Madras, which he had done on the 17th February. This body of troops was ready to co-operate with the Nizam's army, and, had they been able to join hands, Colonel Forde would have been in a position of great danger. But after the fall of Masulipatam the British were masters of the position and Salabut Jung was ready to come to terms with them, for news had reached him that, taking advantage of his absence, his brother, Nizam Ali, was endeavouring to bring about a rising in Hyderabad. There can be no doubt that Nizam Ali was encouraged to take this step by letters he had received from Calcutta and from Colonel Forde; for both Clive and the latter officer hoped that, by creating a disturbance in his capital, Salabut Jung would be prevented from taking any active part on behalf of the French. This, in fact, turned out to be the case. Salabut Jung, anxious to return, was only too willing to treat with the English and the result was that a treaty was drawn up in which the French alliance was finally relinquished. This treaty is dated the 14th May, 1759, and under it the Nizam ceded to the English the whole of the Circar of Masulipatam, together with eight districts, as well as the Circar of Nizamapatam and two other districts as an inam, or free gift, together with the *sanads* which had been given to the French. The Nizam further undertook to drive the French out of the Deccan within 15 days and to compel them to retire to the south of the river Krishtna and in future never to allow them to have a settlement in his country nor to retain them in his service or give them any assistance. The Rajah of Vizianagaram was to continue to pay tribute to the Nizam, but was not to be called upon for any arrears. Both parties to the treaty agreed

that they would not assist the enemies of the other, nor give them protection of any kind. This therefore was the first occasion on which the Nizam of Hyderabad was brought into direct relations with the English, and it is worthy of remark that in return for his concession the Nizam himself received little or nothing. The English were now placed in the same position as that which the French had, and became the possessors of the line of coast extending 80 miles from north to south, and stretching some 20 miles inland, with a revenue of 40 lakhs of rupees, in return for which they were not even bound to assist the Nizam with any permanent army. These terms show clearly how great the moral effect of the successes of Colonel Forde, and of the English in Madras, had been, and how urgent was the necessity of the Nizam to return to Hyderabad. With the loss of his French troops Salabut Jung was deprived of the only protection from his enemies. On his return to Hyderabad he found that his brother, Nizam Ali, was so strong that he could resist him no longer. He had to accept him as his Minister or Dewan and dismiss his brother, Basalut Jung, to his government at Adoni. All real power passed into the hands of Nizam Ali, who at last threw off all further disguise and in 1761 deposed Salabut Jung and threw him into prison, where he soon afterwards died.

During the interval between the treaty between Salabut Jung and Colonel Forde, and the assumption of the *musnud* by Nizam Ali just alluded to, the remaining brother, Basalut Jung, finding himself deprived of all power and influence at the Court of Hyderabad, had from his jaghir of Adoni entered into negotiations with the French with the object of creating for himself, assisted by them, an independent kingdom in the Carnatic. Basalut Jung's object was to add the districts of

Circar and Cuddapah to his own adjacent jaghirs of Adoni and Guntoor, since he saw that Salabut Jung, deprived of Bussy's help, would be unable to hold his own, and forseeing that Nizam Ali would inevitably, sooner or later, assume the Subadarship, he hoped in the meantime to make himself independent. Accordingly he marched into the Cuddapah country, and there he was joined by Bussy. This alarmed Nizam Ali, who feared that Bussy would return to Hyderabad and regain an ascendancy over Salabut Jung, which would effectually destroy his schemes. He accordingly became profuse in his offers to Basalut Jung of an increase of territory if he would return to his jaghir (*Wilks*, Vol. I, Chapter 3.)

Basalut Jung was joined by Bussy in Cuddapah. He disclosed to him his plans, which were that he should be recognized as Nawab of the whole of the Carnatic or districts south of the Krishtna and Tungabudra rivers. These negotiations, however, fell through, and the difficulties in which the French Governor Lally now found himself by the march of the British upon Pondicherry compelled Bussy to join his chief. A detachment of sepoys under the command of French officers was, however, left with Basalut Jung, who for the present had to keep his ambitious projects in abeyance, projects indeed which the subsequent victory of the English rendered impossible of accomplishment. But Nizam Ali in order to carry out his own designs found it advisable to come to terms with Basalut Jung, who was accordingly left in possession of Guntoor, the south position of Cuddapah, and his own jaghirs of Adoni, which comprised a large portion of the present district of Bellary.

After Nizam Ali had succeeded in carrying out his designs Basalut Jung passes out of any further share in

Hyderabad affairs. He continued unmolested in his jaghirs, where he enjoyed a kind of semi-independence, assisted still by a French contingent, until his death, when the contingent was passed into the service of Nizam Ali, in spite of British protests that this was a breach of treaties—the Nizam's excuse being that he had stipulated not to employ French troops, but that there was no stipulation against his employing natives officered by Frenchmen. This contingent formed the nucleus of the celebrated contingent raised subsequently by Raymond, of which we shall hear hereafter.

In the meantime the struggle between the French and the English for supremacy had come to an end. Disaster followed disaster to the French arms. After the decisive battle of Wandiwash (21st January, 1760) the English gradually reduced the various forts in the Carnatic and pressed the French back to Pondicherry, which they besieged, and, after a siege of four months, captured on the 17th January, 1761. Lally, Bussy and the other French officers, together with some 2,500 men were all taken prisoners and sent to Europe and the French influence, which for some time had threatened to overshadow the whole of Southern India, was for ever broken. It is true that, when peace was proclaimed between England and France, 1763, Pondicherry was restored, but, though fifteen years later the French made another final attempt to regain power, their influence as a nation ceased for ever. Individuals, as we shall see later on, achieved for themselves power and influence, but France was no longer a power to be reckoned with, and the eyes of all South India were now directed towards the English, who in so marvellous a manner had taken the place of her rivals.

In 1765 Lord Clive returned to India, and on his way

stopped at Madras. Here he pointed out to the authorities the importance of securing the whole of the coast-line of the Circars, and it was resolved to apply to the Emperor at Delhi for a *sunnad* for these districts. It will be remembered that under Forde's treaty with the Nizam only Masulipatam and some of the districts were given to the English as *inam*; for the remainder the Rajah of Vizayanagaram had to pay tribute to the Nizam who was still nominally the sovereign. Clive now desired to obtain a grant to the English of the whole of this portion of the country and accordingly, without any reference to the Nizam, applied to and obtained from the Emperor a *sunnad* which freed the Circars from the Nizam and bestowed them upon the British (1766). At the same time General Calliaud was despatched with a large force to take possession of these provinces, which he did without any difficulty being raised by the various Rajahs and Zemindars.

It may be imagined that the news of this new step excited Nizam Ali's rage and indignation. Although the Nizams invariably acknowledged the Emperor as their sovereign, and obtained his signature to their *sunnads* of appointment, it was most unusual for a *sunnad* to be granted by the Emperor direct to a stranger for districts which were under their immediate jurisdiction and which had hitherto paid tribute to them as the representatives of the Emperor. When he received the news Nizam Ali was engaged with the Mahrattas on the western frontier, but he at once returned with his army to Hyderabad, and declared that he would avenge himself for the usurpation, as he deemed it, of so important a part of his territories by an invasion of the Carnatic. The Governor of Madras was not then prepared to embark upon

another war, and accordingly General Calliaud was directed to go to Hyderabad and if possible to settle the matter amicably with the Nizam. This was done, and on the 17th November a treaty was signed between Calliaud and the Nizam. This important document commences thus: "A treaty of perpetual honour, favour, alliance and attachment between the great Nawab, high in station, famous as the Sun, Nawab Asaf Jah Nizam-ul-Mulk, &c., &c., and the Honourable East India Company." Under this treaty the two contracting parties solemnly engaged themselves to mutual assistance and to esteem the enemies of one the enemies of the other and contrariwise the friends of one the friends of the other. In return for the "gracious favours received from His Highness" consisting of the sunnads of the five circars as a free gift, the British undertook to maintain a body of troops to settle the affairs of His Highness's Government and only to withdraw the same in the event of the peace of the Carnatic being threatened, and that only after timely notice to His Highness. As a consideration for this free gift the Company undertook to pay for Rajamundry, Ellore and Mustafanagar five lakhs of rupees yearly, and for Chicacole and Mustafanagar, when obtained, two lakhs each, or a total of nine lakhs. Chicacole was to be taken possession of at once, but Mustafanagar, or Guntoor, was to remain in possession of the Nizam's brother, Basalut Jung, unless he or his agents should create any disturbances, in which case the Company was authorized to take possession at once. The nine lakhs referred to were to be used for the payment of the troops which the Company engaged to maintain, and the Company was to account to the Nizam for any balance if the expense should fall short of that sum, but must them-

selves bear any excess. These troops, however, were to be maintained only when required by the Nizam, and when not required the payment as fixed above was to be made annually in three instalments. The Nizam promised to give three months' notice when he required the troops, and, on his part, promised to assist the Company with his own troops, reserving to himself the same right of withdrawal on necessity occurring. These were the principal points of the treaty, which concluded with a declaration that in future all doubts and suspicions should cease between the respective parties and in their room a perpetual, just and sincere confidence should be established.

No sooner was this treaty concluded than the Nizam called upon the British to furnish assistance in reducing the fort of Bangalore. This was done, but Hyder Ali, who was then the actual ruler of Mysore, took the opportunity of the Nizam's presence to persuade him to throw over the English alliance and to join him in an invasion of the Carnatic. It is difficult to understand why so soon after the signing of the treaty the Nizam should have consented to break it, for the English had carried out their conditions, and there was apparently no reason for the breach. However this may be, the English force was dismissed, and the Nizam joined forces with Hyder Ali and invaded the Carnatic in two columns. A battle was fought near Trinomaly in which Hyder was beaten and compelled to retire, after which the Nizam separated from his new ally and withdrew to the neighbourhood of Caveripatam, but 40 miles west of Madras. Here ambassadors from Madras were received and the Nizam declared himself willing to enter into a new alliance with the English and the Nawab of the Carnatic, Mahomed Ali, who now for the first time was recognized by the

Nizam. This treaty was signed by the Nizam upon the 26th February, 1768, or 22nd Shawal 1181 Hijri.

This new treaty confirmed the provisions of the former treaty but went considerably further and commences by reciting the grants given by the Emperor to the British, in consequence of which the Nizam confirmed the grant of the five Circars with the exception of Murtuzanagar, which was to be held by Basalut Jung until his death, and agreed to write orders to the various Rajahs and Zemindars to recognize the English Company as their sovereign in future. The terms of payment were reduced to two lakhs (with one more as soon as the Circar of Condavir should be handed over) for the next six years, after which, if they had been left in undisturbed possession by the Nizam, the Company should pay five lakhs, or seven if Condavir was in their possession, such payment to cease if either the Nizam, or, at his instigation, the Mahrattas should attack the Circars. The stipulation about mutually furnishing assistance with troops is specially omitted in this treaty as likely to give rise to "misunderstandings," and it is simply provided that the enemies of either shall be regarded as the enemies of the other (the Nizam and the Nawab) and the friends of either as the friends of all. They all three agreed to give no assistance to any invaders, and the Company and the Nawab promised to send to the Nizam two battalions of sepoy and six guns whenever he should require them and circumstances would permit, to be maintained at the Nizam's cost as long as they should be in his service. The treaty goes on to provide for the recognition of Mahomed Ali as Nawab of the Carnatic, and releases him from all tribute in consideration of payment of five lakhs of rupees. It finally concludes by declaring "Hyder Naik" to be a

rebel and a traitor, and bestows the territories held by him in the Carnatic Balaghat on the English, who, on coming into possession of them, agreed to get a *sunnad* for them from the Emperor and pay to the Nizam seven lakhs of rupees annually. This latter clause was something like the hunters dividing the lion's skin before he was shot, for a good many years were to elapse before the British were able to obtain the possession now bestowed upon them. On obtaining these districts the English also agreed to pay the *chouth* for them, which up to that time had been paid to the Mahrattas. *Chouth*, as explained in a former chapter, was a species of blackmail levied by the Mahrattas in all districts over which they could gain any influence. It consisted of 25 per cent. of the revenue, and if this was not paid the Mahrattas sent a force to harry and raid the district in question, so that it was only by regular payment of this tax that the villagers could count upon safety from ravage or plunder. In return, however, the Mahrattas agreed to protect such districts from any other robbers. This claim for *chouth* had been recognized early in the century when, as we have seen, Syed Hussein had been appointed Subadar of the Deccan, and from that time the claim had been asserted by the Mahrattas whenever they could do so. It was originally a kind of tax for nominal police protection. A further account of the origin of this claim will be found in Chapter VII. On the whole the terms of the treaty were much less favourable to the Nizam than those of General Calliaud. Not only did he recognize the validity of the Emperor's *sunnaads* of which no mention was made in the former treaty, but the payments were greatly reduced and finally he was made to recognize Mahomed Ali as the independent ruler of the Carnatic. It is therefore only

fair to assume that the advantages gained by the British in the short war with Hyder Ali had been very considerable, and that the Nizam bitterly repented ever having yielded to the temptation to break the former alliance. At all events the Nizam never again showed the slightest wish to sever his connection with the English, and from that time forward the two countries have remained in a state of perpetual friendship and alliance, the bonds of which, as we shall see, were in the course of time drawn still more closely together.



CHAPTER VI

THE BRITISH RESIDENT AND THE FIRST MYSORE WAR



THE circumstances that led to the appointment of the first British Resident to Hyderabad are interesting and important. It will be remembered that one of the circars, Murtuzanagar—or as it is now called Guntur—was to be reserved for Basalut Jung during his

lifetime. In 1779, Hyder Ali sent an army to reduce Cuddapah, which for some years had been tributary to Mysore.

This alarmed the Madras authorities, since they feared that Hyder would prove to be a dangerous neighbour. They were besides dissatisfied with the way in which Basalut Jung had behaved, for he had retained a body of French troops in his service, and, in spite of protest and representation made through the Nizam as far back as 1776, he had not dismissed them. Accor-

dingly the Madras Government opened out negotiations with Basalut Jung direct, without first communicating with the Nizam, and the result was that Basalut Jung executed a treaty (January, 1779) under which he agreed to dismiss the French from his service and to cede the district of Guntoor on condition of a fixed annual payment. The amount of this payment was not settled, but it was agreed that it should be the same as the Nawab then received. It was further agreed that, if the Nawab required protection, the Madras authorities would send him the troops, the cost of which would be deducted from the Jaghir rents. As soon as this had been arranged, a body of troops was sent in April, under Colonel Harper, to take possession of the district and to protect the person of Basalut Jung. The manner in which this march was conducted was extremely foolish. After reaching Guntoor, Basalut Jung asked that the troops should join him at Adoni, of which he was Governor, and accordingly they marched through the Cud-dapah district, which then belonged to Hyder, without first asking for permission. Hyder's officers refused to allow them to pass, and Colonel Harper had to retire with the best grace he could. This thoughtless conduct, however, was quite sufficient to enrage Hyder, and there can be no doubt that it was one of the many causes that led to his next desperate struggle with the British power.

Hyder Ali, however, was not the only person who was offended with the arrangement about Guntoor. Soon after concluding the treaty with Basalut Jung, the Madras Government resolved to send an officer to the Nizam's court in order to sound him regarding his relations to other Indian powers and also to the French. The first Resident selected was a Mr. Holland, who arrived at

Hyderabad on the 6th April, 1779, or about the same time as Harper arrived at Guntoor. Mr. Holland was received with every mark of respect and courtesy, but, when he had to explain the transactions which had taken place between the Madras Government and the Nizam's brother, Basalut Jung, he found that his Highness was extremely indignant. He said, and quite truly, that the treaty with Basalut Jung, his subject, was most improper and uncalled for; that the sending of troops to Guntoor, a portion of his dominions, was, without his permission, a breach of the treaty of 1768; and, if the troops were not stopped, he would be compelled to oppose them. Probably the real reason why the Nizam was jealous of a body of English troops being attached to the person of his brother, was that he feared lest, aided by them, his brother should endeavour to assert his independence. As regards the French troops whom Basalut Jung had dismissed, they had been taken on by the Nizam, in order, as he explained, to prevent them from passing into the service of Hyder Ali or of the Mahrattas. There can be no doubt that the Nizam was justified in being indignant at the manner in which he had been treated, and this indignation was still further increased when Mr. Holland presented to him a request from the Madras Government that the tribute of five lakhs of rupees, which was already two years in arrears, should be remitted altogether. This unjustifiable proposal threw the Nizam into a state of extreme agitation and he declared his conviction that the English no longer meant to observe the treaty; for which reason he must prepare for war. But it is the boast of the English Government that, though individuals may commit wrong and injustice, the Government itself will see that justice is done, and this is what happened in the present case. Mr. Holland had

been authorized to communicate with the Supreme Council in Calcutta, and accordingly he sent copies of all the correspondence which had passed between the Madras Government and the Nizam.

The Supreme Council at once recognized the mistakes and injustice committed by the Government of Madras, and wrote a letter to the Nizam reassuring him of the pacific intentions of the Company; they ordered Mr. Holland to suspend further negotiations till he should receive fresh instructions from his own Presidency, and at the same time wrote to the Government of Madras, pointing out the mistakes that had been committed. (1st November, 1779.) The Nizam expressed himself as completely satisfied by the friendly assurances of the Supreme Council, but the Madras Government accepted the rebuke in a very different spirit. Sir Thomas Rumbold who was then the Governor of Madras (father of another Rumbold who had afterwards a good deal to do with Hyderabad), drew up a minute in which he denied the right of the Supreme Council to interfere and attacked that body in respect of its own policy in the conduct of the Mahratta war. This minute was forwarded to Bengal, together with a resolution of the Government couched in the same strain, and at the same time an order was sent recalling Mr. Holland. The Supreme Council now determined to assert its authority. The whole matter was reported to the directors in London, and in the meantime Sir George Eyre Coote was sent to Madras with orders to suspend Sir Thomas Rumbold, and, as the Madras Government had suspended Mr. Holland, the Supreme Council appointed him as their representative at the Nizam's court. It only remains to mention that the decision of the Supreme Council was confirmed by the Board of Directors. Sir Thomas Rumbold and two

members of Council were dismissed from their service, two other members were deprived of their seats, and the Commander of the Forces, Sir Hector Munro, was severely reprimanded. (*Mill*, II, 471.) From this time the authority of the Madras Government over the affairs of the Hyderabad ceased, and the Resident continued to be appointed by the Supreme Government in Calcutta, with whom he was placed in direct communication, a custom which continues to the present day.

For the present, therefore, the affair of the District of Guntoor was satisfactorily settled, but it was destined to lead to still further correspondence and negotiations. In 1782 Basalut Jung died, and, according to the treaty, the Guntoor District should have been handed over to the Company. This, however, was not done, and in return the Madras Government withheld the *Peshkash* due on the other four Circars. At this time the whole of Southern India was in a very disturbed state. Hyder Ali had also died in 1782, and was succeeded by his son, Tippoo, who at once embarked upon a career of conquest. He attacked and annexed districts on the western coast, and then put in a claim for Bijapur against the Nizam. As a consequence a junction was formed between the Hyderabad and Mahratta armies, and it was expected that the British would join their alliance in order to put a check to Tippoo's ambition. The English, however, had made a treaty of peace with Tippoo after he had taken Mangalore (1786), and Lord Cornwallis, who was then Governor-General, let it be known that he did not intend to commence fresh hostilities. A peace, therefore, was patched up between the different rival powers, and Lord Cornwallis resolved to take advantage of this to press the Company's claims to Guntoor. Accordingly, Captain Kennaway was despatched as Resident at Hyderabad

to conduct the negotiations. Mr. Briggs in his work, *The Nizam*, makes the following remarks regarding the position: "The situation of the Nizam was such that he regarded himself as having more to hope and less to apprehend from a connection with the English than with either of the four Powers which bordered upon the dominions. Generally inferior to either the Mahrattas or Tippoo, he was ever in dread of being swallowed up by one of those formidable neighbours. An alliance with one of those Powers threatened hostility with the other." An alliance with the English, therefore, was more likely to bring safety as not being likely to cause these two, with so many conflicting interests, to combine against him. Captain Kennaway therefore arrived at Hyderabad at the time when the Nizam was inclined to listen to his proposals in regard to the cession of Guntoor, and, without discussing any other points which were reserved, he at once consented to hand over the District (1788). At the same time Meer Abdul Kassim, more generally known as Meer Allum, was sent to Calcutta with a letter to the Governor-General, couched in friendly language, in which, after urging the settlement of certain pecuniary claims, it was suggested that a new treaty of offence and defence should be formed between the Nizam and the British. The pecuniary claims were easily settled, with the result that a balance of nine lakhs of rupees, which were found to be due to the Nizam, were paid to him. Lord Cornwallis, however, was not equally disposed to enter into a treaty, and he replied that he had no power to do so without the permission of Parliament, but he wrote to the Nizam a letter which he said should have the force of a treaty (July, 1789), in which certain articles of the treaty of 1768 were modified or explained. This letter was afterwards confirmed by

Parliament and declared to have the same force as a treaty. The chief points in this letter are : (1) a definition of the force to be supplied to the Nizam. It was agreed that two battalions, each of 800 sepoy, commanded and officered by Europeans, with six guns, should be supplied to the Nizam at his cost, *whenever he should apply for their services*, thus modifying the words in the former treaty, "if the condition of the affairs of the Company should allow it," but it was stipulated that these troops should not be used against certain Powers then in alliance with the Company, namely, the Marhatta States, the Nawab of the Carnatic, and the Rajahs of Tanjore and Travancore. (2) It will be remembered that in the treaty of 1768 a stipulation was made about taking certain districts in the Carnatic Balaghaut from Mysore, for which tribute should be paid to the Nizam. Abdul Kassim had been instructed to point out that this stipulation had never been carried out, and to urge the advisability of its being put into effect. Lord Cornwallis, however, replied that circumstances had altered since 1768, and that we were then at peace with Mysore, but promised that, if in future the Company should come into possession of those districts, the terms of the treaty of 1768 should be strictly carried out. It is significant that, although the Company was then at peace with Tippoo, that king's name was not mentioned as one of those against whom troops supplied to the Nizam should not be used. The reason of this appears to have been that Lord Cornwallis thoroughly distrusted Tippoo's intentions, a suspicion which, as was shown by subsequent events, was amply justified. At the same time as these negotiations were being carried on at Calcutta the Nizam appears to have sounded Tippoo in respect to an alliance. This statement is on the authority of Colonel Wilks, who


also states that negotiations were broken off because Tippoo added as a condition a matrimonial connection between the two families. Tippoo's father, Hyder Ali though of a respectable family, had begun life as a common soldier, and his nickname of "Naik" shows the estimation in which he was held. It was not likely, therefore, that the Nizam with his long line of descent from the Prophet would agree to such a condition, and so the negotiations by whomsoever commenced were abruptly broken off, much to Tippoo's disgust. The probabilities in fact would seem to point to the overtures having been made, in the first place, by Tippoo and not by the Nizam. One Hafizjee had been the ambassador at Seringapatam on this occasion, and, as Tippoo attributed to him the subsequent failure of his overtures, he became the special object of the tyrant's hatred. The negotiations at Calcutta were successfully terminated in 1788, and in the following year (December 24th, 1789) Tippoo made an unprovoked attack upon the British ally, the Rajah of Travancore. This led to war being declared by the British, and the contingency provided for by the treaty of 1788 having occurred, the Nizam and the Mahrattas were both called upon to furnish contingents. This they did, and the Nizam promised to provide a body of cavalry of not less than 10,000, to be maintained at the cost of the Company. It was agreed that all country conquered from Tippoo should be equally divided between the three contracting parties, and, should eventually Tippoo attack or molest any one or other of the contracting parties, the others should join to punish him in such manner as might be afterwards settled. Both the Mahrattas and the Nizam fulfilled their part of the agreement and sent bodies of troops to act on the Mahratta and Hyderabad frontiers of My-

sore. The Mahrattas were assisted by a body of British troops under Captain Little, and the Nizam by two battalions of Madras troops with six guns. The chief command of the army against Tippoo was taken over by Lord Cornwallis, the Governor-General, and the campaign did not come to a close until 1792, when Tippoo had to agree to the terms of peace dictated by the allies. In the final operations before Seringapatam the Nizam and the Mahrattas each sent a body of ten thousand horse to assist the main army. The Nizam's troops were accompanied by his son Sekunder Jah and by Meer Allum, both of whom took a prominent part in the final negotiations. There was also a detachment of the French contingent raised by Raymond numbering 150 men and commanded by Raymond himself. It is not necessary here to go into the details of the campaign which are fully given in the works of Wilks and Grant Duff, but one incident may be mentioned as it forms a sequel to the marriage proposal just mentioned. During the march to Seringapatam the Nizam's contingent passed through his old possession of Cuddapah, and on its way proceeded to recover the different forts. One of the principal of these was Gurramkonda, a hill fort of great strength about 30 miles from the present Mysore frontier. The lower fort was taken by a British force under Captain Reed, who then went on to join the main army, leaving Hafizjee with a sufficient force to continue the siege of the upper fort. This command, however, he did not long retain. As soon as Tippoo heard of the fall of this important fortress, he despatched an army of 12,000 men under his own son, Futteh Hyder, then about 18 years old, assisted by Ghazi Khan and Ali Reza. This army succeeded in surprising Hafizjee, who was then taken prisoner; the lower fort was evacuated

by the Nizam's troops and the upper fort was relieved. The unfortunate Hafizjee had fallen into bad hands. Futteh Hyder was the young prince for whom Tippoo had desired a Hyderabad bride, and Ali Reza was fully aware of Hafizjee's share in the transaction and of Tippoo's hatred towards him. In order to please his master he practised upon his prisoner the most cruel insults. He was stripped naked, and, after being taunted and mocked, was at last put to death, whilst at the same time a French officer in the Nizam's service was assassinated. On hearing of this disaster the whole of the Nizam's army marched back and recovered the lower fort, though the upper fort held out till the close of the war. (*Cud-dapah Manual*, p. 102.) It is not our object to describe the details of this campaign. The Prince Sekunder Jah assisted by Meer Allum distinguished himself and was especially mentioned by Lord Cornwallis. Tippoo was defeated and was compelled to cede a large portion of his territory, and this was divided between the allies, each of whom received districts yielding about 40 lakhs. The British received the Salem Baramahl and Coimbatore districts to the south of Mysore, the Nizam obtained the Gurramkonda, Gooty and the Doab districts, which had been overrun by Hyder Ali, and the Mahrattas received extensive territory in Bijapur and Dharwar. The result, therefore, of the campaign was satisfactory and profitable to the Nizam, not only in prestige and the accession of valuable territory, which although it had belonged to him formerly, had been taken by Hyder, but also in the weakening of the power of this dangerous rival Tippoo. These incidents occurred during the years 1791 and 1792.

CHAPTER VII

THE NIZAM AND THE MAHRATTAS



URING the course of our narrative up to this point the Mahrattas have been frequently alluded to, and it now seems necessary to explain in more detail their relations with the State of Hyderabad. It will not be necessary to trace the rapid growth of this strange nation, which, in the course of a hundred years, grew to such enormous power that at one time it seemed as if the whole of the Indian Empire would be under its sway. The story of Sivajee, the "mountain rat" as he is often called by the Mahomedan historians, is a most romantic one, but can find no place here. His son, Sambajee, that "vile dog" as the Emperor Aurangzebe called him, met with a tragical end, being flayed to death by the Emperor's orders, but, although the last 20 years of Aurangzebe's life were devoted to the task of crushing the Mahrattas, he failed in his attempts, and at his death in 1707 they were stronger than ever. As a matter of fact it was this

20 years' campaign that was one of the principal causes of the rapid rise of the Mahrattas. After Aurangzebe had conquered the two last Mohamedan kingdoms of the Deccan, Bijapur and Golconda, he remained in the country moving from place to place with his vast army and leaving everywhere ruin and desolation behind him. The governors whom he left in charge of the conquered provinces had their hands more than full in preserving order in the districts surrounding the capitals. As soon as the grand army left one position in the country and moved to another, it was followed by the hordes of the light Mahratta horse, who, avoiding anything like a pitched battle, continually harassed the flanks and the rearguard, and, as soon as the army had moved to any distance, occupied the district it had left, and commenced levying tribute from the unfortunate villagers, or, if this were refused, harrying, devastating them with fire and sword. Whenever the villagers agreed to these exactions the Mahrattas installed a collecting officer, who often worked side by side with the Mogalai official. In this way gradually a custom grew up for the Mahrattas to levy their tribute, which they called *chout* and *surdeshmuckee*, sometimes one, sometimes the other, and sometimes both, over a great part of the Deccan, and over territory which belonged to the Imperial provinces. As a *quid pro quo* they professed to protect the villagers from aggression on the part of anyone else. In this way they created a kind of "sphere of influence" as it is now termed, and a claim of this kind once enforced was never afterwards relinquished. Even if it fell into abeyance owing to temporary disasters, as after the battle of Panipat, it was sure to be subsequently put forward with a claim of arrears when the Peshwa felt himself strong enough. In this way there was

always an open question between the Imperial governors and the Mahrattas, and, when subsequently the Nizam made himself independent, between them and the Nizam.

In the meantime, whilst Aurangzebe was occupied in the Deccan, the large tract of country between the Nerbudda and Delhi, occupied by the great province of Malwa, was left unprotected. Thither some of the predatory Mahratta chiefs went, followed by their depredating armies, creating each for himself a separate sphere of influence though still professing allegiance to their sovereign at Sattara, and afterwards to his deputy at Poona. This was the origin of Scindia, Holkar, Baroda and the Bhonslah Rajahs of Nagpur, or, as they are generally called in history, the Rajahs of Berar. But these Mahratta chiefs, although they were occupied in extending their respective spheres of influence north of the Nerbudda, always retained a strong affection for, and interest in the villages from which their ancestors had come, and where their relatives resided. These villages they generally managed to acquire by grant or by purchase, and so, whilst exercising their chief power at a considerable distance, they managed to get, and to keep with the utmost jealousy, jaghirs and villages situated in the south, some of which were actually in the Nizam's territory. In the provinces to the north of the Nerbudda, their chiefs did not always exercise an actual sovereignty for the country was full of semi-independent chiefs and Rajahs, really vassals of Delhi. Some of the country the Mahrattas succeeded in annexing entirely, and this was then called *Suraj* or *Swaraj*, as for instance, Oojjaein, Gwalior, Indoor, Baroda and Nagpur, with their surrounding districts; whilst the semi-independent Rajahs were made to pay *chouth*, *surdeshmucki*,

and other exactions, to the extent sometimes of 65 per cent. of the revenue. In the wars that followed, the Mahrattas were at liberty to pursue their dreams of conquest, which were to convert India into a Hindu Raj. The 14 years of interregnum in the Deccan served to consolidate their power, and, when Asaf Jah made himself independent, the Mahrattas were the only enemies he had to dread. The descendants of Sivajee still maintained the royal title and style. Their residence was at Sattara, but in course of time they had become mere puppets in the hands of their ministers, the Peshwas, who ruled at Poona. Further away, other Mahratta noblemen had conquered for themselves independent kingdoms. Scindia, Holkar, and the Gaekwar at Baroda were among the most powerful of these, and they, together with the Mahratta Rajah of Nagpur, surrounded the Hyderabad State on the north, the west and the south-western frontiers. Scindia especially was the most ambitious and powerful amongst these princes, although he, together with the rest, nominally accepted the overrule of the Peishwas at Poona. Whilst Asaf Jah was Nizam of Hyderabad, he was continually at war with one or other of these princes, and in these wars he was not always successful in arms, although he was more than a match for them in diplomacy. During the disturbances that followed Asaf Jah's death, the Mahrattas increased their power and levied *chouth* over almost all the western portions of the Nizam's dominions. And, as regards the Princes of Malwa, Scindia succeeded in asserting his supremacy over all the districts north of the Tapti. We have seen how, soon after his arrival, Bussy was sent against the Mahrattas, and succeeded in defeating them with his small but well-disciplined army. We have also seen how they were waiting near Aurungabad

to take advantage of the quarrel between the Nizam Salabut Jung and his brother Nizam Ali; but were prevented from interfering actively, although, in the negotiations that followed, the Nizam had to concede several of his outlying districts in Khandesh, thus giving the Mahrattas a continuous run of territory all along the western boundry of Hyderabad right up to the dominions of Scindia and Holkar. It has also been narrated how, soon after Bussy's withdrawal from Hyderabad, Nizam Ali, who was acting as Dewan, usurped his brother Salabut Jung's power and confined him in the State prison of Bider, where he soon afterwards died. This was in 1761. In the previous year, whilst Salabut Jung was still on the throne, and Nizam Ali was acting as his minister and commander-in-chief, the Nizam had suffered a severe defeat at the hands of the Mahrattas at Udgir about 150 miles from the western boundary at Ahmednagar, and had been compelled to cede the greater portion of the district of Bijapur, in the south-western portion of his dominions. This portion passed into the possession of the Mahrattas, who further exacted a claim of *chouth* over the neighbouring districts of Hungund, lying to the south of the river Krishtna, and between it and the Tungabhra. On the 7th January, 1761, occurred the third great battle at Panipat, in which for the time the power of the Mahrattas was almost entirely crushed by the Afghan Abdali, who came forward as the champion of the Emperor. Taking advantage of this disaster, Nizam Ali, who, as narrated above, had deposed Salabut Jung soon after the defeat of Udgir, thought that an opportunity had come for recovering from the Mahrattas some of the territory which had been taken away. Accordingly he marched with an army to the neighbourhood of Poona,

which, the main army being away in the north of India, was not able to offer any resistance. The city was sacked, and many of the houses which did not pay a ransom were pulled down. The remnants of the Mahratta army were on their return, and, hearing of the invasion, took advantage of Nizam Ali's absence and laid siege to Aurungabad, where, however, they were repulsed. They then marched to Hyderabad, where also they were defeated, and had to retire, although not without levying a considerable amount of blackmail. (1763.) Neither party seems to have gained any great advantage in these operations, but there can be no doubt that the plunder of Poona greatly irritated the Mahrattas, who for that time were resolved to take ample revenge at the earliest opportunity. The Mahrattas continued in this unsettled state for some years, and, as the British were allies of both the Nizam and the Peshwa, they were often placed in a very awkward and dubious position. As the Mahrattas recovered from the defeat they suffered at Panipat, their power and influence again increased, whilst that of the Nizam appeared to be on the decline. But a new power was then growing in South India, that of Mysore, and for some time the attention of the Mahrattas was fully taken up with the ambitious schemes of Hyder Ali, who had designs equally upon them and the Nizam. We have seen how, in 1768, after first joining Hyder Ali, Nizam Ali concluded a treaty with the British, and how, from that time forward, the alliance between the two Powers was gradually and continually strengthened. The common enemy of both was Hyder Ali, and after him his son Tippoo Sultan.

At the time of Kennaway's (afterwards Sir John Kennaway) visit to Hyderabad as Resident, and of the negotiations with regard to an alliance previous to the

Mysore War, which has been mentioned in the last chapter, the only Powers in South India, from whom danger was to be expected, were Tippoo Sultan and the Mahrattas, and of these, owing to his violent and passionate character, Tippoo was the most to be feared, at all events from the English point of view. The Nizam's power had been greatly reduced from what it had been at the time of Asaf Jah's death. He had entirely lost the Carnatic. On the east coast, the northern circars, Guntoor and Masulipatam, had passed into the hands of the British. Hyder had conquered, and Tippoo was in possession of the districts of Bellary, Gurramkonda, Cuddapah (Kurpa), and asserted a claim to Kurnool, whilst the Mahrattas were asserting their claim to *chouth* and levying it, when they could, over the whole of the Mahrattawari Provinces. In Berar a large portion had been actually annexed by the Bhonsla Rajah of Nagpur, and in the remainder there was a kind of double administration known as the *do-amil*, in which the Nagpur officials levied 60 per cent. of the revenue as *chouth* and *surdeshmookhee*, side by side with the Nizam's officers, who had to be content with the balance. So predominant was the influence of the Bhonsla Rajah in his province that he is generally spoken of in official documents as the Berar Rajah. Scindia and Holkar both held outlying districts in the Nizam's territory near the Ajunta Hills and Jalna, and the Peishwa held tracts of country stretching right up to the Godavery and the fort of Dowlatabad, whilst his horsemen harried all the neighbouring districts which did not protect themselves by paying *chouth*.

The Nizam dared not make an alliance with either Tippoo or the Mahrattas for fear of attracting the hostility of the other. He was himself too weak to with-

stand the arms of either, and was therefore compelled to fall back upon the protection of the British. Hence it was that he was only too ready to enter into negotiations with Kennaway. But the British on the other hand, though willing to combine against Tippoo, were by no means anxious to excite the hostility of the Mahrattas, who were at that time equally their allies as well as the Nizam. Therefore it was that, in the treaty with Kennaway, the Mahrattas, equally with the Kings of Travancore and Tanjore, were excluded as powers against whom the British should not be liable to fight. As long as Tippoo was the common enemy, this arrangement worked very well, but after he had been conquered in 1792, and the danger averted, at all events for a time, the difficulty again arose. The Mahrattas again pressed their claims against the Nizam for arrears of *chouth*, and Nizam Ali appealed to the British for protection. But the British urged with justice that they had no more right to side with the Nizam against the Mahrattas than they would be justified in taking the part of the Mahrattas against the Nizam. It is true that they were bound to give the Nizam support, but not against their own allies to whom they were equally bound by treaty. It must be remembered that the condition of affairs at the end of the seventeenth century was very different from what it is now. The British power was not then strong enough to oppose in South India the combined power of the Mahrattas princes, especially as in such a case the latter would probably be helped by Tippoo, who, though beaten in the last war, was still formidable. Accordingly, the Governor-General declined to interfere, and, as neither the Mahrattas nor the Nizam would give way, after some time spent in useless negotiations, war became inevitable. At this time the Nizam had in his service a

body of well-disciplined troops, commanded by Monsieur Raymond and other French officers, and upon these, in addition to his own regular army, he had to rely in the coming struggle. It will be as well here to give a short sketch of Raymond, who was a remarkable man, and, though not so fortunate in his career as Bussy, is, next to him, the most important Frenchman who had any connection with Hyderabad, and one whose memory is still, after more than a hundred years, held in high esteem.

Michel Joachim Marie Raymond* came out to India at the age of 20 in 1775. His father was a merchant and sent him with a consignment of goods to Pondicherry. After having sold these at a profit, the young man resolved on a career of adventure and entered the service of Hyder Ali as a sub-lieutenant in a corps commanded by Chevalier de Lasse. With this corps he fought against the British in the campaign of Trinimoly, and afterwards, when Bussy came out to India for the second time, in March, 1783, he joined this distinguished veteran. But Bussy was not then the same man that he had been thirty years before. He was in poor health, had grown very stout and had no longer the energy of his younger days. When Bussy died at Pondicherry in 1785 (January), Raymond went to seek employment in the Deccan. He did not at once come to Hyderabad, but joined the French corps under Basalut Jung at Guntoor, which, as we have seen, became the subject of correspondence with the British Government. After five years, Basalut Jung was compelled to dismiss this corps, which was at once taken over by the Nizam. It would at first appear as if this act was a breach of the

* For these notes on Raymond's career I am indebted to Colonel Malleon's interesting little book, "Foreign Adventure in India."

former treaties, under which the Nizam had promised not to entertain a corps of Frenchmen in his service. This difficulty was got over by the Nizam contending that the promise did not refer to native battalions officered by Frenchmen or foreigners. To this construction of the treaty the British Government were obliged to consent, although with great reluctance, and with the frequently expressed displeasure of the Madras Government. Raymond was placed at the head of this force, which, with the large European element at his disposal, he was able to bring to a considerable state of efficiency. It was divided into regiments, and in the year 1795 consisted of 15,000 men formed into twenty battalions and officered by 124 Europeans. These troops were regularly paid from the revenues of certain districts near Bider, which were assigned to Raymond's management for this purpose. The corps was made self-sustaining in every respect and possessed storehouses, workshops, arsenals, gun foundries and powder mills. The ruins of the old gun foundry still form a conspicuous object on a piece of waste ground nearly opposite the Fatteh Maidan in Chudderghaut. Malleson thus sums up Raymond's character: "No adventurer in India ever stood higher than he did. He was brave, magnificent, generous, affable and vigilant. To great abilities he united the most consummate prudence. The one dream of his life was to carry out by the means still open to him the schemes of Dupleix, of Lally, and of Suffrin. He deserves to be ranked with those illustrious warriors in the hierarchy of patriotic Frenchmen." It was, therefore, upon Raymond's force that the Nizam principally depended in the approaching struggle with the Mahrattas.

Whilst angry correspondence was passing between

Hyderabad and Poona, Mahodajee Scindia died on the 12th February, 1794. He was by far the most powerful and ambitious of the Mahratta princes, and, indeed, overawed the Peshwa himself. The intrigues and disturbances which followed his death were still further increased by the sudden death of the young Peshwa, and the Nizam considered that this was the opportunity to declare war. This declaration on the part of the Nizam rendered it still more impossible for the British to lend him the active support of their forces, and all that the Resident, Captain Kirkpatrick, could do was to allow the two battalions of British troops to preserve the internal peace of the dominions whilst the army was engaged in the campaign.

Accordingly early in 1795 both armies took the field. The Nizam's forces consisted of 70,000 irregular infantry, 25,000 regular troops under Raymond, including his own battalion of about 11,000, and a due proportion of artillery. To meet this army the Peshwa summoned all his vassal princes. Daulat Row Scindia sent a portion of De Boigne's army under his second-in-command, Perron, numbering 25,000; Raghojee Bhonsla of Nagpur, 15,000; Holkar, 10,000; and Parasaram Bhow, 7,000. Other contingents increased the total number to 130,000, and there were besides 10,000 Pindaries. The greatest strength of the Peishwa's army consisted of the brigades commanded and disciplined like Raymond's force, which had been sent by De Boigne, of whose career further notice will be found hereafter. These consisted of about 18,000 men commanded by European officers, together with a similar brigade of 4,500 brought by Holkar and commanded by Dudrence and Major Boyd. There was, therefore, the strange spectacle of French officers fighting on both sides, in some instances aided also by English

private adventurers. The Residents at both the courts also accompanied the armies. Sir C. Malet was with the Peshwa and Captain Kirkpatrick with the Nizam. The latter was often placed in a very awkward position. Fraser ("Our Faithful Ally," p. 13) describes the difficulties in which he found himself: "The Nizam made several attempts to elicit from Captain Kirkpatrick his opinion in regard to the disposition he had made of his forces, the Resident always replying that his inexperience in tactics totally disqualified him for judging of such matters. As an illustration of the adroitness with which these questions were put and the prudence required in answering them, Captain Kirkpatrick was one day invited by his Highness to one of his tents on the pretence of viewing the river Manjerah from a remarkably favourable point. Here he found the minister, Azimul Omrah, who led on the discourse until, in the most natural manner, he commenced describing the several passes by which the army might descend from Balaghaut. So talking, he by and by asked the opinion of Captain Kirkpatrick as to which of these routes he thought the most eligible. Instead of directly replying to this question, the Resident, addressing himself to the Nizam, appealed to his candour whether he could with the smallest propriety, considering the friendship subsisting between the Company and the Peshwa, offer any opinion on so delicate a subject. The minister then demanded what was to prevent Captain Kirkpatrick, and observed that the privacy of his present audience had been purposely arranged to guard against the disclosure of his advice. Captain Kirkpatrick, still addressing himself to the Nizam personally, demanded in his turn what His Highness would expect from W. C. Malet were the Peishwa to consult with him respecting the best mode of attacking

the army of Hyderabad. 'I know,' interrupted Azim-ul-Umrah, that the answer of Sir Charles Malet would be the same that you have so often given me; he would advise a speedy adjustment of all subsisting differences as absolutely necessary to the welfare of both sides.' 'And this,' said Captain Kirkpatrick, 'is the only reply it is now possible for me to give to the question which has been put to me.' " With this the interview terminated. The two armies met midway between the forts of Parenda and Khurdla, near the river Manjera. According to Briggs, it was almost entirely a skirmish, ending in some night firing, a panic, and the flight of the Nizam's troops. Malleon, however, goes into much greater detail in his account of the life of Perron, and the following description is taken from that writer (*Foreign Adventurers*, p. 197): " The battle began by an advance of the Mahomedans on the right wing and centre of the Mahrattas. The attack completely succeeded. The Mahratta right wing was driven on to its centre, at the same time as the centre itself was completely broken by the steady advance of Raymond's drilled troops. These divisions fled in confusion carrying Dudrence's and Boyd's men with them and endeavouring to seek a refuge behind the still unbroken left. Towards this left, covered and supported by a cavalry flushed with victory, Raymond now advanced. Perron allowed him to approach almost within musket shot and then suddenly opened a concentrated and continuous fire from the thirty-five guns, loaded with grape, which he had placed on the eminence. At the same time, Raghojee Bhonsla resisted the Mahomedan cavalry with a shower of rockets, the materials for firing which he had obtained on the ground during the general fight of the right wing. This simultaneous discharge sent the Moghal cavalry

to the right-about. Raymond's infantry, however, not only stood firm, but succeeded for a time in making a successful opposition to all the efforts of Perron. It is difficult to say how the battle would have ended had Nizam Ali been endowed with the most ordinary qualities of a leader. But, like most Asiatic commanders, he trusted only to his horsemen; when these fled, he fled with them, sending order after order to Raymond to follow him. Meanwhile, the Mahratta horse, rallying, were hastening to support Perron. Raymond then most unwillingly was forced to follow his master. He did so, however, in the most perfect order, prepared to renew the fight on the next day." An accident, however, occurred during the night which converted the orderly retreat into a panic. Towards the middle of the night a small patrol of Mahrattas in search of water for their horses came upon a party of the Nizam's troops near a stream. Firing commenced, in which Raymond's troops who were close by with loaded muskets started from their sleep and commenced firing. An alarm of a general attack was raised, and the Nizam, escaping in haste, took refuge in the small fort of Khurdla (*Grant Duff*), where he was at once surrounded by the Mahrattas, and after three days was obliged to purchase his release by complying with all the Mahrattas' demands. This is known as the "Capitulation of Khurdla," and for a time was a crushing blow to the Nizam's power. The historians who describe this battle all speak in contemptuous terms of the Nizam's courage on this occasion, but it must be remembered that he was a very old man at the time, and also infirm, having only lately recovered from a dangerous illness. He was, besides, anxious for the safety of his ladies, and these possibly were the reasons which led to his flight; for, in earlier days, the Nizam,

like all the rest of his ancestors, had been conspicuous for his courage. One thing is clear, and that is that a battle-field is not the place for ladies, and that the presence of a king of advanced age and in infirm health is calculated to be a hindrance rather than an advantage to his troops.*

Captured in this way in a trap, the Nizam had to submit to most humiliating terms. He had to yield a large slice of the western portion of his dominions, including Dowlatabad, Ahmednagar and Sholapur, with a revenue of thirty-five lakhs of rupees and an indemnity of three crores, and had also to send to the Poona court as hostage for the fulfilment of this treaty his principal minister, Azim-ul-Umrah.

One result of this unfortunate war was that the Nizam was bitterly disappointed at the want of support which he had received from the British force that were in his pay. He told the Resident that he no longer required their services, and asked him to withdraw them. This was done, and the consequence was that M. Raymond, with his French battalions, rapidly advanced in the Nizam's favour. The troops were greatly strengthened, and additional assignments of land were granted for their support. In the meantime, Azim-ul-Umra did not neglect his master's interest at Poona. Soon after the conclusion of the war (October, 1795), Mahdhoo Row, the Peishwa, died suddenly, not without a suspicion of foul play. In the intrigues which followed, Azim-ul-Umra was able

* One curious feature of the Nizam's army was that he had two regiments of women, who were called the "Zuffer Paltans" or victorious regiments. They were generally used as guards for the palace and zenana, and were regularly armed and drilled according to the French method. Briggs, writing in 1861, of the time he was at Hyderabad, as Assistant Resident, says that a few of the descendants of these female soldiers were even then in the service of Shumsul-Umra, and went through their exercise in his presence with many shouts of amusement and much laughter.

to obtain several important modifications of the terms, and soon afterwards returned to Hyderabad with increased power and influence. This, therefore, was the condition of affairs in 1795. British influence was considerably weakened, the Nizam had received a very serious reverse, and it seemed to him that, if he was to obtain any real support against the growing power of the Mahrattas he must depend upon the French troops entirely.



CHAPTER VIII

DISBANDMENT OF RAYMOND'S CONTINGENT

ONE of the results of the disastrous Kurdla campaign was that the Nizam was greatly disappointed in the support he could expect from the British alliance. His worst enemies were the Mahrattas and against them it was evident that, for the time at all events, the British, as the ally of both Powers, would give him little or no support. As regards Tippoo, the case was different.

Although the British were at peace with the Sultan, there was everything to be feared from his ambition and desire for revenge for his late losses. In order to guard against any aggression on Tippoo's part, it was absolutely necessary for the British to maintain a strong force, and any unprovoked attack on his part on any of their allies would have been the signal for a fresh war. On this side, therefore, the Nizam was comparatively safe; in fact, signs were not wanting that Tippoo would not be disinclined to make common cause with the Nizam. It was from the Mahrattas that he had most to fear. Although he had succeeded in obtaining a considerable reduction in the humiliating terms imposed after the capitulation of Khurdla, the Mahrattas had still enormous

money claims against him, which were unsettled, the interest on which grew from year to year, and which at any time might bring about a renewal of hostilities. But the Mahrattas had now a very large and constantly increasing force of well-drilled and disciplined troops, officered for the most part by Frenchmen, against which, as we have lately seen, the Nizam's irregular levies were absolutely of no service whatsoever. Unlike Falstaff's rabble they were not even fit as "food for powder," since they showed so little desire to face it. The only thing left for him to do was to strengthen his own disciplined contingent, taking advantage of the exact words of his treaty with the British that the force, though officered by French, was in reality a native force. Accordingly, as soon as this war with the Mahrattas was concluded, the Nizam dispensed with the services of the two British battalions, which, although they had served to replace troops employed at the front, had refused to take any active share in the hostilities. Coincidentally with the dismissal, he ordered a large increase to Raymond's troops and assigned fresh districts for their maintenance. It was in vain that the British Resident expostulated and intimated that so much encouragement of the French portended serious changes in his relations with the English. (*Sir John Malcolm.*) These protests were not only disregarded, but a portion of Raymond's corps was sent to occupy the districts of Cuddapah and Cum-bum, which the Nizam had obtained as his share of the Mysore spoils and which lay on the border of the Madras Presidency. At this step the Governor-General took alarm. "The measure itself," he remarked, "had a suspicious, not to say criminal appearance, and the strongest representations" were ordered "to be made to induce the Nizam to recall the detachment of Mr. Ray-

mond." In case of refusal the Resident was even instructed to threaten the Nizam with the march of a body of English troops to his frontier, and the apprehensions of the English Government were increased by the discovery that certain French officers, prisoners in Madras, were suspected of a design to join Raymond and detected in this a project to escape. (*Briggs*, Volume I, Chapter IX.) But before it became necessary to take so pronounced a step, an event occurred in Hyderabad which showed the Nizam that it was not only foreign foes that he had to fear, but that there were even more dangerous enemies in his own household.

The Nizam had now attained a very advanced age and was in infirm health. The disaster of Khurdla was, there can be no doubt, to a certain degree attributable to this fact. His condition excited a certain amount of discontent among many of the younger and excitable nobles, who felt that in the crisis that was approaching a younger and more energetic ruler should be at the head of the State. Led away by these men and prompted by his own personal feelings of ambition, on the 28th June, 1795, the Nizam's eldest son, Ali Jah, fled from the capital and took refuge in the ancient royal city of Bieder. Here he raised the standard of rebellion, and was soon joined by a number of disaffected chiefs, bringing with them considerable levies. In a very short time this rebellion assumed a formidable and dangerous appearance. A few successes followed the first outbreak which served to attract more followers, and the Prince advanced towards Aurungabad. The first act of the Nizam was to recall the two British battalions which he had so lately dismissed, in order with them to replace Raymond's force which he had at once despatched against rebels. Raymond with his well-disciplined force had no

difficulty in putting down this rebellion. At the first skirmish the Prince's hastily assembled levies broke and fled and the Prince himself escaped to Aurungabad. He was followed by Raymond and captured without any show of resistance. The Nizam at once despatched his minister to take charge of his rebellious son and bring him back to his presence. Whilst on the journey the minister ordered the Prince's elephant's *howdah* to be covered with a veil or *pardah*, as in the case when women travel. Whether the shame of this indignity was too much for him to bear, or whether he was afraid to meet his outraged father, it is impossible to say, but the fact remains that before he reached the capital the Prince Ali Jah committed suicide by taking poison.

Although this rebellion had been so easily suppressed, the Nizam was not slow to appreciate the additional security derived from the presence of the British battalions and they were accordingly retained in the capital. Their presence threw many difficulties in the way of Raymond, whose prompt action in the rebellion led to an even greater show of the Nizam's confidence. The force then consisted of about 12,000 men and was in a very high state of discipline. In spite of all obstacles, it is probable that its strength would have been still further increased and the French influence have become paramount in Hyderabad, as it already was in the leading Mahratta principalities.

The growth of the French influence amongst the Mahratta chiefs in the north of India forms one of the most interesting episodes of modern Indian history, but it is only possible here to mention the names of the leading French commanders of these subsidiary contingents. De Boigne, Perron, Dudrence, Filoz, Pedrons, Claude Martin, Bourquin, and the notorious Sumroo, are

names to which are attached a great deal of interest and romance.*

The work of these men was the last desperate attempt of the French to recover the prestige and power wielded by Dupleix, Lally, and Suffrein, and to wrest from the rival English the Empire that was drifting into their hands, which, but for the supineness and lethargy of the French Government of the middle of the eighteenth century, would most certainly have been the heritage of France. Looking back now after the lapse of more than a century, it is easy to say that the idea of the French Empire in India was bound to fail, but about the year 1795 it was as near success as possible. Malleison thus describes the position (*Final French Struggles*, Book III) : "To enable the Princes of India to meet the English successfully in the field, it was necessary above all things to impart to their troops a thorough knowledge of European discipline and a complete acquaintance with the system of European strategy. To this somewhat venturesome task the sons of France bent themselves with untiring energy. They gave to it often their lives, almost always their every faculty. They had much to aid them. The native princes who employed them knew at least that their hatred of England was not feigned ; that they had nothing so much at heart as the humiliation of the rival of their own country. They, therefore, gave them almost always a confidence without stint. Their behests were but rarely refused. They worked under the avowed sanction and with the authority of the prince whom they served. And, if they did not succeed, their want of success is to be attributed rather to the jealousies which prevented combination amongst the native princes than

* Attention may here be drawn to Campton's *European Military Adventurers of Hindustan*, published by Fisher Unwin & Co., "Adventure Series."

to any shortcomings on the part of the ablest and most influential among them." At the period therefore at which we have arrived this French influence was at its zenith. In Mysore, Tippoo had, 6,000 miles away, caught the fever of the French Revolution. He suffered the Cap of Liberty to be received in his capital—Tippoo and Liberty!—and allowed himself to be called Citizen Tippoo. He was actively enlisting under his standard as many foreign adventurers as he could obtain, and, as subsequently transpired, had sent ambassadors to the French Governor of the Isle of France with overtures of alliance and a request for help. A similar letter had been sent to Bonaparte, who was then commencing his Egyptian campaign, which it was generally supposed would be followed up by an expedition to India.

We have seen what large forces were under the Mahratta princes, commanded by De Boigne, Perron and others, and now in Hyderabad Raymond was organizing a force which was in every way equal to theirs. If there had been anything like combination it seems difficult to understand how the British would have been able to withstand it. But it almost seems as if the hand of Providence was against the French, and that when success seemed to be almost within their grasp some unforeseen thing happened to shatter their hopes. In the midst of all his plans, and at the very height of his power and success, Raymond suddenly died on the 25th March, 1798, just six months previous to a crisis which proved one of the chief turning-points in the history of British influence in Hyderabad.

Raymond was succeeded by his next in command—a Fleming named Piron. This name is in some accounts of Hyderabad confused with that of Perron, the general in the Mahratta employ. Piron was however, a very

different character, and had few of the qualities belonging to the man whose name resembled his. He had little of the tact of Raymond, and his influence over the troops under his command and over the Nizam was but very small. The Marquis of Wellesley had now arrived in India with the settled resolve to crush the power of Tipoo Sultan once for all.*

The Great Marquess, or as he was then called the Earl of Mornington, is one of the most prominent and brilliant characters in the history of the British Empire in India, over which he ruled for the next seven years. In the long voyage out he had ample time to reflect and resolve upon the policy he would pursue, and once resolved his was a masterful mind that would allow no obstacle to interfere with the attainment of the object he had in view. At the Cape of Good Hope, which was then largely used by officers on temporary sick-leave from India, he met Captain Kirkpatrick, who had come from the Hyderabad Residency to recruit his health, his place being in the meantime occupied by his brother, Captain Achilles Kirkpatrick. By him he was thoroughly posted up in the condition of affairs in the Deccan, and, in the Memorandum which the Governor-General elect drew up, his policy and the reasons for it are clearly laid down. In order the better to understand the events which were soon to follow in rapid succession, it will be as well to take a survey of the actual condition of India at the commencement of the year 1798.

* There is conclusive evidence that this was Lord Mornington's resolve before he landed; at all events, that he expressed his intention so soon after his arrival that it is impossible to suppose that his words were not the result of a deliberately formed resolve. On the 17th May, 1799, after the fall of Seringapatam, Sir Alured Clarke wrote to Lord Mornington to congratulate him on the victory, and in a postscript to the letter, says, "I remember your observations of humbling Tipoo before the anniversary of your entering upon the duties of this Government, which took place precisely this day twelve months. (*Wellesley, Despatches*, Vol. I, p. 591).

The three great native powers at this period were Tippoo Sultan, the Nizam and the Mahrattas. They, occupied the whole of the territory from the Carnatic up to Delhi, with a long line of seaboard on the western coast extending from the north of Cochin up to Guzerat, excepting the Portuguese ports and the British dependency of Bombay. On the eastern coast the provinces of Cuttack and Orissa divided the Madras Presidency from Bengal and afforded an outlet to the sea. As regards the Carnatic it was almost entirely in the hands of the British. The Nawab, Mahomed Ali, was still the nominal ruler of the former portion of the Nizam's dominions, but he resided at Madras, and, though suspected of intriguing with Tippoo, he was practically under British influence. Of these three Powers Tippoo's was the one from which most danger was to be apprehended. For the last six years he had been carefully husbanding his resources and increasing the efficiency of his army. He was known to be waiting for an opportunity to recover the territory he had lost in 1792, and he looked upon the French as his natural allies, since they were the hereditary rivals of the English. Tippoo's possessions on the western coast gave him facilities for communicating with the French at the Isle of France, and as a matter of fact some 200 volunteers had recently landed on that coast from Mauritius and had been taken into his service.

The Nizam, although greatly reduced in power from what he had been fifty years before, was still in possession of an extensive kingdom, but with every year this power was being weakened, and the result of the battle of Khurdla had been to shake his kingdom to its very foundations. It seemed inevitable that, sooner or later, if left to himself, he must fall a victim either to the ambition

of Tippoo or to the rapacity of the Mahrattas. Nizam Ali was now an old man, and, although he actually lived on for five years more, his decease was looked for daily. When that should take place a disputed succession was sure to follow and rival candidates were likely to be supported by Tippoo or by the Mahrattas. In the meantime, the growing power of the French contingent at Hyderabad was likely to prove an important factor in the coming struggle. If, as seemed likely, they should join hands with Tippoo, it was probable that they would prove irresistible and that the latter, openly joined by reinforcements of the French from Egypt, would become the predominating power in the south of the Peninsula.

The Mahrattas ruled over a more extensive territory than either of these two Princes, but their weakness lay in their mutual jealousies. The Peishwa at Poona was the nominal head, but the most powerful of the Mahratta princes was Scindia, who, as the protector of the blind old Emperor Shah Allum, and in possession of the enormous territories extending from Kandesh up to Delhi and Agra, was in a way representative of Imperial authority. Holkar ran Scindia close and both were anxious to make their influence at Poona paramount. The Bhonsla Rajah of Nagpur was the third great Mahratta power. He occupied the whole of the territory to the north of the Nizam's dominions, from Berar to the east coast at Cuttack. These Mahratta princes had all of them large armies with highly disciplined contingents officered for the most part by Frenchmen; so that here again came in the dangerous French influence, from which at that moment the school of English politicians, of which Pitt, Nelson and Wellesley were the representative spirits, feared so much. Every one of the Mahratta princes had large money claims upon the Nizam which they

were ready to enforce by arms, and a general combination of their power would have been irresistible.

The policy which the new Governor-General had been instructed to uphold was the maintenance of the balance of power between the Native States as it stood in 1792 at the close of the first Mysore War. But this balance no longer existed, and had been materially altered by the Khurdla catastrophe. On the whole, it seemed likely that the Nizam, if left to himself, would have to apply to Tippoo for support, in which case that chief's power would become overwhelming. The Nizam's power had been greatly weakened; that of the Mahrattas had been increased *pro tanto*; Tippoo had recovered from the effects of the war of 1792, which he was burning to avenge; and a fresh element of danger had arisen from the French influence in Hyderabad, backed up by the mysterious, and therefore dreaded, ambition of the brilliant young French general, who had astonished Europe by his sudden descent upon Egypt.

The policy that Lord Mornington laid down to himself was first of all to dissolve the French contingent at Hyderabad and by substituting an English subsidiary force to prevent the Nizam from joining hands with Tippoo.*


Then the latter was to be called to account for his breach of friendly relations by his overtures to the

* There is nothing to show that Tippoo was ever afforded an opportunity of explaining his conduct, and there is a long minute of Lord Mornington in the Secret Department, dated 12th August, 1799 (reproduced by Wilks's "History of Mysore," Vol. II, Chap. LV), giving conclusive reasons why, since the overtures with the professed intention of exterminating the British, were an actual fact and constituted in themselves an act of hostility, there was no necessity to ask for an explanation of that which could not be explained; and that we were justified in making preparations for war without disclosing our knowledge. The whole minute is a most masterly production though we are not prepared to say that it is not open to objection.

French, and having crushed him by the Nizam's co-operation, together with that of the Mahrattas, to dispose of the remaining States separately. The method of dealing with them was to be the maintenance at each court of a British subsidiary force to the exclusion of the French, and by cutting the Native States off from the sea-coast to prevent them from having the power of affording a landing to a French army from over the sea.

The Nizam was, therefore, the first of the Native States that had to be dealt with, and as soon as the new Governor-General landed in Madras in May, 1798, on his way to Calcutta, he commenced to carry out his plans.

General Harris, then in charge of the Madras Government, was ordered to commence the collection of military stores, and to prepare a detachment of troops to be sent at a moment's notice to Hyderabad, and instructions were sent to the Resident to use every persuasion with the Nizam to disband the French troops. It had become a struggle for existence, and the presence of a large force entirely in French hands at the Nizam's court was likely to be a most dangerous element in the coming struggle. The minister, Azim-ul-Umrah, was a partisan of the English, and backed up the Resident's representation to the Nizam. The latter for some time was doubtful what to do ; he was on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, he did not wish to throw the French trained troops over, for he would then be entirely dependent upon the English for support, but, on the other hand, he was afraid that, deprived of British support, he might be attacked by the Mahrattas, who were the enemies from whom he had most to fear, and could easily find ground for hostilities on account of their still unsettled claims, which amounted to about six



THE RESIDENCY, CHUDDERGHAT.

crores of rupees. Finally, a compromise was arrived at. The Marquis, bolder than his predecessor, resolved to run the risk of offending the Mahrattas rather than allow a large force devoted to French interests to remain in Hyderabad, and accordingly he pledged himself to support the Nizam against any unjust demands of the Mahrattas, and to increase the British troops from two to six battalions. The Nizam thereupon engaged to disband the French corps, to deliver over the officers to the British Government as soon as the new British force should arrive, and to raise the subsidy which he paid for the maintenance of the British troops from Rs.57,713 to 201,425 a month. This treaty was signed on the 1st September, 1798.

"The way in which the disbandment was carried out was as follows: The French corps numbered 14,000 men, and it was necessary to take every precaution against the chance of resistance, so that nothing could be done until the arrival of the additional troops, which occurred on the 10th October. There was already a considerable feeling of discontent in the French corps. The rivalry to succeed to the deceased Raymond had produced a considerable amount of jealousy and animosity amongst the officers, whilst the men themselves were in a condition bordering on mutiny owing to large arrears of pay being due to them. Some of the men were absent on distant detachment duty, and altogether there were not more than 11,000 present at the headquarters in Hyderabad. After considerable difficulty, the reluctance of the Nizam to proceed to extreme measures was overcome, and the battalions of British, assisted by a strong body of the Nizam's horse, surrounded the lines of the French force, which was situated about two miles from Hyderabad, at the foot of the hill

on which stands the house known as Asmangarh, near which is situated Raymond's tomb."

It is impossible to withhold a considerable amount of sympathy for the sufferers in this sudden dissolution and disbandment of a little army which had done such good service. It was dissolved not for any fault of its own, but in consequence of the exigencies of British policy, to which its existence was a menace and a danger. Kaye, in his life of Sir John Malcolm, who was employed as a principal actor in the final scene, says: "Viewed from the English side, the dissolution of the French corps was a masterpiece of policy. But the sympathies of our common humanity may yet be awakened in favour of the sufferers, when we contemplate the rending of all those ties which had bound the soldier and the officer together, and linked the united military body to the State. Doubtless, it was a necessity, but it was a cruel one. And, when the hour of parting arrived, it was not strange that there should have been a plentiful growth of subterfuge and evasion to delay the fulfilment of a stipulation so humiliating both to the French party and the Hyderabad court."

"The arrangements for the disbandment were carefully completed by the Resident, Kirkpatrick, and Major Malcolm. There were two brigades, one consisting of the two old battalions under Colonel Hyndman, and the other of the four regiments which had just arrived under Colonel Roberts. The former were moved up to attack the rear of the French camp; the latter were ready to advance upon its front. From such a disposition of the British forces there was no escape, and the French troops were completely at their mercy. In the meantime, the dissension in the French force had culminated in open mutiny. The officers, disunited and foreseeing the in-

evitable, had entered into negotiations with the Resident with the view of obtaining a safe conduct, which was promised them ; but the men, fearful of what might happen to them if they were abandoned by their officers, and clamorous for the pay due to them, rose in revolt and seized the persons of Piron and the other officers. When Malcolm reached the lines, the violence of the mutineers was at its height. In vain he endeavoured to make his way to the place where Piron was confined ; in vain he remonstrated ; in vain he endeavoured to persuade men to suffer order to be restored to their ranks. They crowded tumultuously around him. They threatened to deal with him as they had dealt with their own officer. And doubtless, in the violence of their excitement, they would have fulfilled their threats ; but timely assistance was at hand. Among the crowd of the mutineers were some men who had formerly belonged to Malcolm's company in the 29th Battalion but had deserted to the French corps. They now recognized their old officer and went at once to his assistance. He had been kind to them in former days, and they had not forgotten his kindness. Lifting him up and bearing him away on their heads, they rescued him from the hands of the infuriated mob. Malcolm returned to the Residency and the mutiny continued to spread. It was an event to be welcomed, not to be deplored (though to the French officers concerned the position must have been an exceedingly unpleasant one). It was plain to the British diplomatists that it would render the dissolution of the corps comparatively easy. So measures were at once concerted for the accomplishment of disarming and dispersion of the disorganized mass. Early on the following day Colonel Roberts was instructed to draw up his detachment opposite the French lines and

to summon the men to an unconditional surrender. If at the end of half an hour they had not complied with the demand, he was to attack them in front, and, as soon as Colonel Hyndman heard a shot fired, he was to open upon their rear. A party of 1,500 horse was placed under Malcolm, who was ordered to occupy their right flank and prevent escape in that direction, whilst Captain Green with another party of 500 horse occupied the left. Some time before Roberts's force came up Malcolm had reached his ground. The first French sepoys whom he met—a small party of deserters—fearing an immediate attack upon their camp, were in an extreme state of alarm. He exerted himself to allay their fears. He told them that if they fulfilled the required conditions no violence would be offered to them, and despatched them into the lines to give assurance of protection to their comrades. A deputation of subadars—native officers—came out to him and declared that they were ready to do anything that was ordered. On this he advanced into the lines. He found the whole body of sepoys panic-struck as were those whom he had first met. They had released their officers and were now disciplined and subdued by an overwhelming sense of their common danger. Malcolm assured them that if they laid down their arms in peace they would be protected by the British troops. They promised their prompt submission. The only condition which they urged upon the British officer was that the lines should be placed in the possession of the Company's troops, and not given up to the destructive plunder of the Mogul horse. Having reported to Colonel Roberts the favourable aspect of affairs, Malcolm drew up his detachment on the heights fronting the French lines. There he was speedily joined by the European officers of the French corps, elated

with joy at their escape from the hands of their infuriated soldiery, and actually, in the conjecture that had arisen, regarding the English as friends and deliverers. The rest was soon accomplished. The sepoy left their guns, laid down their arms, and in the presence of the two lines of British troops moved off in a deep column to a flag planted on the right of their ground, followed by their wives and carrying their property with them. Not a shot was fired, not a drop of blood was shed. Eleven or twelve thousand men were thus dispersed in a few hours; and before sunset their whole cantonments with all their storehouses, arsenals, gun foundries and powder mills were completely in our possession. The celebrated French Corps of Hyderabad had passed into a tradition." (Kaye: "Life of Sir John Malcolm," Vol. I, p. 72.)

It was impossible to overestimate the importance of this event and its bearing upon the history of Hyderabad, and, indeed, of India. By the disbandment of the French corps the Nizam showed to the rest of India that he definitely decided to trust to the British alliance, and had, for good or for evil, resolved to throw in his lot with theirs, to trust to their protection and to be guided by their advice. The incident when it became known created a profound sensation throughout the Native States of India, and the immediate results were not long in revealing themselves.

CHAPTER IX

THE MYSORE WAR

THE disbandment of the French contingent at Hyderabad having been successfully carried out, everything was ready for the war with Tippoo. Bajee Row, the Peshwa, had promised his assistance, which indeed the Peshwa, as one of the signatories of the Tripartite Treaty of 1790, was bound to render, but, though a body of English troops was especially told off to co-operate with the Mahratta contingent, he rendered no actual assistance in the conduct of the war. The fact is that Bajee Row had no idea that Tippoo would be so easily conquered. He expected that the hostilities would be prolonged as had been the case in the former war, and that their result would be doubtful, and he therefore waited to see which side he should ultimately support. Indeed, at the very time that the siege of Seringapatam was proceeding, the Peishwa was entertaining Tippoo's ambassadors at Poona, with whom he was negotiating and had actually received from them no less than 13 lakhs of rupees purporting to be arrears on account of *chouth*. He was also negotiating with the Bhounsla Rajah of Nagpur with the intention, should the British arms suffer a reverse, of attacking the Nizam ; but events were too

rapid for him. No sooner had the French contingent been disbanded than the whole of the British force in Hyderabad, consisting of 6,500 men, with an equal number of the Nizam's army, marched towards Mysore, and joined the main army under General Harris at Vellore.

The force from Hyderabad consisted of the subsidiary troops under Colonel Roberts and Hyndman, and the Nizam's troops under Meer Allum. This portion of the allied army arrived at Chittoor, near the Mysore frontier, in advance of the main army, and here it was joined by Major Malcolm, who accompanied the Nizam's troops as Political Agent, and was of great service in preserving discipline and order on account of his personal influence. There was still a number of the French sepoys in the ranks of Meer Allum's regiments who were in a state of disorder, but Meer Allum delegated his authority to Malcolm, who, aided by the subsidiary troops, soon overawed and persuaded them into obedience, and subsequently the regiment contributed greatly to the success of the campaign. Meer Allum was so delighted with the success of his old friend Malcolm that he insisted upon his taking command of the entire infantry force. A European regiment, the 33rd, was attached to the subsidiary and Nizam's contingent, and the colonel of the regiment was—Colonel Roberts having expressed a wish to be relieved—appointed to command the whole of the Nizam's division. This colonel was Arthur Wellesley, brother of the Governor-General and eventually Duke of Wellington. Major Briggs says: "It was this circumstance (the relationship to the Governor-General) that rendered the appointment so acceptable to Meer Allum and so flattering to the Nizam that history may well afford to sink the question of military seniority which it involved."

Lord Mornington had himself come down from Calcutta to Madras to superintend the preliminaries in person; and Tiopoo, having refused to entertain the ambassadors whom the Governor-General proposed to send, war was declared. A second British army advanced from the western coast, and the two armies met and besieged Seringapatam, into which fortress, after a feeble resistance in the field, Tippoo had thrown himself. Nor did the siege itself last long. The preparations for a general assault were soon ready, it was delivered, and Tippoo himself fell, fighting bravely in the breach (1799). With him fell the Mahomedan rule in Mysore, and nothing now remained but a division of the spoil between the allies. Instead of wiping out the Mysore State entirely, in which case the Nizam would have been entitled to one half of the conquered dominions, it was deemed more politic to reconstitute the State. The central portion was made over to the descendant of the Hindu Rajah, whom Hyder Ali, Tippoo's father, had displaced, and the remainder was divided between the allies. The whole of Tippoo's revenue was estimated at ten crores of rupees, or 3,040,000 pagodas (the pagoda being reckoned at Rs. $3\frac{1}{2}$), and the following is the division as given by Grant Duff (*History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II, Chap. 16) :

To the new Rajah	1,360,000 pagodas
.. Nizam	530,000 ..
.. British	537,000 ..
For the maintenance of Hyder's and Tippoo's families	240,000 ..
For Kummer-ud-Din	70,000 ..
			<hr/>
			2,737,000 (Rs. 9,446,000)

This left a balance of 263,000 pagodas, which was reserved for the Peishwa, for, although he had totally failed to carry out his engagement, it was deemed

politic to allow him some share in the conquered territory. But this offer the Peishwa was unable to accept or refuse. It was by no means adequate to the share he would have received had he taken a part in the war. This no doubt was another reason for the resuscitation of the Mysore kingdom under a Hindu Rajah. As things turned out, to have divided the kingdom entirely between the Nizam and the British, as the two allies really concerned, would have had the effect of dangerously increasing the power of the former. By keeping a portion for the new Rajah, the shares of the new allies were naturally reduced, and rendered possible an arrangement to which we shall presently allude.* Had it been necessary to give to the Peishwa an equal third share of the conquered province, it is probable that the Mysore Kingdom would not have been reconstituted, or only on a very insignificant scale. But to the acceptance of this reduced share were attached conditions which were distasteful to the Peishwa. One of these was the establishment of a British Subsidiary Force to be stationed at Poona—ostensibly for the protection of the Peishwa against his powerful and dangerous vassals, Scindia and Holkar, but in reality in pursuance of the policy of Lord Mornington (afterwards Marquis Wellesley), to which allusion has already been made, namely, to build up the British Empire by means of British troops stationed in the Native States and maintained from the revenues of those States. The policy was in reality a development of that of Dupleix and Bussy, but Lord Wellesley was the first English statesman to recognize its great possibilities. To this condition the Peishwa was not personally

* That this was the real reason for the restoration of the Hindu Rajah, and not a sentiment of generosity, is clear from the Governor-General's despatch to the Secret Committee. (*Wellesley, Despatches, Vol. I.*)

averse ; but he was afraid if he accepted it of incurring the resentment of his great chiefs. The second condition was that the British should arbitrate in all matters in dispute between the Nizam and the Peishwa. This condition, however, Bajee Row absolutely rejected, with the consequence that negotiations were broken off and two-thirds of the reserved revenue were given to the Nizam, whilst one-third was retained by the British. This therefore was the condition of affairs in the last year of the eighteenth century. This great enemy of the British power in South India had been annihilated. In the Deccan, the Nizam had become their devoted ally, dependent upon them for support against his chief enemies, the Mahrattas, who in their turn were disunited. Their rule still extended from Delhi to Poona, but the house was a divided one and therefore doomed to ruin. From Hyderabad to Cape Comorin British influence was now supreme.

But in order to make this influence permanent one thing more was needed. It was necessary to render impossible the recurrence of a hostile force such as Raymond's in the midst of the British sphere of influence, and accordingly in 1800 a new treaty was drawn up. It will be as well here to give a *résumé* of all the previous treaty arrangements so as to show at a glance the progressive nature of the relations between the Nizam and the British.

The first treaty was in 1759 (14th May), after the battle of Condore and the capture of Masulipatam from the French. The result of this war was that the power of the French on the east coast was broken. But it will be remembered that the Nizam Salabut Jung had given to Bussy the tribute hitherto paid by the east coast Rajahs, of whom Vizianagaram was the chief,

in return for his undertaking to maintain the French contingent, the history of which appeared in a previous chapter. Under this treaty all the east coast districts were given to the English Company as an *inam* or free gift in the same manner as was done to the French. The Nizam (or Nawab as he is styled) undertook to compel the French troops to retire south of his dominions, and not to allow them to make a settlement in his country "on no account whatever, nor keep them in his service, nor assist them, nor call them to his assistance." The Vizianagaram Rajah was to continue to pay the same tribute to the Nizam as he had done before the time of the French, and all that the Company promised to do was not to assist the Nizam's enemies, nor to give them any protection.

The next treaty was in 1766 (12th November) and was executed between the Nizam and General Calliaud. In it the free gift of the five eastern Circars of Ellore, Chicacole, Rajahmundry, Mustaphanagar, and Murtezanagar was confirmed. In return the English engaged not only to keep a body of troops (number not specified) to settle the affairs of His Highness "in everything that is right and proper," but they also engaged to pay a tribute for the Circars of nine lakhs of rupees, namely, five for the three Circars of Rajahmundry, Ellore and Mustaphanagar, and two each for Chicacole and Murtezanagar when they should be put in their possession. Chicacole was to be given as soon as possible, but Murtezanagar (otherwise known as Guntoor) was to be allowed to continue in the possession of the Nizam's brother, Basalut Jung, during the Nizam's pleasure, or until the brother's death. As regards the payment of the troops to be maintained by the English, it was arranged that it should be made out of the five lakhs of

tribute to be paid for the three Circars above mentioned, the Company to be answerable to the Nizam for any surplus, but in case of any excess to be themselves answerable. The same agreement in like manner was to hold good for the sums to be paid for the other two Circars, when settled. In case the troops of the Company should not be wanted, the tribute was to be paid each year in three instalments. The Nizam also bound himself to help the English with his troops under the same conditions, should occasion arise.

At the time of this treaty, the Nizam does not seem to have been aware that in the previous year the English had obtained a firman or *sunnad* from the Emperor Shah Allum, for the same five Circars as an *inam* or free gift. This, as has been shown in a previous chapter, was one of the reasons of the Nizam's temporary estrangement from the English, and of his alliance with the French, and in February, 1768, another treaty was entered into between Nizam Ali and the Company. This treaty is practically a confirmation of the previous treaty of 1766, but in it the gift from the Emperor is recited and an additional provision is made for the recognition by the contracting parties of the Nawab of the Carnatic, Wallah Jah. This appears to have been the first occasion on which the Nizam publicly recognized the Nawab of the Carnatic as an independent Power, and renounced all claim to any authority over the Carnatic for the future. In this treaty the number of troops that the English were bound to furnish was fixed at two battalions of sepoys, with artillery, officered by Europeans, and a further provision of mutual alliance and defence was made between the three parties—the Company, the Nizam, and the Nawab of the Carnatic. A further provision was

also made that the English should take from Hyder Ali the district of the Carnatic Balaghat, and, in consideration of the Nizam relinquishing all his claim to the district, that the Company should pay him a tribute of seven lakhs of rupees. This latter provision, however, was never carried out, for soon afterwards the Company made peace;

In 1799 a treaty was made with the Nizam's brother, Basalut Jung, regarding the Circar of Murtezanagar, or Guntoor. This treaty gave very great offence to the Nizam, but need not be further alluded to, as it does not seem to have been acted upon; and eventually, in 1788, Basalut Jung having died, the district was handed over to the British in pursuance of the former treaties of 1766 and 1768.

The next agreement which we find is in the form of a letter from Lord Cornwallis to the Nizam, written on the 7th July, 1789, which was subsequently confirmed by the House of Commons and declared to be equal to a treaty. This letter was written immediately before the first war with Tippoo and recapitulates and confirms the previous arrangements. It begins by expressing the Governor-General's satisfaction that the Guntoor District had been handed over, goes on to specify that the number of British troops to be sent "whenever His Highness shall apply for them" shall consist of two battalions of sepoys of not less than 800 men each, and six pieces of cannon manned by Europeans, provided, however, that the troops are not to be employed against any of the Powers in alliance with the British, namely, the Peishwa and other Mahratta chiefs, the Nawab of Arcot (Carnatic) and the Rajahs of Tanjore and Travancore. The troops, however, when wanted, were to be

paid for by the Nizam, and it does not appear that the cession of the Circars involved any obligation to maintain troops; in fact, the cession was one of sovereignty only, and the Company paid for the district a tribute of nine lakhs of rupees. In this respect, therefore, the Company's possession of the Circars was different from that of Bussy, who held them free of any tribute, in return for which he had to pay for his contingent out of the revenue.

The former stipulation about the Balaghat was confirmed in his letter, but was to take effect only if the existing peace with Hyder should be broken. This letter was written after the despatch of Meer Allum (Abool Cassim, as he is called) to Calcutta, where he personally conducted the negotiations with the Governor-General. These negotiations led to the treaty of 1790 between the three allies who were to take part in the war which was then impending—the British, the Nizam, and the Mahrattas. The allies agreed to furnish 25,000 infantry, and, if required, 10,000 horse to co-operate with the British army. If the horse were required they were to be paid for, but no stipulation was made regarding the payment of the infantry. It was, however, provided that any territory conquered should be equally divided between all the allies.

Then followed the war with Tippoo, in which the latter was compelled to sue for peace. This was granted by the treaty of Seringapatam (1792), under which certain districts were ceded, of which as his share the Nizam received Kurnool and Cuddapah, altogether about 30 lakhs annually.

Subsequent to this treaty occurred the enrolment of the French contingent under Raymond, the war with the Mahrattas ending with the battle of Kurdla, and the disbandment of the French contingent. Before, how-

ever, this last event took place, another treaty, already alluded to, was arranged in 1798, in which it was agreed that the British should furnish a subsidiary force of not less than 6,000 men, including the existing two battalions, with artillery, at an annual cost of twenty-four and a half lakhs by instalments. In the event of there being any deficiency, the British were authorized to deduct the same from the tribute or *peshkash* paid on the Circars. This force was to be a permanent one but was not to be employed for the purposes of *sebundy* or collecting revenue. The British also agreed to contribute in the event of any dispute with the Mahrattas, and to uphold the Nizam in all that was right and proper.

We have seen how the disbandment of the French Contingent took place, and immediately afterwards occurred the second war with Tippoo, which ended in his defeat and death. Thereupon followed the treaty of 1800, in which the conquered territory was divided, the Nizam receiving as his share districts worth 19 or 20 lakhs of rupees, and subsequently, as the Peishwa declined to accept the position allotted to him, two-thirds of the Peishwa's share aggregating about five lakhs of rupees. This was therefore the condition of affairs when it was deemed necessary to place the subsidiary force at Hyderabad on a permanent footing, and to form a still closer alliance with the Nizam, both offensive and defensive, so that, in the words of the treaty, the affairs of the two nations should be considered as "one and the same in interest, policy, friendship and honour." Under this treaty the British agreed to add to the already existing subsidiary force in perpetuity two battalions of sepoys of 1,000 each, a regiment of cavalry 500 strong, and a due proportion of guns and artillerymen, so that the whole force should consist of 8,000 firelocks, two

regiments of cavalry (or 1,000 horse), with the requisite artillery fully equipped, to be stationed in His Highness's territories. Roughly speaking, to judge from the former treaties, the cost of a regiment of foot 1,000 strong, or of cavalry 500 strong, together with the necessary artillery, appears to have been reckoned at one lakh of rupees annually, so that the total cost of this army of eight-thousand foot and one thousand horse may be calculated at nine lakhs of rupees monthly. In order to provide for the punctual payment of these troops, the Nizam ceded in perpetuity the whole of the districts which he had received as his share of the two wars with Tippoo. These districts were valued at about 73 lakhs of rupees, but the Company expressly undertook to bear any loss until they could be made to yield more.

As a matter of fact, it is doubtful whether there ever was a loss, and in a very short time they yielded considerably more than the cost of the subsidiary force. At the present time they yield from 180 to 200 lakhs annually, and consist of the four important districts in the Madras Presidency known as Bellary, Anantapore, Cuddapah and Kurnool. The Nizam on his part expressly refused to pay any possible increase, and so a complete payment in advance was made for the subsidiary force in perpetuity; in the words of the Treaty (Art. 8), "the cession of the districts shall be considered as a final close and termination of accounts between the contracting parties with respect to the charges of the said subsidiary force."

In the event of war, the Nizam agreed to support the above force with not less than an equal number of infantry and 9,000 cavalry, so as to form an army of a strength of 12,000 infantry (two battalions of the infantry being reserved for the defence of His Highness's

person) and 10,000 horse, and to furnish as many more as he possibly could, a similar obligation resting upon the Company.* Certain other articles are also of importance. The Nizam undertook not to enter into negotiations with any other Power without consulting the Company, to commit no act of hostility against any Power whatever, and to submit all differences to the Company's Government for adjustment (Arts. 15 and 16); and in their turn the Company declared that they had no manner of concern "with any of His Highness's children, relations subjects or servants, with respect to whom His will is absolute."

As regards the payment of the subsidiary force, it was arranged that if the Zemindars of Shorapoor or Gudwal or any other subjects or dependents of His Highness's Government should withhold payment or excite rebellion, the whole force, or a portion of it, should be ready—in concert with the Nizam's own troops—to reduce such offenders to obedience. This clause appears to be in supersession of the clause in the former Treaty of 1798, where it was stipulated that the force should not be used as *sebandy*, or for collecting revenue. This is a point of some importance, and should be borne in mind.

It will be at once seen that this treaty is a very important advance in the policy which the great Marquis had resolved upon. Under the former treaties there was an alliance, and we undertook to furnish troops for which the Nizam had to pay. No permanent cession of territory was made to provide for the payment of these troops. The British still had to pay the stipulated tribute for the districts held by them, although they were authorized to treat that tribute as a security from

* Particular attention is drawn to this clause because it subsequently formed a ground for the establishment and maintenance of the Hyderabad Contingent.

which to provide for the payment of these troops. Under the earlier treaties the British were only required to furnish a stipulated number of troops when required by the Nizam, who could dispense with them when he liked, and it was only whilst they were actually employed in his dominions that he was liable to pay for them, and when withdrawn from his service the tribute had to be paid untouched. Under the treaty of 1790, a small force of two battalions was provided for, but even this was not permanent, for the Nizam, could as we have seen he did after the Kurdla campaign, actually dispense with them. In 1798 this Subsidiary Force was largely increased and made permanent, but still no arrangements were made for their pay by the assignment of territory. Although there can be no doubt that this was the ultimate end of the Governor-General's policy, he scarcely dared take so important a step. But, as soon as the Mysore War was ended and the division of the conquered territory had taken place, he commenced preparing the ground for this the basis of his policy. On the 6th November, 1799, a secret despatch was sent to the Resident (Captain J. A. Kirkpatrick), in which the outlines of a new treaty were sketched, under which the Subsidiary Force was to be increased by 2,000 men and a permanent provision to be made for their payment in perpetuity by an assignment of the whole of the districts, given to the Nizam as his share of the Mysore conquest. But the Resident was specially enjoined not to approach the Nizam on the subject at once, but to wait until his decease should appear to be imminent and then to make the execution of this treaty a condition of our placing his son, Secunder Jah, on the throne. This point is not alluded to in any of these histories, and it will therefore be as well to give chapter and verse for the statement.

Allusion having been made to the state of the Nizam's health, and the reason which would induce the Governor-General to support the succession of Secunder Jah in preference to the other princes, the despatch goes on to say:

"No obligation of treaty binds us to take part in any contested succession, arising either from the total silence of the Nizam respecting his intended successor, or from a disputable declaration of His Highness's intentions on the subject. Even in the case of an unequivocal nomination of a successor to His Highness, we should not be bound by the treaty of September, 1798, or by any other obligation to support that successor against any rival whose cause might be espoused by the Mahrattas."

. . . "Having stated the general principles which should govern our conduct in the conjunction under contemplation, I shall proceed to furnish you with an outline of the particular conditions on which I am willing to support the succession of Secunder Jah against all competition." Then follow the various provisions as subsequently embodied in the treaty, and the despatch continues: "Such is the outline of the terms upon which I propose to support and maintain the succession of Secunder Jah, *whether he would obtain the previous nomination of his father or not, or even if it should be pretended that His Highness had declared in favour of some other of his sons.* You will prepare without delay an instrument in the Persian language in conformity to the foregoing outline, in order that Secunder Jah (*at the moment of his father's death, or when that event shall appear to approach*) may be apprised of the terms on which we are ready to support his cause and may be enabled, by immediately executing a formal instrument, to accede to my propositions in a regular manner. . . . Secunder Jah must not be allowed to procrastinate his

determination. *If at the end of a stated and short period he should not determine to accept the proffered Treaty, you will proceed in concert with Azim-ul-Omrah and Meer Allum to place one of the younger sons of the Nizam on the Musnud, previously stipulating that the Prince succeeding to the Musnud shall fulfil all the conditions of the Treaty proposed to Secunder Jah."*

Here is to be seen the mailed fist of the masterful Marquis, but the strange thing is that it is impossible to state from the materials available how the consent to the treaty was actually obtained. Nizam Ali did not die until 1803, but the treaty itself, as it appears in the official record, purports to have been concluded with Nizam Ali, and bears date the 12th October, 1800, and there is no letter from the Resident explaining what were the reasons that led him to depart from the secret instructions contained in this despatch. The foregoing extract is taken from *Wellesley's Despatches, Vol. II*, and the instructions were subsequently confirmed by the Governor-General's despatch to the Secret Committee of the Board of Directors, dated 25th January, 1800. This apparent alteration in Lord Wellesley's original intention is the more remarkable because the despatch of Captain Kirkpatrick goes on to say that, "although the objects proposed might be obtained from Secunder Jah with less difficulty previously to the death of the Nizam and that it would on that account be desirable that a negotiation should be opened immediately with Secunder Jah, there are many objections which occur to determine from such step. The attempt (if it should transpire either by accident or design) would probably lead to mischievous consequences; I am therefore of opinion that no such an attempt should be hazarded until the Nizam shall be at the point of death."

The position of the Nizam at the commencement of the nineteenth century was therefore very different to what it had been on the death of Asaf Jah in 1748, which may be summarized as follows. At the death of Asaf Jah the Nizam's authority nominally extended over the whole of Southern India as far as Trichinopoly and Tanjore. Now everything was changed. The result of the war between the French and the English had brought about the independence of Mohamed Ali as the Nawab of the Carnatic, and Hyder Ali was able to extend the Mysore Kingdom from the western coast to the banks of the Tungabudra. Towards the south and the west the Mahrattas made considerable encroachments in the direction of the Doab and Aurungabad. The Province of Malwa was lost to the Mahratta Chief, Scindia, and the greater part of Berar was in the possession of the Nagpur Rajah, whilst Khandesh had long since been ceded to the Mahrattas by Salabut Jung. On the east the coast zemindars no longer owed him allegiance, and, though he still continued to receive tribute or *peshkash* for these districts, it was paid by the British, who exercised all the rights of sovereignty which had previously been held by the Nizam without, as far as these districts were concerned, being bound to render any military assistance. Between 1750 and 1790 the Nizam's dominions had been enormously reduced in extent. The area over which he exercised sovereign rights was not so large as the present kingdom of Hyderabad, and over a great portion of this the Mahrattas levied *chouth*. After the first siege of Seringapatam in 1791 the result of the British alliance was a considerable accession of territory, but the Kurdla campaign showed that the Hyderabad State was unable to stand against the Mahrattas, and it was probably only owing to the dissensions amongst the Mahrattas

themselves that the Nizam's power was not entirely crushed. The result of the second siege of Seringapatam was a further accession of territory, the whole of which, however, was ceded by the Treaty of 1800, except the portion between the rivers Krishna and Tungabudra. But in return for this cession the Nizam received the whole of the moral and material support of the British Subsidiary alliance. As long as British power remained paramount in India the Nizam was rendered safe from any outside attack and was greatly relieved from the burden of maintaining a large army. He was not entirely relieved, for he was bound under the treaty in case of war to co-operate with an army of not less than 6,000 foot and 9,000 horse, but compared with the enormous hordes maintained by Asaf Jah this was a comparative trifle. On the whole, though greatly reduced in size from what it had been fifty years before, the Nizam's dominions in 1800 were more consolidated and much safer from attack than they had been only a few years previously. The crisis in his affairs which seemed to have set in after the disaster at Kurdla had, thanks to the British Alliance, been successfully passed. There now only remained the Mahrattas to be dealt with in order to ensure to the Nizam complete safety for the future and in the next chapter we shall see how this danger was successfully averted.



CHAPTER X

THE MAHRATTA KINGDOM



THE sudden collapse of Mysore took the Peshwa and the Mahratta princes by surprise. At the moment a small force was sent out to co-operate, but it had scarcely crossed the Mysore frontier before Seringapatam had fallen and the war was over. The Peshwa had hoped that by waiting he might have secured to himself a better share of the spoil, but he waited a little bit too long and in the end overreached himself. Strictly speaking, as he had rendered no assistance worth speaking of, he was not entitled to any share of the conquered country, but a small portion was reserved for him of districts on both sides of the Tungabudra valued at about six lakhs of rupees annually, but coupled with them a stipulation was made that all matters of difference between the Peishwa and the Nizam should be submitted for the arbitration of the British and that he should receive a subsidiary force at his court on the same terms as the Nizam. To this stipulation he would not consent and the result was, as we have seen, that two-thirds of the Peshwa's share were given to the Nizam and one-third to the British. Under this arrangement, the Nizam received some increase apart from that portion which, after having been allotted to him, was subsequently

reassigned in payment of the Subsidiary Force, as related in the last chapter. This portion consists of the tract of country known as the Doab lying between the rivers Kishtna and the Tungabudra, the latter formed the natural boundary between the Nizam's and the Company's territories. In this way the last vestige of the ancient kingdom of Vijayanagar, which played so prominent a part in the early history of the Deccan, was cut in half. A descendant of the old royal family was still in possession of what had now dwindled down to a small zemindari, but the site of the old capital on the south bank of the river had for many years been deserted and the zemindar lived at Anaigoondy, a suburb of Vijayanagar, situated on the north bank.* The Rajah of Anaigoondy, as he is still called, thus became a subject of both states, holding lands on both sides of the river. The last Rajah died without any issue in 1886 and his widow subsequently adopted a boy, but the adoption was not recognized by the British Government, and the estate in British territory, together with the political pension paid to the family, was escheated. The Nizam's Government, however, more liberal to the last representative of their old enemy, recognized the adopted son and allowed him to remain in possession of his diminished estate. The present Rajah still lives in Anaigoondy, but in sadly reduced circumstances, his net income amounting to no more than about Rs. 20,000 per annum.

We must, however, return to the Mahrattas and to the position of affairs after the fall of Seringapatam. It will not be within the scope of this work to deal with Mahratta

* The Anaigoondy State is mentioned in the first Tripartite Treaty of 1788, between the British, the Nizam, and the Mahrattas, as one of those states which had been wrongfully annexed by Tippoo and which it was the object of the allies to recover. Practically, however, the Rajah cannot be said to have benefited by the result of the two campaigns.

affairs, except in so far as they are connected with those of Hyderabad, and they are therefore only alluded to in respect to that connection and not with the detailed accuracy which they would otherwise deserve. But, in order that the reader may properly understand the actual condition of India at the period at which we have now arrived, it is necessary to dwell somewhat more at length on the relative position of the different princes.

We have hitherto spoken of the English almost entirely with reference to their connection with the Nizam, which, indeed is the main object of this work ; but it must be remembered that until very recently the English by no means occupied the prominent position in Central and South Indian affairs that one is apt to suppose. Until after the first Mysore War, their territory was confined to the Northern Circars and the extreme south of the peninsula. A very large portion of the Carnatic was still in the possession of the Nawab Mahomed Ali, and the remainder of South India, up to the Taptee and Godavery river, was divided between Mysore, the Nizam, and the Mahrattas. During the last decade of the 18th century, the Mahratta power extended enormously. The principal chiefs were Mahadoji Scindia, Tukaji Holkar, Bhonsla Rajah of Nagpur, and the Gaikwar of Baroda whilst the whole Mahratta sphere of influence extended from the source of the Krishtna in the South to Delhi and Agra in the North ; and from Guzerat in the West, across India to Cuttack in the East. It is true that they all professed allegiance to the Peishwa at Poona and their conquests were nominally in his name. Scindia and Holkar shared between them the great province of Malwa, north of the Taptee, the former having his capital at Ujain, and the latter at Indore. It is impossible on a map to give anything like an accurate outline of their

boundaries, for they were changing with each year. Scindia was by far the most powerful of the three princes, and his authority extended right up to Delhi and over the Doab or country between the Ganges and the Jumna. He was the custodian of the blind Emperor Shah Allam, and in his name he exercised imperial power, whilst the Emperor himself was kept in a state of miserable indigence.*

Scindia thus exercised a predominant influence over the enormous tract of country stretching from the Tapti up to the Sutlej, bounded on the west by the Sikh Kingdom of the Punjab and on the east by the Kingdom of Oudh, which still intervened as a buffer separating him from the English possessions in Bengal. The whole comprised, besides what is known as Hindustan, the whole of Central India and Rajpootana, including, it is

* The following letter written by a friend of Scindia, General de Boigne, conveys about the best description of the miserable state of the descendant of the great House of Timur. It is quoted by Herbert Compton (*Military Adventures of Hindustan*, page 83): "Scindia sets Shah Nizam-ud-Din (known as the 'Cowrie Father' from having been a Fakcer), over the Badshah, as the greatest scoundrel they could find. He does not give a farthing of money to the Badshah, or any of his people, affecting to console the poor old king that it is all the better for him, as no temptation can remain for another Goolam Kadir to seize upon him for the sake of plunder. Regularly every day he furnishes the old king with 2 seers (4lb.) of polao and eight seers of meat for himself to get cooked as he likes. This, with two loaves of bread, about the length each of a cubit, to suffice for breakfast, dinner, and supper, and he may get *masala* (spices and condiments) where he can. This, however, though it is to serve five persons, and the poor servants who can pick at it a bit afterwards, is living in clover in comparison with the rest of the royal household. They, poor creatures, without distinction, princes and princesses, nay queens, and old eunuchs and female slaves, have exactly delivered out to them to bake into cakes two seers a day of barley flour for every three of them, which they are to bake for themselves, and are thus afforded two-thirds of a seer of food a day. For liquors, from the king to the turnspit, they have nothing but water. The king's quincuncial party at dinner every day is made up of himself and his doctor, his son and heir, and a little favourite daughter, and the mighty boom of being one at this fine extra fare is fairly allotted to his 200 Begums one after another in turn; so that of the poor queens each has a prospect of what to them, after their miserable fare, must be a high treat indeed, a dinner and a half a year! I asked if the old gentleman would not wish to regale himself with beef now and then? Yes, he longs for it, but where is he to get it? The servants often apply in great misery to the unfeeling father (Nizam-ud-Din) for a little wages, when, after having been three or four months without a farthing, he will perhaps only bestow on them three or four annas, on another perhaps as much as eight annas. The old Nizam (of Hyderabad) sent the king, six years ago, 6,000 gold mohurs. Then every farthing got into Cowrie Father's hands, and remained there."

true, a large number of independent states, all of which were, however, more or less in subjection to him as lieutenant of the Emperor. It comprised also the State of Holkar, with whom he was constantly at war; and if it had not been for the rivalry of these two chieftains, whose principal amusement seemed to lie in their sacking each other's capitals and raiding their respective territories, the map of India might have been different from what it is now. But the supremacy undoubtedly lay with Scindia, which was due to the large disciplined army maintained by De Boigne, the great French adventurer, who rose from the position of a common sailor to be almost the absolute ruler of a province nearly as large as his native country, France. De Boigne had a thoroughly efficient army of 40,000 men of all arms, officered by Europeans, and carefully drilled and disciplined; and it was by means of this army that the great Mahadoji Scindia had acquired his predominance over other princes of India. Practically, Scindia was master of the whole country from Khandesh to Agra, extending over the principal portion of the province of Malwa and the Doab. The south eastern portion of this province was in possession of his rival Takoji Holkar, who had also a European-officered force which had been enlisted and trained subsequent to that of Scindia and was by no means so efficient. Holkar depended for the most part upon his cavalry, and he and the Nagpur Rajah, his neighbour to the south, were in the habit of extending their raids as far as Calcutta itself, of which, until just before the time of which we are treating, the existence of the "Maratha Ditch" was a standing proof. We have now arrived at 1800. Mahadoji Scindia and Takoji Holkar had both died very recently, De Boigne had retired and had been followed by Perron, Dowlut

Row Scindia had succeeded to Musnad of the Mahadoji, and Jeswunt Row (of illegitimate birth) to that of Holkar. Both of these princes were young men : the former was devoted to pleasure and dissipation, and the latter, a headstrong passionate man, was ambitious in the extreme and desirous of making himself supreme at Poona. The Peshwa himself was more or less in the hands of one or other of these great chiefs, but his minister Nana Furnavis, who is known as the Machiavelli of India, managed with extreme adroitness to steer a safe course between the two. Nana, however, also died in 1801, and with him disappeared all moderation from the Mahratta councils. It will be remembered that the Peshwa, Baji Row, acting under Nana's advice, had refused to receive the subsidiary force offered by Lord Wellesley as one of the conditions of participating in the division of the territory conquered from Mysore. After that war was over, one of the Mysore chiefs, Dhundia Vagh, refused to submit, and was followed by British detachments under Wellesley and Stevenson, until after a nine months' campaign he was at last defeated and killed at Kondgal (September, 1799), in the extreme south of the Nizam's territory, and for some time afterwards Colonel Wellesley remained in the vicinity of the Peshwa's country engaged in settling the districts recently conquered from Tippoo, whilst Colonel Stevenson was placed in command of the Nizam's subsidiary force. When Nana Furnavis died, Scindia was engaged in the northern dominions, and Jeswunt Row Holkar marched to Poona with an army determined to achieve an ascendancy in the Peishwa's councils. After some negotiations and an attempt to gain possession of the person of Baji Row, the Peshwa, the battle of Poona was fought, and, Holkar being victorious, the Peshwa fled to Bassein, where he sought protection from the

British. This was promised but only on the former condition that he would agree to entertain a British Subsidiary Force on conditions similar to those which had been accepted by the Nizam and should accept British arbitration in all disputes with that prince. This was the origin of the Treaty of Bassein (31st December, 1802), and the Peshwa was led back to his capital and installed on the *musnad* by Colonel Wellesley, who, at the head of the Mahratta Subsidiary Force, was able in a short time to reduce the refractory chiefs to obedience.

But the Treaty of Bassein was entirely opposed to the policy of the other Mahratta chiefs, and they regarded the interference of the British in Mahratta affairs with the greatest jealousy. Scindia and the Nagpur Rajah—who at this time was generally known as the Rajah of Berar, in which province he exercised a predominant influence, although nominally a great portion was still under the sovereignty of the Nizam—met together some fifty miles south of the Taptee in the Berar province. From a despatch of Lord Wellesley's it appears that the first intimation of their hostile intentions was given by the Nizam's agent who resided at Scindia's court, and measures were at once adopted by the Governor-General to meet any possible combination. As had been the case in the Mysore War, those measures were of a most complete character. Colonel Arthur Wellesley (afterwards the Duke of Wellington) was instructed to advance with the troops under his command, together with the Mahratta Subsidiary Force from Poona; Colonel Stevenson with the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force and the Nizam's troops acting in conjunction with Colonel Wellesley advanced to the Godavery on the road to Aurungabad; and General (afterwards Lord) Lake was ordered to hold an army in readiness to operate against Scindia's possessions in

Hindustan. Lord Wellesley was the more determined to crush the Mahratta opposition because he was still haunted by the bugbear of French interference. Perron, Scindia's general, was believed to be in communication with Napoleon, who in this year (1803) was crowned Emperor of the French, and to whose ambition and hostility there seemed to be no bounds. De Boigne was also supposed (erroneously as has since been proved) to be one of Napoleon's advisers in France itself, and the Mahrattas held access to the sea on both coasts, at several places on the west coast and at Cuttack on the east. Wellesley's policy was based on this conviction that the British could never be safe in India as long as they did not hold the whole of the seaboard. We have seen how effectually he had closed all the seaports in the south from attack. The same task was now to be performed in the north, and if possible the policy so successfully carried out at Hyderabad and Poona was to be followed at Oojjein (Scindia's capital), Indore (Holkar's), Baroda and Nagpur. French influence was to be destroyed and the princes were to be compelled to accept the British Subsidiary Force, which would undertake to defend them from all external enemies and would arbitrate between them in all their quarrels. The British were to play the part of the police of India and introduce order and rule in the place of anarchy and civil war. It was to be the commencement of the great *Pax Britannica* which was to open to India a new era of peace and prosperity. Negotiations were at once opened with the two Mahratta princes. At first they pretended that they had no hostile intentions. If that was the case, replied Colonel Wellesley, let them both retire to their respective capitals, Oojjein and Nagpur. To this they answered that they were willing to retire to Burhanpoor

if the British armies would also retire within British limits. In other words, they would retire for fifty miles if the British would retire to separate destinations for 500, leaving the whole of the Nizam's country open to their combined attack. Colonel Wellesley took this as tantamount to a declaration of war, and at once commenced operations by storming Ahmednagar, which belonged to Scindia; and then, in co-operation with Colonel Stevenson, marched against the allies. Events followed as quickly as they had done in Mysore four years previously. The battles of Assaye and Argaum followed in rapid succession, and Gawilgurh, the last stronghold of the Rajah, and Berar and Nagpur, fell on the 15th December, 1803, and peace negotiations were concluded with him the 23rd of the same month, the campaign having opened in August of the same year. On the east coast, Colonel Campbell had overrun and conquered Cuttack, belonging to the same Rajah, and in the north General Lake, by a series of brilliant actions, had taken Aligarh, Agra, and Delhi, and, after gaining the battle of Laswarry (1st November), had made himself master of the whole of the country between the Ganges and the Jumna. In their last operations Lake was opposed by the celebrated battalions of De Boigne, now commanded by Perron, but they proved entirely unable to face the British Force. The result of the war was that Scindia and the Rajah of Nagpur had to make considerable concessions of territory, in which the Nizam as our ally received a share. The treaty does not contain the actual money value of this share, but it consisted of the whole of the districts west of the river Wurda and east of Khandesh, now known as Berar. Some of these districts were in the exclusive possession of Nagpur, and in the others the Mahrattas exercised a joint administration with the Nizam, known

as *do amil*, under which the Mahrattas collected 60 per cent. and the Nizam the balance of the revenue. (*Berar Gazetteer*.) The Nizam also obtained certain outlying districts held by the Mahrattas in the midst of his territories, such as the fort of Dowlatabad, the fort and district of Jalna, some districts lying on the Godavery, and the country near the Ajanta Hills. The British got the fort and city of Broach, the fort and districts of Ahmednagar, and the whole of the territories held by Scindia in the Doab, including Agra, Delhi, and the country up to the Sutlej.

So far everything had succeeded with the Nizam and the British. The Peshwa's teeth were drawn by the presence of a subsidiary force, and the power of Nagpur and of Scindia had been greatly diminished by the deprivation of the territory they had forcibly possessed themselves of. By occupying Broach and Cuttack, the Marquis's policy had been further carried out and the Mahrattas were cut off from their remaining posts on both coasts, whilst Perron had been obliged to take refuge with the British; and Scindia's brigades officered by Frenchmen were disbanded. But the war was not yet over. It had opened with a series of brilliant successes, but it was doomed to end with some serious disasters.

Up to this point Holkar had taken no active share in the war. After the treaty of Bassein he was supposed to have expressed his willingness to sink his differences with Scindia and to make common cause against the British. Probably he did not think that operations would be so quickly concluded, and waited in order to secure better terms for himself. However this may be, at the end of the year 1803, he found himself isolated. The Nagpur Rajah had already submitted and Scindia had done the same (the actual treaty was signed on the 3rd

January, 1804.) The British power was now in the ascendancy at Delhi and in the Doab, and there seemed no chance of his succeeding to the position hitherto held by Scindia. Accordingly, he determined to try a last chance. One of his first acts was to put to death three Englishmen in his service, who, taking advantage of a proclamation issued by the Governor-General, had tendered their resignations. He then massed his army, consisting chiefly of Mahratta cavalry and Pindaris—a new race of soldiers, half camp-followers and half bandits, that had begun to form a new feature in conditions of warfare—near the British frontier. Lord Lake at once moved towards the Chambel, which was regarded as the frontier of British influence and hostilities commenced. Holkar's tactics were different from what those of Scindia had been. The latter, relying upon his European-drilled battalions, did not hesitate to meet the British in the open field; but Holkar judging rightfully that his Mahratta troops were better suited to their traditional system of skirmishing and harassing, avoided anything like a pitched battle. For the first time circumstances were unfavourable to the Marquis's plans and combinations. The season was very advanced (June, 1804); the Deccan army under Colonel (now General) Wellesley, had withdrawn, and the column which had been ordered up from Bombay to march from Surat on Holkar's capital, Indore, was delayed. Lake sent on Colonel Monson with an advanced force to cross the Chambel. Hearing that he could not expect to form a junction with the Bombay column, and fearing that his supplies would run short, Monson commenced a retreat. He recrossed the Chambel harassed by Holkar's cavalry at every step. On all sides the Mahratta light horse laid the country waste and prevented his getting supplies.

By degrees the troops became demoralized ; detachments were cut off ; guns stuck in the heavy mud and were captured ; even the smallest rivers became impassable ; and gradually the retreat degenerated into a rout, until at last, when approaching Agra, they finally broke and took refuge within the walls of the fort. This disaster was doubtless afterwards avenged and at Deeg Holkar's troops received a severe defeat from Colonel Frazer, who was killed in the action and was succeeded by the same Colonel Monson who had fared so badly ; but the moral effect was a bad one, and at once raised the spirit of resistance in Scindia's bosom. After a series of desultory fights, Holkar had to vacate his own districts and take refuge with the Sikhs ; his capital, Indore, was at last occupied by the Bombay columns, and there can be little doubt that Lord Lake would have effectually crushed all further resistance on the part of the Mah-rattas, but a change had come over the spirit of British policy. The war had dragged on throughout the whole of 1804 and well into 1805, and the Directors at home had become alarmed at the results of the Marquis of Wellesley's policy. They had accepted the conquest of Mysore and the alliance with the Nizam with a certain amount of fear as to the responsibilities that would follow in their train. The minds of the merchants in Leadenhall Street had not yet grasped the idea of an Empire and had not yet got beyond that of an investment. No doubt, Lord Wellesley's forward policy had been eminently successful, but one war had led to another, and after each conquest there seemed to arise a fresh complication which could only be overcome by another war. Though the limits of the Empire were yearly extending, the " investment " was suffering. The money which should have been spent on commercial enterprise had

to be wasted, as they deemed, on military expeditions, and in an interference with Native Princes, who, if left to themselves, would sooner or later cut their own throats. And to meet these expenses money in increasing quantities had to be sent out to India, loans had to be raised and liabilities incurred, whilst there were no corresponding profits to be made from merchandise. And now to crown all a check had occurred in the career of conquest. The capricious fortune of war seemed to have changed. This proved to be the last proverbial straw. The veteran Lord Cornwallis was implored to go out to India as if he were the only one who could save the country, and Lord Wellesley was recalled. This occurred in July, 1805, and the great Marquis had to leave India with his plans only half finished. His successor had only some ten weeks of life left, but it was sufficient to inaugurate a new policy. A hasty peace was patched up. Holkar's conquered districts were restored to him; he and Scindia were left uncontrolled by a subsidiary force and free to follow out their own devices with the Rajpootana States, with which Lord Wellesley had resolved to form a defensive alliance, and the elements were left of another war which was bound to break out sooner or later. One subsidiary alliance was formed, viz., with the Gaikwar of Baroda, who agreed to receive 3,000 men as a protection of his state, and so was cut off from the other Mahratta princes. The power of the latter, however, had been scotched, not killed, and even the Peishwa entertained hopes of being able some day to shake off a yoke which he found to be irksome and from which he had again derived no profit, for, owing to his apathy, his own forces had taken little or no share in the late war, and accordingly he received no share in the division of the spoil. The only one who benefited was the Nizam,

who was again put in possession of ancestral dominions, which, but for his alliance with us, would have been lost to him for ever. The actual value of the estates thus recovered may be taken to have been about 30 or 35 lakhs of rupees annually although owing to the constant wars with which they had been ravaged they were greatly depopulated and deteriorated. But the Nizam had nothing to complain of. Since 1792 he had gained a considerable accession of territory, and, by parting with only a portion of it, he had acquired the right of permanent protection at no cost to himself. The 3rd Article* of the "Separate and Secret" clauses attached to the Treaty of 1800 had been faithfully carried out, and, although the battles of Assaye and Argaum had been won by Colonel Wellesley's force, the prestige of the Nizam had been greatly increased by the fact that the conquest of the Berar districts, which were now handed over to him, had been effected by his troops acting in conjunction with the Subsidiary Force under Colonel Stevenson.

* The last portion of this article (which still remains in force) runs as follows :—
" It is, however, declared that, in the event of war and of a conquest partition of conquests between the contracting parties, His Highness the Nawab Asaph Jah shall be entitled to participate equally with the other contracting parties in the division of every territory which may be acquired by the successful exertion of their united arms."

CHAPTER XI

THE HYDERABAD CONTINGENT AND THE PINDARI WAR

WITH the accession of Secunder Jah and the end of the Mahratta war, there commenced an entirely new era for Hyderabad. The history of the last hundred and fifty years has shown it to have been a scene of constant and almost annual warfare. The country had been well-nigh devastated by the results of these perpetual struggles; in many parts it was almost depopulated, and in the absence of anything like a settled Government confusion reigned everywhere. The petty Rajahs and zemindars were frequently in a state of revolt; they were always turbulent and as dilatory as possible in the payment of their *peshkash*. The greater nobles enjoyed in their estates almost regal powers; they had the power of life and death and exercised a kind of *Imperium in imperio*—by one of the greatest of these families, a claim was put forward only a few years ago that the head of it had the right to put three persons to death every day.

Whilst the Government was constantly engaged with foreign enemies it was well-nigh impossible to regulate the internal affairs. Matters were left to adjust themselves as best they could. With the introduction, however, of the system of subsidiary alliance in the Deccan, matters assumed an entirely different aspect, as the Nizam

had no longer any enemies of whom he need be afraid. From being an open enemy, Mysore had become a friendly state. In Poona the British Subsidiary Force was sufficient to keep the Mahrattas quiet, and a similar but larger force was stationed at Hyderabad, which was a sufficient protection of his own dominions against any danger that might be expected from Scindia, Holkar, and Nagpur. To the extreme north-west of his dominions, at Baroda, there was another British Subsidiary Force; and to the east and west he had the allied British Presidencies of Madras and Bombay as his neighbours. The Province of Berar, recently reconquered from Nagpur, was still, it is true, in a considerable state of confusion, and, bordering as it did on the territories of Scindia and Holkar, whom the altered policy of Lord Cornwallis and Sir George Barlow had left independent, was still exposed to the ravages of the Pindaris. The Berar Province itself, from being a garden, had been converted almost into a desert. A large proportion of the inhabitants had either been killed or had emigrated, and it required a long series of years of careful nursing before it could recover its former condition of prosperity. But assured as it was now of protection from foreign enemies, if the Nizam's Government had devoted itself in earnest to the task of retrenchment and reform, it would not have been long before a period of prosperity would have been introduced. Unfortunately no attempts appear to have been made towards retrenchment, especially in the reduction of the large military levies, which under the modern system of warfare had become comparatively useless. The late Nizam had granted to the Shums-ul-Umra family no less than 52 lakhs of rupees' worth of *jaghirs* for the maintenance of the so-called *Paigah*, or feudal troops—a force which, though it



THE NAWAB SIR ASRAR UL-MULK,
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF H.H. THE NIZAM'S ARMY.
(See Appendix No. 1).

may have been necessary twenty years before, was now no longer required for protection of His Highness's person. Besides this small army, there was an immense horde of irregular troops, infantry and cavalry, which were maintained by other noblemen, to whom assignments of land were made for that purpose. Almost all these noblemen resided in Hyderabad, where the Nizam held his court, and vast sums of money were spent in profusion and display. The whole revenue of the country (at least, such of it as the farmers or renters of the estates chose to send) was poured into Hyderabad, and scarcely anything was spent on the internal requirements of the country, such as roads, communications, and sources of irrigation. A certain amount of military the Nizam was bound to maintain, because under the treaty of 1800 he had undertaken to provide a force of 15,000 men to co-operate with the Subsidiary Force in the event of war. Amongst the troops thus entertained there were still a number of brigades officered by Englishmen and Eurasians.*

* Briggs gives the names of some of the officers employed, namely:—

Colonel Finglas	Irish (descendants still survive).
Captain Harding	English.
Captain Douglas	Scotch.
Major Johnstone	East Indian.
Captain don Torribio Paula Denis	Portuguese.
Captain J. Gordon	English.
Captain Freeman	East Indian.
Captain J. Fonseca	Portuguese.
Captain W. Palmer	East Indian.
Captain Guest	English.
Captain Bridges	English.
Captain Drew	English.
Captain Elliot	East Indian.
Captain Vincente	Spaniard.
Captain Blake	East Indian.
Dr. Silvester	Portuguese.
Signor Joachim	Portuguese.
Jose de Nunes	Portuguese.
Mr. Key	English.
Mr. Kullic	English.
Mr. Joachim Schmidt	East Indian (Dutch).
Mr. Flight	East Indian (Dutch).
Mr. Marten	Portuguese.

We have already heard of the Finglas Brigade, which had been raised as a counterpoise to Raymond's French troops. There were several other regiments of this description, officered by Europeans who had not enjoyed a regular military training, and it was in a great measure upon these regiments that the Nizam relied for furnishing the contingent he was bound to supply in case of war. They were accordingly employed for the most part in the western or Aurungabad division of the dominions, from which side danger was chiefly apprehended. Amongst officers of this stamp was a Mr. William Palmer, who had entered the Nizam's service in 1799, and had seen active service in the Mahratta War of 1803-4, under Colonel Stevenson, in Berar, by whom he had been appointed Brigade-Major. Of this gentleman we shall hear more later on.

It has already been narrated that Captain Achilles Kirkpatrick was the Resident at Hyderabad during the important events which occurred in the five years previous to Nizam Ali Khan's death. Captain Kirkpatrick exercised very great personal influence in Hyderabad during the nine years that he was Resident, and formed a romantic attachment to a young lady connected with the great family of Mir Alum. It is related that the young lady was about to be forced into a marriage which was distasteful to her, and that, rather than submit to it, she took refuge in the Resident's house, or rather zenana ; for in those days it was not considered a reproach for a European official to conform in this respect with the customs of the country. This led to an intimate connection between the lady and Captain Kirkpatrick. He brought her openly to the Residency, " built for her specially, the *Rang Mahal*, and there made the usual public acknowledgment of marriage according to Mahomedan ritual,

by allowing garlands to be bound about his brow." (Briggs's *Nizam*, Volume II, Chapter I.)

From this union a son and a daughter were born,* but the connection was highly distasteful to Mir Allum, who made several representations on the subject to the Governor-General, Lord Wellesley. The Resident was called upon for an explanation, which was considered satisfactory, and in 1805 he went to Calcutta to confer with his lordship on political affairs, where he was suddenly taken ill and died on the 15th October, aged 41 years.


Captain Kirkpatrick was succeeded as Resident by Captain Thomas Sydenham, who continued in that post until 1809. For the first period of his administration he was a firm friend and adherent of Mir Allum, whom he caused to be appointed Minister in supersession of the Nizam's authority. The Nizam's assent to this arrangement is said by Briggs to have been "extorted from his timidity." Altogether throughout his reign Secunder Jah seems to have troubled himself very little about public affairs, and was content as long as he was left to his own amusements, and provided with sufficient funds to indulge in them. The great rival of Mir Alum at this time was one Rajah Mohiput Ram. This man the Resident caused to be sent to his jaghirs on the frontier, where he at once broke into revolt; he was, however, subdued without difficulty, and then went to Berar, where he created further disturbances, in the quelling of which the Mr. William Palmer who has been

* The two children were sent to England for their education, where the son died, but the girl grew up and married into a good English family. As Kitty Kirkpatrick she became known for her beauty and wit, and she was immortalised by Carlyle in *Sartor Resartus* as Blumhilde. A descendant of hers was serving in Secunderabad in a British Hussar Regiment in 1896, and was subsequently killed in the Benin expedition.

already mentioned was employed. Subsequently the Rajah took refuge in Holkar's court, by whom he was also employed. Here again he mutinied for arrears of pay, and being attacked by Holkar's troops was killed.

Mir Allum did not long survive his appointment as Minister, and in the question of his successor the Resident again opposed the wishes of the Nizam. The latter desired that the late Minister's son, Munir-ul-Mulk, should succeed his father, but Captain Sydenham insisted that Shums-ul-Umra should be selected, against whose appointment the Nizam had a strong objection on the ground that Shums-ul-Umra had been especially appointed to the great command of the Paigah troops in order to remove him from taking any share in politics and to secure him as adherent of the Nizam's person, to whose sister he was married. Eventually a compromise was arrived at: Munir-ul-Mulk was appointed nominal Minister but was compelled to sign a written engagement to take no part in the administration, "but to be content in the enjoyment of a stipend of about six lakhs of rupees per annum. The authority of the Government was vested in Rajah Chundoo Lal under the designation of the Minister's deputy." (Briggs' "*Nizam*," Vol. II, Chapter 1).

From this time forward for the next thirty-odd years Rajah Chundoo Lal was the principal power in the State. He was a man of great ability, and was intimately conversant with all the intricacies of Hyderabad intrigue. His policy was to make himself as amenable as possible to the British Resident, and at the same time to keep the Nizam quiet by supplying him with all the funds he required. By pursuing this policy he gained the active support of the Resident and of the Government of India, so much so that the Nizam became a



mere puppet and kept himself in the seclusion of his own palace without taking any part in the public affairs of his kingdom.

Captain Sydenham resigned in 1809, in consequence of the Governor-General, Lord Minto, having expressed disapproval of the advice which he had given to the General Commanding the Subsidiary Force on the occasion of a disagreement with his officers. At the time he retired he expressed an opinion that the disorders of the Nizam Government were "too deeply rooted and too widely extended to admit of any remedy short of placing the administration of the country under the control of the Resident." He was succeeded by Captain Charles Russell, who in 1811 was succeeded by his brother, Mr. (afterwards Sir Henry) Russell. At this time the total army of the Nizam consisted of about 70,000 men, the greater part of which was of a most irregular and disorderly description. A very large proportion, especially of the cavalry, were quartered in the Berar Province where their presence was as much feared by the agriculturists as was that of the Pindari freebooters. A large number of infantry and cavalry were also stationed in the Aurungabad district. Some of these regiments were, as already mentioned, officered by Europeans and Eurasians, and were, comparatively speaking, in a greater state of efficiency. There were also several thousand men stationed in Hyderabad itself, remnants of the old French corps and of the Finglas Brigade. These, of course, did not include the irregular rabble of Africans, Arabs, and Afghans, who were maintained as military retainers of the noblemen, with whom the city swarmed, and whose presence rendered it unsafe for a European to visit the city unless strongly guarded. Although at this time the greater part of the

Deccan was at peace as far as any foreign invasion was concerned, still the whole of Central India (including Nagpur, Malwa, and Rajputana) was in a state of anarchy and confusion. The whole of this vast extent of country was ravaged in succession by the armies of Scindia and Holkar, and by the Pindaris, the principal leader of the latter being Amir Khan, the successful freebooter who after some eighteen years of predatory warfare, in which he was constantly changing from one side to another, was at last successful in getting himself recognized as the ruler of the small principality of Tonk. But large though the area of the country was over which these disorders spread, it soon became manifest that they must inevitably spread to the bordering British possessions. In order to maintain the turbulent and disorderly soldiery, fresh fields and pastures new would have to be sought out. The principal Mahratta chiefs—Nagpur, Scindia, and Holkar—were themselves becoming alarmed at the aggressiveness of the Pindaris, and were becoming uneasy at being rigidly restrained by the British boundary which encompassed them on all sides; the Peshwa at Poona also becoming dissatisfied with the comparatively peaceful rôle which the presence of the British Subsidiary Force compelled him to play, was secretly increasing his forces. It became evident that before long there would be another outbreak of war, and that the task which the great Marquis of Wellesley had been compelled to leave uncompleted would ere long have to be taken in hand again. But a war of this kind, in order to be effectual, would have to be conducted on a very large scale, and would tax the whole of the resources, not only of the British army, but also of the subsidiary allies of the British Government. But, large though the Nizam's

army nominally was, it was manifestly out of the question to expect any efficient support from so badly armed and disciplined a force. Accordingly the new Resident, Mr. Henry Russell, resolved to reform and reorganize a small portion, at all events, of this heterogeneous force. He commenced with a body of about 2,000 men stationed in the old French gun foundry, not far from the Residency, and afterwards extended similar reforms to some of the infantry regiments stationed at Aurungabad, and some of the cavalry regiments in Berar, in which reforms the Resident was allowed a free hand by the Nizam's minister, Chundoo Lal. In order to maintain anything like a thorough state of discipline, it was absolutely necessary to ensure regular payment of the troops. This is exactly what the Hyderabad military authorities have never been in the habit of doing. If left to themselves the troops were allowed to remain in arrears of pay for months and months together, until at last they frequently broke into open revolt, tied their officers to guns and threatened to blow them away unless their arrears were discharged. This is what actually happened in 1812 amongst the troops, which, as above stated, were quartered in the old French lines at Hyderabad. After the murder of their commandant, Major George Gordon, by a mutineer, he was succeeded in the command by his brother, Major Edward Gordon. The soldiers again mutinied, tied their commanding officer to a gun, and threatened to blow him away unless their pay was given them together with a free pardon for their offence. (Briggs's "Nizam," Volume II, Chapter 4.)

The demands were acceded to, but, as there was no money in the Nizam's treasury, funds were furnished by the Resident, who afterwards so far departed from the promise held out to the mutineers as to insist upon the

principal offenders being punished. It was this incident that caused him to take the necessary reforms in hand, and he at once commenced with the corps in question. The brigade thus remodelled consisted of two battalions numbering nearly 2,000 men, together with a train of one 24-pounder, four 6-pounders, and two 5½-pounder howitzers. This force came to be styled the Russell Brigade, and was permitted to purchase ammunition and stores from the Company's arsenal at Secunderabad. Arrangements were also made by the Resident for regular payment of these troops from the *peshkash*, amounting to nine lakhs of rupees a year, which it will be remembered was paid by the British to the Nizam for the Northern Circars. This Russell Brigade formed the foundation of what has been subsequently known as the Hyderabad Contingent.

In the meantime, a large banking house had been formed in Hyderabad by Mr. William Palmer, who had retired from the Nizam's service in 1810. Mr. William Palmer was a gentleman of mixed blood, whose father, General Palmer, was for a long time Resident at the Court of Scindia and married a Mahommedan Begum. From this union there were three sons, one being Mr. George Palmer, who was a wealthy merchant and banker at Calcutta, and the others William and Hastings Palmer, who settled at Hyderabad. They took as partners a Mr. Samuel Russell (of the same name but no relation to the Resident), a native *sowcar* named Bankadi Das and Mr. William Currie, who though he held the appointment of Residency Surgeon, was, under the regulations then in force, allowed to embark in private trade. Subsequently, the firm took as another partner, Sir William Rumbold, who had come out with the Governor-General, Lord Moira, better known as the Marquis of Hastings, and married a ward of that nobleman. Sir William Rumbold

was not a mere adventurer : he was a grandson of Sir Thomas Rumbold, the notorious Governor of Madras, from whom he had inherited a considerable fortune. A portion of this fortune he embarked in the firm of William Palmer & Co.

The objects of this firm were not only banking, but also the development of the resources of the country. They embarked largely in the timber trade on the Godavery, and invested to a considerable extent in the cotton produce of Berar. In 1816 they obtained a licence from the Government of India to carry on their business as bankers, and to have pecuniary transactions with the Nizam's Government. This could not have been done without a licence, because under 37th George III, Chapter 142, Section 28, no European was allowed to have any financial transactions with Native States without the express sanction of the Governor-General in Council, the only reservation made being "that it should be at the discretion of the British Resident at Hyderabad, for the time being, to satisfy himself regarding the nature and objects of the transactions in which Europeans might engage under the permission accorded." The banking house, thus formed and authorized by the terms of the licence to be in communication with the British Resident, was of very considerable use to Mr. Russell in the military reforms which he was carrying out, which was especially the case in regard to the newly organized regiments at Aurungabad and Berar. Under arrangements with the Hyderabad Government, the firm guaranteed the regular payment of the troops, being reimbursed from time to time by the Minister, either by cash payments from the revenue or by assignments of land. Punctuality in payment was not, however, one of the chief points of the Hyderabad Government, and, as interest at the rate of

24 per cent. was charged on all outstanding balances, this item formed one of the firm's principal sources of profit. To modern ears this rate of interest sounds very high, but at the time we are writing of it was the ordinary rate of interest charged in all mercantile circles. So dear was money that the merchants themselves gave as much as 12 per cent. on deposits, and when making advances on a large scale to the Government they frequently had to borrow money themselves at 21 or even 24 per cent. Even at the present day, it is not uncommon to find that the charges for loans are from 6 to 18 per cent. and even more. It will be easily understood how, in the course of a comparatively short time this commercial firm became a most important factor in the Hyderabad State, and Mr. William Palmer and Sir William Rumbold took status amongst the most important residents of Hyderabad. They kept open house, and it is said that in the house of the former the table was always laid for at least thirty guests. They were lavish in their entertainments, and, being allowed access to the palace without the intervention of the Resident, were regarded by most of the principal personages of Hyderabad as being even of greater importance than the Resident himself. This prestige was greatly enhanced by the connection of Sir William Rumbold with the Governor-General's family, and the consequence was that the influence of this great banking firm overshadowed that of the Residency itself. As long as Mr. Russell was at Hyderabad this does not seem to have caused any friction. By means of this firm's support Mr. Russell was able to carry out all his reforms, and in about four years' time he succeeded in organizing a select and really efficient body of troops numbering about 7,000 men, formed of all arms. One portion of

this force, as already stated, was stationed at Hyderabad, but the remainder was garrisoned at Aurungabad and in Berar. These reforms, however, were not carried out for nothing ; the *peshkash* of nine lakhs was soon found to be insufficient to provide for their payment, and by the year 1818 the cost of these re-formed troops, generally known as the Russell Brigade, amounted to 36 lakhs of rupees.

At the time of which we are writing the total revenue of the Hyderabad State could not have amounted to more than a crore and a half of rupees, or about one and a half million sterling, for the Mahrattas still continued to levy *chouth* over a considerable portion of the western districts. When it is further remembered that the Nizam still maintained a very large army and had also assigned more than half a crore of jaghirs for the upkeep of the Paigah force, it will be understood that the cost of this Russell Brigade constituted a very heavy drain, and that after meeting the demands of the Nizam there was but little left to cover the cost of administration. Chundoo Lal, however, knowing that these re-formed troops were a special hobby of the Resident, made no difficulties in supplying him with the necessary funds, whilst at the same time he furnished the Nizam with the money which he demanded. In this way there arose a period of financial embarrassment which lasted for at least 25 years more, and threatened in the end to plunge the State into a condition of insolvency.

In the meantime, the long-threatened war of extermination against the Pindari hordes had actually commenced in 1817. Lord Hastings' plan was to envelop them on all sides ; from the south by the Nizam's Subsidiary Force ; from the west by an army from Bombay ; whilst he in person accompanied the grand army from the north

and north-east. But no sooner had the Deccan Subsidiary Forces marched to take up their respective positions than fresh troubles with the Mahrattas commenced. The first to break into open revolt was the Peshwa, Baji Rao, of Poona. Taking advantage of the absence of the main body of the Subsidiary Force, he called in the whole of his available troops. The Resident, Colonel Barry Close, was just able to obtain some small reinforcements when the Peshwa's army advanced against him. The Residency was vacated and burned, and there followed the battle of Kirkee, in which, though little more than 1,600 British were attacked by thousands of Mahrattas, the result was a signal defeat of the Peshwa, who thereupon became a fugitive, until, after a year spent in hiding, he at last surrendered and was sent as an exile to Bithur, near Cawnpore, on the Ganges, where he afterwards resided, deprived, it is true, of his possessions, but in enjoyment of a princely allowance of £60,000 a year. It was here that he adopted as his son the afterwards notorious Nana Saheb. The example of Poona was followed at Nagpur. As soon as the British force had left for the Pindari war, the Rajah, or, as he afterwards pretended, his troops, without his consent, broke into open revolt. The battle of Setabaldi followed, with the same result as that of the battle of Kirkee, and although for the time the Rajah of Nagpur obtained better conditions than had fallen to the fate of the Peishwa he was effectually prevented from doing any mischief in future. But the infection of rebellion spread to the two other Mahratta princes, Scindia and Holkar, with the consequence that two years were occupied before the war was brought to a successful conclusion. The southern army was under the command of Sir Thomas Hislop. At the battle of Mahidpore, Hislop totally defeated

Holkar's army (December 21st, 1817). Holkar's submission followed, and in a treaty which was concluded on the 6th January, 1818, he entered into a bond of subsidiary alliance and agreed to reduce his troops to a contingent of 3,000 horse, and from this time forward he became a loyal ally of the British Government. After Holkar's defeat, Scindia also became more tractable, and the British troops were able to devote their attention to the Pindaris, who were divided into three bodies, headed by Wassal Mahomed, Curreem and Cheetoo. The two former were defeated in detail and their bands were broken up. Cheetoo's fate was even more tragic. After being followed and defeated in several engagements his followers gradually deserted him, until at length, when singly pursuing his flight, he was devoured by a tiger in the jungles near the fort of Aseergarh in Berar. "The Pindaris thus dispersed, without leaders, and without a home or rendezvous, were afterwards little heard of, though flying parties were seen in the Deccan until the termination of the war with the Peishwa; they mingled with the rest of the population, but the real Pindaris still retain their name, though some have become active improving farmers." (*Grant Duff*, Volume II, Chapter 26.) A course of pacification followed rapidly. The Rajpoot States of Jodhpur and Jaipur were admitted to an alliance which freed them from all further danger from Mahrattas and Pindaris. What the ravages of these marauders in Rajpootana were has been described by Colonel Tod in the *Annals of Rajasthan*, a book which everyone interested in Indian history should carefully study. The Rajah of Bondi, who on a former occasion had been conspicuous for his loyalty in helping Colonel Monson during his disastrous retreat in the former Mahratta war, but had been ill requited by Lord Corn-

wallis and Sir George Barlow by being left to his fate, was now amply recompensed. All tribute was relinquished and the possessions usurped by Holkar and Scindia restored. Similar favours were shown to the Nawab of Bhopal, not only for the friendship of his ancestor towards General Goddard's army in the previous century, but for the zeal he had shown in the present war by selling his jewels to support troops.

The Peshwa himself finally surrendered on the 3rd June, 1818, and the war was finally brought to a conclusion by the reduction of the celebrated fortress of Aseergurh, after a siege of twenty days (9th April, 1819).

The foregoing is but a very brief summary of the last of the warlike proceedings in Central and Southern India. The whole story has been narrated by Grant Duff, who was himself an active sharer in the war itself, as well as in the pacification that followed. It only remains to be said that the Nizam's Subsidiary Force and the re-formed Russell Brigade took an active and most creditable share in the whole of the proceedings. After the close of the war, the Russel Brigade was highly commended by Sir Thomas Hislop for its zeal and efficiency. It took a part in the battle of Mahidpore, and the name of this decisive engagement is borne on the flag of the Hyderabad Contingent, by which name the force became known until its final absorption into the British Army under an agreement with the Nizam, dated the 5th November, 1902. Another portion of the force was engaged during this war in the reduction of the fort of Nowar. This fort was situated in a jaghir belonging to the Peshwa in the very heart of the Nizam's dominions, about twenty miles from the town of Nander, near the Godavery. The fort was strongly garrisoned by Arabs,

and the siege lasted from the 8th to the 31st January, 1819, when it was carried with great gallantry by two battalions of the Russell Brigade, the 3rd battalion of the Berar Regular Infantry and a party of the Nizam's Reformed Horse, accompanied by a field battery and a small battering train. The name of this engagement is also borne upon the regimental standards. With this episode the period of warfare in the Deccan, which had lasted almost continuously for 170 years, may be said to have concluded. From this time forward *Pax Britannica* reigned throughout these disturbed regions, for on all sides they were surrounded either by British possessions or by tributary allies of the British power. It now only remains to be told what share fell to the Nizam for his co-operation. We cannot do better than quote from Grant Duff (Volume II, Chapter 27), who was himself one of the principal officers concerned in the settlements that followed :

"As to claims, the most important upon the British Government were those which regarded the settlement with its ally, the Nizam, but no arrangement of their mutual affairs could be made until it had been fully ascertained what surplus revenue the British Government should derive from the conquest. The advantages immediately gained by the Nizam were exemption from debts amounting to about 60 millions of rupees,* which on the most moderate estimate he could not have settled with the Peishwa without making cession of territory equal to ten lakhs of rupees a year. The shares of revenue within the boundary of the Subadar of the Deccan, which the Peishwa or his subjects had enjoyed up to the breaking out of the war and of which the Nizam now retained the collections, were more than equal to

* 6 crores—£6,000,000.

twelve lakhs of rupees a year, and the cessions which fell to him from the Governments of Holkar and the Rajah of Nagpur amounted to nearly six more ; so that the Nizam obtained an addition of at least 28 lakhs of rupees of annual revenue."



CHAPTER XII

THE HYDERABAD CONTINGENT AND WILLIAM PALMER AND CO.

IT will be seen from the facts recorded in the previous chapter that the reforms carried out by the Resident in the Russell Brigade, the Berar Regular Infantry, and the re-formed Cavalry, which comprised together about 7,000 men (the different corps for the sake of brevity being hereafter styled the Hyderabad Contingent), were commenced and carried out in all good faith with the intention of rendering as efficient as possible the Contingent which the Nizam was bound under treaty to furnish. That these measures were eminently successful is shewn by the highly creditable manner in which the troops acquitted themselves during the Pindari war. It was, perhaps, unfortunate for the Nizam that the Contingent should have shown itself as efficient as it did; for the British Government became naturally reluctant to lose the services of so compact a little army which had proved itself to be so useful in a case of emergency. In addition, therefore, to the Contingent being a favourite hobby of the Resident as his own creation, and of which he was regarded as the controlling authority with all the powers of patronage at his disposal, it became a policy on the part of the Government of India that the

Nizam should be encouraged to continue the maintenance of so valuable a military unit. The minister Chundoo Lal was, as we have said, by no means disinclined to humour the Resident, and to defer to the wishes of the Government of India. For his own part he would probably have been quite willing to reduce the number of the Nizam's irregular forces, and so effect a saving in order to provide for the cost of the Contingent, but this was a matter which would naturally be very distasteful to His Highness; for according to his traditions it would lower his prestige to reduce his army, besides there were so many vested interests concerned that any step of this kind would have been highly resented and have raised against him a host of enemies, who would have rendered his position even more difficult than it was. Accordingly, Chundoo Lal temporized and gave a free hand to the great banking house of William Palmer & Co., to make the necessary advances for the upkeep of the Contingent. In this manner the Hyderabad Government became largely indebted to that firm, and in 1820 William Palmer & Co. proposed to adjust this indebtedness by consolidating it into a loan of 60 lakhs of rupees, which was to be paid off by regular instalments. The interest on this loan was to be reduced from 24 to 18 per cent., but the firm was also to receive a bonus of commission of 8 lakhs of rupees. The arrangement was recommended by the Resident, Sir Henry Russell, and sanctioned by the Government of India. In 1820, Sir Henry Russell retired, and was succeeded by his friend, Mr. (afterwards Sir Charles, and subsequently Lord) Metcalfe, who had been private secretary to the Governor-General, Lord Hastings, and was, of course, fully acquainted with Hyderabad affairs, which for many years had formed a subject for correspondence. He

must have been fully aware of the embarrassed state of the country's finances, but immediately after his arrival he did not hesitate to put forward a request which he had brought with him from the Governor-General, that the Nizam would contribute a sum of 16 lakhs of rupees towards the improvement of the city of Calcutta. It was only natural that this request should have been taken as a command, and was at once complied with. How Chundoo Lal managed to raise the money we are not able to explain, but he was probably only able to do so by further borrowing of a ruinous description, the burden of which ultimately fell upon the unfortunate cultivators. When Metcalfe arrived in Hyderabad the house of William Palmer & Co. was in the very zenith of its prosperity. As already mentioned, the partners were profuse in their hospitality, while politically, owing to their financial relations with the Minister and the Nizam, they probably enjoyed more influence than the Resident himself, whose business communications were chiefly confined to the Minister. These financial relations were not merely confined to advances in money, as the firm also acted as general agents for the supply of European goods of every description, not only to the Nizam but also to the different noblemen who vied with each other in their profusion and ostentation. It would seem that when Metcalfe arrived he was not imbued with any hostile feelings against the firm ; indeed, he was on intimate terms with John Palmer, at Calcutta, who was the brother of William Palmer, of Hyderabad ; he was also a friend of Sir William Rumbold, who had married a ward of Lord Hastings, and he knew that his patron and friend, the Governor-General, was greatly interested in the latter's welfare. These considerations would naturally predispose him in favour

of the firm, and, indeed, no one was more cordial in welcoming him than each of the principal partners; but, before he had been in Hyderabad many months, Metcalfe came to see that the influence of William Palmer & Co., was likely to form a most dangerous element in Hyderabad politics. The very connection of one of the partners with the Governor-General led the orientals of Hyderabad to suppose that his private influence with Lord Hastings was supreme, while the indebtedness of the Government to the firm, which could only be temporarily met by continual assignments of land, threatened before long to make them the paramount power in Hyderabad. Again, it soon became apparent that many of the officials connected with the Residency were pecuniarily interested in the firm's transactions, either by receiving an unduly high rate of interest on their deposits or else by receiving a share of the profits in return for investments. Metcalfe came to the conclusion that even at the sacrifice of his own prospects this overshadowing influence of the firm must be broken. Major Briggs, who was an Assistant at the Residency some years later, attributes the attitude which Metcalfe assumed to be due to personal pique at finding himself obliged, as it were, to play second-fiddle to the firm; but calmly reviewing the facts after a lapse of years it only seems fair to ascribe Metcalfe's action to conscientiousness. Had he been less conscientious, selfish motives alone would have induced him to remain quiet, and to support the firm, towards which he knew that the Governor-General, from whom he had everything to expect, was favourably disposed. This is the view which Kaye, in his *Life of Lord Metcalfe* takes, and it is one with which, knowing Lord Metcalfe's subsequent career and character, we feel bound to agree.

Before taking any active steps, Metcalfe made a lengthened tour throughout the Nizam's dominions, especially in those parts in and near the Berar districts, which had chiefly suffered in the former wars, and these he found to be nearly depopulated: the inhabitants had fled elsewhere, and the lands which were assessed at an exorbitantly high rate were left uncultivated and waste, owing both to want of money to pay for them and want of labour to cultivate them. Metcalfe accordingly introduced a system under which European officers were placed in charge of districts, the rates were to be reduced, and the cultivators were invited to return with the promise of protection. This arrangement was no doubt made with the very best intentions; and, although at first great hopes were conceived regarding it, it does not appear to have been successful in the end. Not only was the European supervision necessarily a costly one, but the dual management of Europeans and natives, especially when the latter found that their hereditary habits of speculation and corruption were interfered with, caused an amount of friction which made the whole arrangement very distasteful to the Hyderabad Government. Naturally, the European officials, when thwarted or opposed, appealed to the Resident, and this led to an interference which was scarcely consistent with Treaty arrangements. Subsequently, when the Nizam died in 1829, this arrangement was abolished by one stroke of the pen, and the old system of the native management was reverted to. It is difficult to give a correct description of what this system was, but suffice it to say that it was permeated throughout by corruption. Persons who had claims against the Government received assignments of lands, from the revenues of which they were supposed to reimburse themselves; and, knowing that

before long they would probably be replaced by others with similar claims, they naturally tried to feather their nests as much as possible. Others again offered to the Minister *nazars* by way of bribes, for the privilege of farming out one or more districts, and such persons always remained at head-quarters, and sent out their deputies to do their dirty work. Indeed, it not infrequently happened that the same district was farmed out to more than one person, from each of whom a *nazar* had been received, so that it became a proverb in Hyderabad that when a deputy went out to join a new district he rode with his face to the horse's tail in order to see whether his successor was following him. (See First Administration Report of the Nizam's Dominions for the Year 1884-5, Historical Review, Chapter XII). One of the results of Metcalfe's tour was to convince him of the dangerous nature of the influence of William Palmer & Co., and of the drain their demands upon the Government caused to the country. The consequence was that he made an official recommendation to the Government of India that steps should be taken to raise, at a more reasonable rate of interest, a loan sufficient to pay off the whole of the State's liabilities to the firm. In his proposals the Resident was even liberal in his wish to compensate the firm for the losses they would incur in having to bring their financial transactions to a close; and, in addition to the eight lakhs of rupees bonus which they had been promised under the loan just concluded, he recommended that a further sum of six lakhs should be given in the shape of compensation. But, liberal though his proposal was, it by no means corresponded with the wishes of the firm. Before sending off his despatch, Metcalfe showed a copy of it to the partners, and they at once forwarded a vigorous protest

to head-quarters, Sir William Rumbold using the whole of the influence he possessed with the Governor-General to induce him to reject the proposal. He appears to have led Lord Hastings to suppose that Metcalfe was actuated by personal feelings against himself and the minister, Chundoo Lal, and Lord Hastings appear to have entirely sided with the firm; he was highly displeased that his former protégé should have sent up these proposals officially without having first consulted him on the subject, and the result was that for more than a year and a half the proposal was shelved, and Lord Hastings wrote to Metcalfe privately, with a considerable amount of irritation, pointing out to him what he conceived to be his disloyalty; adding that in return for his past services the Government of India was pledged to uphold Chundoo Lal. The result of this was that the firm became more influential than ever, and the Hyderabad authorities became convinced that the firm's influence was superior to that of the Resident. The minister, Chundoo Lal, even went so far as to ignore the Resident and send a communication to the Governor-General through the medium of Sir William Rumbold. All this no doubt caused Metcalfe a considerable amount of pain and embarrassment, but, in spite of the estrangement it had caused between him and his former patron, he conscientiously adhered to the course he had adopted, continuing to denounce the transactions of the firm, and to point out the political danger that was being caused by their influence, and by the association of so many officials in their affairs. He also pointed out the danger that arose from the constantly increasing expenditure on the Hyderabad Contingent, which he did not hesitate to describe as a mere "plaything" of the Resident, and used by him for the purposes of patron-

age (Kaye's *Life of Lord Metcalfe*, Vol. II, Chapter 2). In this he was undoubtedly right, for, as already pointed out, the whole of the Deccan was now in a state of profound peace. The Subsidiary Force was more than sufficient to afford ample protection to the Nizām within his own dominions, and outside of them he had absolutely nothing to fear, for he was now entirely surrounded either by British territory or the territory of allied princes. Around him the *Pax Britannica* had been for the first time introduced, and whatever trouble he had to expect in future arose entirely from the disorganized state of his own dominions and finances. The disorganization of the dominions was in a great measure due to the disorganization of the finances, and this again was in a great measure due to the enormous drain caused by the maintenance of the Contingent and by the claims of William Palmer & Co. There seems to be no doubt that, had Lord Hastings acted with fairness and consideration towards the interests of his old and "faithful ally" the Nizām, he would not have encouraged him to maintain this expensive and unnecessary force. But this of course he never adopted; for, instead of helping him to reduce if not abolish the force entirely, for the next thirty years he actually deprecated any interference with it whatsoever. As the Contingent became an established fact, vested interests continued to grow up in connection with it, which became well-nigh impossible to sever. Like an avalanche, the evil continued to increase in volume and weight the longer it moved on, and although successive Governors-General spoke and wrote derisively of the expenditure, and although successive Residents pointed out the growing embarrassments of the Government, no one ever attempted to apply the knife to the sore which was sapping the vitals of the

country. On the contrary, the Governors-General continued to insist upon the punctual discharge by the Nizam of the full cost of the force, and when under altered circumstances he began to fall into arrears we held him personally responsible.

But we are anticipating the course of events, and it is necessary to revert to Hyderabad in 1822. Finding the estrangement between himself and the Governor-General to be increasing, Metcalfe wrote a long statement of all the transactions of the firm and of the different persons involved in them, which he sent to Mr. John Adam, the senior member of Council, with a request that he would shew it privately to Lord Hastings. This paper completely vindicated Metcalfe's action, and justified all that he had done. Lord Hastings seems to have been convinced that it was impossible to support the firm any longer, and wrote to Metcalfe a very handsome letter of reconciliation in which he informed him that the proposed loan by which the Hyderabad Government's liabilities to the banking firm would be paid off, had been sanctioned. This generous overture was at once met by Metcalfe in the same spirit and the estrangement between the two friends came to an end. Lord Hastings' period of office had expired, and he left India on the 1st January, 1823, being succeeded by Mr. John Adam as Acting Governor-General. It was by this officer that the affair of William Palmer & Co. was settled. The debt due to them was paid by means of sixty lakhs of rupees advanced by the Government of India and remitted to the Resident at Hyderabad. The bonus of eight lakhs stipulated for by the firm on the loan of 1820 was disallowed, as were also six lakhs of rupees recommended by Metcalfe to be given as compensation for losses to the firm. William Palmer

& Co.'s claims were not only thus paid off, but the occupation of the firm was also gone and its influence entirely broken. Further transactions with the Nizam of a similar nature were prohibited, and with the departure of Lord Hastings, who was known to be the firm's chief supporter, the public withdrew their confidence and with it their business, and the consequence was that in a few months the firm of William Palmer & Co. had to declare itself insolvent. The loan thus advanced by the Government of India was subsequently liquidated by an arrangement under which the *peshkash* payable by the Government for the Northern Circars was permanently remitted. The *peshkash* amounted to nine lakhs of rupees, and Captain Hastings Fraser, in alluding to this transaction, says that the Nizam had to alienate this *peshkash* for little more than half its value, or, to be precise, Rs. 11,666,666, which amounts to 13 years' purchase.

Although there can be no doubt that it was a political necessity to break the influence which William Palmer & Co. were gaining in the Hyderabad State, it would seem that in the final arrangements the firm was treated with undue severity. They had undoubtedly rendered great service in advancing the funds to equip and maintain the Contingent before and during the Pindari War. Had the supply of the funds been left to the Nizam's Government, there can be no doubt that the troops would have been left unpaid and would therefore have become disorganized. In reference to the same Contingent, Metcalfe subsequently wrote in 1823 that the men had been left so long in arrears that they actually fell in the ranks from sheer exhaustion. Troops of this kind would, of course, have been utterly useless, and it was entirely due to the manner in which William Palmer & Co. came for-

ward with the necessary funds that the Contingent was able to take the field at all. This they did without any guarantee from the supreme Government that their advances would be paid. Such services deserved more consideration than was ultimately shown to them. Nor can it be said that the rate of 24 per cent. for interest was exorbitantly high. It was the ordinary rate at the time which prevailed at Hyderabad, and was what the Hyderabad Government were in the habit of paying on their transactions to the native bankers.

In the discussion which subsequently took place in the India House, Sir Charles Forbes, the leading European banker at Bombay at the time, spoke regarding the rate of interest prevailing in India; he alluded to one transaction of the Government of India itself when they called for a loan in 1798, for which they actually had to pay with discount and interest no less than 34 per cent. per annum! He also added the following remarkable statement: "Now, sir, I have a letter in my pocket at this moment from Calcutta, which states that while some of the houses there are refusing money at four per cent. others are getting 12 per cent. for three months, this is 52 per cent. per annum." So much for the matter of interest; and it would therefore seem that, although it was necessary as a political expedient to destroy the firm's influence, the Government might well have afforded to treat them with greater liberality. Subsequently in February and March, 1824, the whole subject came on for discussion at the India House in the Court of Proprietors. This was brought about by a somewhat ill-advised proposal by some of Lord Hastings' friends for a testimonial in recognition of the services he had rendered whilst Governor-General. He had already been granted £60,000 after the close of the Pindari War and this fresh

proposal was opposed. One of the grounds of the opposition was the interest which Lord Hastings had shown in the affairs of William Palmer & Co. It virtually became an attack upon Sir Henry Russell by the one side and upon Metcalfe by the other. Russell, in a very masterly speech, vindicated himself and also the firm. The whole discussion caused a good deal of excitement in London and party feeling ran very high. After six days' debate the original proposition to give Lord Hastings a further gratuity was lost. The mutual attacks upon Russell and Metcalfe fell through, and subsequently a half-hearted despatch was sent by the Board of Directors that the claims of William Palmer should if possible be satisfied. This does not appear ever to have been done, but the Hyderabad Government continued to pay to William Palmer and his family certain handsome allowances amounting in the aggregate to Rs. 45,000 monthly, and, writing in 1861, Major Briggs says: "Mr. William Palmer still lives enjoying a green old age."

NOTE.—The authorities for this chapter are chiefly Kaye's *Life of Lord Metcalfe* and Briggs's *Our Faithful Ally*—two writers with diametrically opposite opinions.

CHAPTER XIII

MINISTRY OF MAHARAJAH CHANDOO LAL (*continued*)

PERIOD 1825 TO 1845



THE twenty-five years comprised in the period treated of in this chapter, although extending over a time of profound peace, are not marked by any of the triumphs of peace. The record unfortunately is not one of progress, but of deterioration, and at the close of the period it seemed as if nothing but a miracle could save the Hyderabad State from ruin. Not the ruin brought about by the armed forces of the enemy, as seemed so probable at the end of the previous century, after the battle of Kurdla; but financial ruin, which is sometimes even more fatal in its results. To use a homely phrase, it may be said of Hyderabad that during this period the State was not only burning its candle at both ends; but in the middle also; and, in pursuance of the policy of non-interference, it was allowed to continue in its career unchecked by what had been the allied, but had now become the paramount Power. The state of dis-

organization in the interior of the country has been described in a former chapter. This condition of affairs continued in even a more accentuated form, for a system of paying off one debt by contracting another can have but one inevitable result. Disorganized finances of a State must add to oppression and extortion in the interior. Whilst each official was endeavouring to make as much hay during the short period that his official sun was shining, all discipline and supervision were relaxed. The ryots or peasants were the sufferers, and as they are, in an agricultural country, the geese who lay the golden eggs, the revenues of the country continued to decrease, whilst the expenditure showed no signs of diminution. No attempt was made to reduce the huge number of irregular soldiery, for the maintenance of which enormous tracts of country were alienated; there was no falling off in the profuse expenditure of the court and its followers in the capital, and added to this was the annually growing expenditure on the Hyderabad Contingent, which, to use Metcalfe's phrase, had become the "plaything" of the Resident, its maintenance being the price that the minister, Chundoo Lal, had to pay for the unwavering support of successive Viceroys. Indeed, the maintenance of this force had become, to a certain extent, a necessity, for without its presence it is probable that the increasing exactions and corruptions in the interior would have produced ceaseless revolts and disorders; for under the treaty the services of the Subsidiary Force were only available against a foreign foe, and were not to be utilized for police purposes and the maintenance of internal order. The system introduced by Metcalfe, of employing English officials in the collection of the revenue and in the administration of the district, had not been found to work well. Although financially

it was a success, it soon led to friction. There was a constant struggle between the British officials and the local authorities and the former naturally appealed to their own Resident. This dual authority was likely to, and actually did, cause unpleasantness. In Chundoo Lal's own words to Metcalfe, not long after the new system had been introduced, "there was not room for two swords in one scabbard," and, as the non-interference policy became more marked, the system was viewed with less favour by the Government of India. In 1829, Secunder Jah died and was succeeded by his son Nasir-ud-Dowlah, one of the first of whose acts was to abolish the whole system with a stroke of the pen, and neither the Resident nor the Governor-General attempted the slightest protest. In a short time the condition of the interior of the country became even worse than it had been before, although at head-quarters official correspondence between the Hyderabad Government and the Resident ran a smoother course. Chundoo Lal still continued to be minister, although he was now becoming an old man. His position and character have been well described by General Fraser, who was appointed Resident in 1838. In a confidential letter to the Governor-General, Lord Auckland, written soon after his appointment, he says, after describing the condition to which the country had been reduced: "It may appear remarkable that, under the circumstances I have described, the government of the country should have been maintained at all, and that the whole machinery of the State had not been destroyed or its movement stopped many years ago. This may in some measure be attributed to the Minister's personal character—the mild and clement disposition of which prevents him from ever committing a harsh or cruel act, his generosity and lavish disbursement of

money, which secure him many friends and partisans, and the skill with which he has managed parties at Hyderabad, so far concentrating the whole power in his own hands as not to have had, for many years, a rival or antagonist to disturb the course of his administration, or to impair or call in question the autocracy (in the most absolute sense of the term) which he has created for himself. But the general tranquillity of the country and absence of any serious disturbance are, no doubt, principally to be ascribed to our support, to the presence of our troops, and to the close connection and friendship known to have always subsisted between the British Government and the Minister. Yet all these but account for the protracted existence of the Nizam's Government, which may still *consist with much wretchedness and degradation.*" After dwelling at some length upon the difficulty and danger of interfering by advice, the General goes on to say: "If your Lordship commands me to say whether any immediate suggestions have occurred to me in reference to the Nizam's dominions, the adoption of which might seem desirable, I am constrained to reply that, as long as Chundoo Lal lives, I apprehend little or nothing can be done. He is very old (between 77 and 78) and in all human probability the grave cannot be far removed from him. He has played the game of government long, and skilfully, a word which I use rather than ably, for I cannot ascribe to him genuine capacity, nor, still less, great talent. We have been the tools in his hand. Adroitly opposing the Nizam to us, or us at other times to his sovereign, as might suit the aim and object of the moment, he has contrived to keep the government—or rather the dictatorship—of the country in his hands for thirty years. Still, what his motives may have been, and how far soever actuated

by self-interest and determination to uphold his own authority, he has been truly and essentially our friend. . . . But his death may cause embarrassment, which it will be desirable that we should, if possible, guard against by adopting some precaution. The debts of the State to *sowcars* will almost certainly be productive of financial difficulties; but, if any actual disturbance should occur on that score, it will probably arise from the claims of the Nizam's troops, Arabs, battalions of the line, horsemen and others, for payment of their arrears." The General then goes on to show the necessity of establishing an understanding with the Minister's successor, and passes in review the names of the different persons likely to succeed, concluding with the advice that, when a successor shall have been appointed in the ordinary course of events, a loan at 6 per cent. should be raised under the guarantee of the British Government in order to enable the Nizam to pay off the liabilities for which he was then paying 18 per cent. During the next few years this proposal was renewed but it was never actually carried into effect. In the meantime, the State's financial liabilities went on increasing, and in addition to the *sowcars* a new creditor appeared on the scene in the shape of the British Government for the pay due to the Contingent, which began to fall into arrears. A question was at the same time raised by the Government of India whether the whole of the pay of the British officers lent to the different native contingents should not be paid by those States. Hitherto the custom had been for the substantive pay of these officers to be met by their own Government, the especial allowance to which they were entitled being borne by the Native States. General Fraser deprecated the introduction of this rule as regards Hyderabad, on the ground that the Nizam was already

inclined to ask for the abolition of the force and would certainly object to this new burden ; and for the additional reason that if paid entirely by a foreign State the officers would be no longer amenable to the Mutiny Act.

In 1829, Sir Charles Metcalfe had already recorded a minute on this force in which he said : " The existence of a force paid by a Native State, but commanded by our officers and entirely under our control, is undoubtedly a great political advantage. It is an accession to our military strength at the expense of another Power, and without cost to us ; an accession of military strength in an empire, where military strength is everything. The advantage is immense. But I cannot say that I think the arrangement a just one towards the Native State. The same circumstances which make it so advantageous to us make it unjust to the State at whose expense it is upheld." In the same minute, Sir Charles reviewed the whole position in Hyderabad in the following words : " We never conquered the Nizam's territories : our relation with that prince has always been one of alliance, and his alliance was once held to be of so much importance that the officer who negotiated the treaty establishing it was rewarded by a baronetcy. Since that period we have assumed much interference with the country, not warranted by any of our treaties. We effected the elevation of a Minister, who, emboldened by our support, ceased to be the Minister of his own Sovereign, and became in fact the reckless ruler of the country. . . . Our command of a considerable portion of the Nizam's troops still continues, but this is derived, not from any treaty, but from an arrangement with the Minister whom we supported, and who being in power finds this force essential for his own security and domination. . . . Not only is our command of the Nizam's auxiliary force

liable to be withdrawn on the Nizam's requisition, but it is likely to cease from another cause. It gives an undue power to the Government over its own subjects and may lead to our being the instruments of oppression." After General Fraser's assumption of office he soon found that the Nizam was most reluctant to continue to bear the charge of maintaining the Contingent. The cost of this army he said in a letter to Lord Auckland on the 7th November, 1839, "already amounted to thirty-eight lakhs of rupees per annum (£380,000)—an amount which the Government finds it extremely difficult to pay, and which they pay, I believe, but very reluctantly, especially distributed as the army now is, tending not so much as it might to maintain the general peace of the country, and therefore not admitting of the disbandment of many of the irregular troops." But in spite of these representations the Government of India showed no signs either of reducing the cost or the numbers of the Contingent. An appointment to the force was looked upon as one of the prizes of the service, since each officer received an allowance in addition to his substantive pay, at the Nizam's expense. In 1829, these allowances (distributed among 123 officers) amounted to no less than Rs. 1,349,880 or 13½ lakhs (£135,000)! As Colonel Hastings Fraser remarks (*Memoir of General Fraser*): "The Minister and the Contingent were in short the two points of incessant contact and communication between the Resident and His Highness on the one hand, and between the Resident and the Honourable Company on the other. The Minister was always to be maintained if he saved the Contingent from being dependent on the caprice of the ruler, and left it entirely to our discretion. The Resident was constantly told that above all things permanent security for the payment of these troops was

to be 'sedulously sought for at every favourable opportunity,' and that, except with the great object in view, 'it were as well, perhaps, to avoid questions and propositions regarding the Nizam's army.' "

The policy of the Government of India at this time seems to have been to throw the whole of the military duties on the Contingent and to withdraw, if possible, the Subsidiary Force, the numbers of which had been fixed at "8,000 firelocks, 1,000 cavalry, and a due proportion of artillery," and the maintenance of which had been permanently paid for in advance by the cession of territory as provided for in the Treaty of 1800. In fact, immediately after General Fraser's appointment, Mr. Colvin, the Private Secretary to Lord Auckland, wrote to Major Moore, the Resident's Military Secretary, as follows: "Kindly let me know, after consulting Colonel Fraser, what portion of the Subsidiary Force could, in his and your opinion, be spared from the Hyderabad territories for other service in emergency. I should say at least half. For your fine army (the Contingent) is amply sufficient to maintain the general tranquillity of the country. But there should always be, doubtless, an imposing force near the city. Would it be ever safe to remove the Queen's Corps from Secunderabad?"* There can be no doubt in every impartial mind that the policy of the Indian Government was to make the Nizam pay a second time for military duties which at the opening of the century he had already handsomely paid for in advance. This was done against the Nizam's own wishes, and the minister who aided us in this policy was, therefore, imposed by us, even against his sovereign's wish. It was the cost of this second army which mainly

* *Memoir and Correspondence of General James Stuart Fraser*, by Colonel Hastings Fraser, p. 91 (London: Whiting & Co., 1885, Second Edition).

led to the subsequent financial embarrassments to the State, and, as Sir Charles Metcalfe had already said in 1829: "It seems hardly fair, therefore, to hold either the Nizam or his minister responsible for the evil, situated as they are. In fact, we may perhaps more properly be regarded as responsible for them, having the power in our hands to remedy them and having shown that we were no ways scrupulous about making use of that power when we think fit to do so." (*ibid*, p. 86.)

Soon after General Fraser's arrival there occurred the revolt of the Nawab of Kurnool. This small state is situated on the southern bank of the river Krishna, near its junction with the Tungabudra. It had long been a vassal state of Hyderabad, and the then Nawab played a prominent part in the wars which followed the death of Asaf Jah. He had been the assassin who shot Nasir Jung before Gingee in the year 1750, and the leader in the attack on his successor in the Cuddapah district in March of the following year, in which affair Muzaffer Jung was killed. Subsequently the state became tributary to Hyder Ali, but reverted to Hyderabad in 1722, and was finally transferred to the Madras Presidency with the districts ceded by the Nizam in 1800. At the time of which we are writing there was a great wave of Wahabism passing through India, one of the main objects of which was a subversion of the British power. Mubariz-ud-Dowlah, the brother of the Nizam, Nasir-ud-dowlah, became infected with this spirit and entered into correspondence with the equally disaffected Nawab of Kurnool. The ambition of the former was to supplant his brother in the Hyderabad State, and the object of both was to overthrow the British rule. Military attacks were conducted against the Kurnool Nawab by a detachment of the Madras Army, and some troops of the Contingent were marched to the

north bank of the river in order to cut off the Nawab's retreat. Kurnool was subdued and taken without difficulty, the Nawab was sent into confinement, and the state annexed. A commission sat afterwards to enquire into the complicity of Mubariz-ud-Dowla, and having been found guilty he was confined to the state fortress of Goleonda, where he remained for many years a prisoner. These incidents occurred in 1839 and 1840.

The somewhat favourable opinion which General Fraser formed of the minister, Chundoo Lal, seems to have undergone modification. As the years passed on and the disorders in the State continued to increase, he seems to have become convinced that no reforms were possible until a successor should be appointed. But the old man still clung to life and to office with an equal tenacity, and the Government of India was so pledged to his support that nothing could be done to remove him. But the debts and embarrassments of the State continued to increase. The regular army was always at least four months and often longer in arrears. Whilst these continued it was, of course, impossible to effect any reductions. And now the Contingent began to be left in arrears, and, as these were paid by the Resident, he was obliged to become an importunate creditor. At last the Minister in despair made a proposal to the Resident to mortgage districts valued at $4\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of rupees, to be selected either in Berar, Raichur, or Bhir, in consideration of a loan of seventy-five lakhs of rupees. The cession was to be a permanent one (February, 1843). This proposal did not meet with Lord Ellenborough's consent, which he declined to accord until it should come before him with the Nizam's authority (letter of 11th April, 1843), which does not seem to have been ever accorded.

Chundoo Lal's long tenure of power was now approaching its close. For many years he had been driven to all kinds of expedients to raise the money required for State expenses. To such shifts was he reduced that grants of land were issued in a most lax and reckless manner, so much so that subsequently the period of 1832 to 1839 was styled the prescribed period, and grants and *sunnads* issued during this time were not held as proof of title unless corroborated by further evidence. It would, however, be unfair to say that Chundoo Lal was alone responsible for this state of affairs. He himself was personally no gainer, and it is to his credit that with so many opportunities of profit and in such an atmosphere of corruption he eventually died a poor man. It is said that his son, Bala Persad, was by no means so conscientious, and accumulated a considerable amount of treasure, but there is no evidence of this. To this day the family remains a comparatively poor one, and the descendents of Chundoo Lal stand in the matter of revenue far below many of the other leading noblemen. By general consent, all writers on Hyderabad affairs attribute the financial embarrassments of the State to Chundoo Lal's misgovernment, but it would seem that they have not made sufficient allowance for the difficulties of his position. As long as the Contingent was duly maintained, the British Government refrained from interference, and, in order to meet this heavy expenditure—amounting to no less than 40 lakhs per annum, or about one-fifth of the total revenue of the State—and at the same time to supply His Highness with the usual funds, the Minister was compelled to plunge deeper and deeper into debt. Although in course of time General Fraser had got to regard the Maharajah Chundoo Lal as the main cause of difficulties, he seems

to have been actuated by a genuine sympathy for the necessities of the State. He constantly advocated a more active interference, and this interference the Supreme Government as constantly refused to sanction. As the difficulties became more acute the proposal for a loan was increased to one crore of rupees (£1,000,000), with districts yielding 17 lakhs as security (1843). In reply, Lord Ellenborough was willing to advance the loan, but only on condition that the administration of the whole State should be handed over to the British Government; that an allowance should be made for the maintenance of the Nizam; and that all surplus of revenue over expenditure should be at the disposal of the British Government. It does not appear that this singular proposal was ever put before the Nizam, nor is it probable that he would have accepted it if it had been. In the meantime nothing was done; the difficulties continued to increase and the Minister by every means in his power endeavoured to retain his office. He did, however, tender his resignation rather in the hope of it not being accepted than otherwise. It was, however, accepted, but the Nizam showed great reluctance to appoint a successor with full powers. Ram Buksh, a nephew of Chundoo Lal, was appointed as Peshkar or Revenue and Finance Minister, and Nawab Suraj-ul-Mulk was nominated Vakeel of the Nizam to confer with the Resident. Having once been relieved from the presence of a Minister who had so long dominated over him, the Nizam appears to have been reluctant to relinquish the power that had fallen into his hands. He did, however, set seriously to work to discharge the State liabilities. A crore of rupees was taken from his own private treasure kept in the fort of Golconda and a sum of eighty lakhs of rupees in gold was taken from the palace in Hyderabad. Altogether

it is represented that he spent two crores from his own private purse, though it is to be feared that much of this did not reach the intended objects. For nearly three years this state of things continued. No regular Minister was appointed, and in spite of the Resident's frequent protests to the Governor-General nothing was done. There were other important matters which occupied Lord Ellenborough's attention in Scinde and the Punjab, and as long as the Contingent was maintained he appears to have troubled himself but little about Hyderabad. In fact, he seems to have been under the impression that no interference in Hyderabad would be effectual unless accompanied by a show of armed force, and for this he frankly wrote to the Resident that he had then neither the men nor the time to spare (letter of 27th February, 1844). But General Fraser did not want to make use of force or of a show of force, and with his knowledge of Hyderabad he constantly urged that a plain statement of the Governor-General's wishes would be quite sufficient. To these applications, however, he received no reply, and matters in Hyderabad were allowed to go on drifting. In June, 1844, Lord Ellenborough was recalled, and was soon afterwards succeeded by Sir Henry (Lord) Hardinge.

CHAPTER XIV

PERIOD 1845-50. LORD HARDINGE AND MARQUIS OF DALHOUSIE AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL. THE NIZAM'S RELUCTANCE TO APPOINT A NEW MINISTER WITH FULL POWERS. CONDITION OF THE COUNTRY. CONSTANT CHANGE OF MINISTERS. INCREASING DEBT. LORD DALHOUSIE'S RESOLVE AND ULTIMATUM. RESIGNATION OF GENERAL FRASER.

GENERAL FRASER'S idea had been that the removal of the Maharajah Chandoo Lal from power must result in an improvement of the administration, on the principle perhaps of any change being a change for the better. Matters indeed could not well be worse. The difficulty which the late Minister had found in raising money to meet the cost of the Contingent, added to the corrupt system of internal administration, led to constant abuses and oppression. As usual in India, the people bore this in silence. Not so, however, some of the larger landholders. Many of these, harassed on the one hand by continual demands for money, and seeing the relaxation of authority and the disregard of their own grievances, took the law into their own hands and revenged themselves for their own losses by depredations, not only upon their own ryots, but upon their neighbours, who,

weaker than themselves, were subject to the same exactions. They were encouraged in this by the knowledge that, although the Contingent was stationed in scattered cantonments throughout the country, it would not be employed against them until an enquiry had taken place and the Nizam's Government had been able to satisfy the Resident of the "reality of the offence." This stipulation occurred in the Treaty of 1800 (Art. 17), and was intended as a safeguard against the troops being used for injustice and oppression. This, of course, meant delay, and the possibility of escape from punishment. In this way the Contingent intended for the protection of the Nizam's Government and country, whilst performing its duty in this respect, became the indirect means of preventing the people from obtaining redress from their oppression. In former times they would have found a natural redress in armed revolt led by their chiefs. The presence, however, of an armed and disciplined force prevented this, and, as it could not be used against their chiefs without enquiry and consequent delay, they were left to the mercy of those who should have been their immediate protectors, but who, oppressed themselves, became their oppressors.

As regards the Nizam, however, there can be no doubt that he felt a great relief by the removal of Chandoo Lal; for more than 40 years this old man had been the practical ruler of the country, and the Nizam and his father had been puppets in his hands. The Maharajah's policy had been to maintain himself in power by deferring in every respect to the wishes of the Government of India, as represented by the Resident. As Minister with plenary powers, every part of the administration was in his hands. Except as a last resource he knew that the British Government would not interfere in internal matters, and

the Nizam could not, because none of the details of the executive were in his hands. The consequence was that, although the Subsidiary Army and the Contingent were an efficient protection of the Nizam's person and the country, they were of little or no protection to the people against oppression. The Nizam dared not remove his Minister, because he knew that the Resident and the British Government would support him, and, even when General Fraser became aware of the misgovernment that was being perpetrated, and showed himself in favour of a change, the Nizam scarcely dared consent. Living alone in his palace, ignorant of all State affairs and transacting no business with the Resident himself, he was easily persuaded that any change would be distasteful to the Government of India, who had so consistently shown themselves to be the supporters of his Minister. When, however, the change did take place and, owing mainly to the Resident's action, the Minister did send in his resignation, believing in his heart of hearts that the Government would not allow it to be accepted, the relief which the Nizam felt by the removal of a subject to whom he was in fact a subordinate was so great that he was averse to appoint another. He certainly nominated Ministers, but, as he refrained from bestowing upon them full powers, matters came to a deadlock. It had been the habitual custom for all subjects of public business to be settled between the Minister and the Resident, any settlement being subsequently ratified by the Nizam, as a matter of course. Now the Minister could settle nothing, and, since by etiquette the Resident could not discuss business with the Nizam, nothing was done.

Such was the condition of affairs at Hyderabad when Lord Hardinge arrived in Calcutta, in 1845, and one of the new Governor-General's first acts was to address to the

Nizam a letter of grave remonstrance (11th April, 1845), not only as regards the arrears due to the Contingent, but also regarding the effects of maladministration on the country itself. The Nizam was told "that, in the event of this state of things leading to serious and unhappy consequences, the British Government will not consent to put down by force of arms, troubles and opposition to your Highness's authority, manifestly caused by the oppression under which the people suffer in consequence of the maladministration of your Highness' Dominions." This warning had a certain amount of effect. Though still reluctant to invest his Minister with full powers, the Nizam made a strong effort to remedy the financial evil, so that in June of the same year the Resident was able to report that the Nizam had disbursed from his personal treasury about one crore and twenty lakhs of rupees (£1,200,000). It is doubtful however whether the disbursement of this large amount had been done in a judicious manner, for the Peshcar Rajah Ram Buksh was still unable to provide for the payment of the Contingent without allowing it to fall more than four months in arrears (*Life of General Fraser*, Chapter VI). In the meantime, the Governor-General and Lord Gough were engaged in the Sikh war and the conquest of the Punjab, and for the time their attention was devoted to the important negotiations which followed the battles of Moodkee, Ferozeshah and Sobraon. In the following year (1846), the disturbance anticipated by the Governor-General in his letter above quoted actually took place and five of the principal Zemindars enlisted bands of Rohillas and commenced plundering the surrounding country. The Nizam applied for the services of the Contingent to coerce them but the Resident declined to give the necessary orders until a month's pay should be

given in advance to the troops in addition to the four months of arrears due, and until he himself had investigated into the complaints. The refractory chiefs, except one, protected by safe conducts, appeared before the Resident, and, in due course, made a peaceable submission, whilst the one who had failed to come in was "brought to obedience without actual bloodshed by the appearance of a detachment of troops in his neighbourhood" (*ibid*).

In September of this year (1846) the debt due to the British Government on account of the Contingent amounted to thirty-eight lakhs (£380,000), in addition to the four months' arrears, and called forth another serious remonstrance from the Government of India, with the result that in November of that year the Nizam at last conferred full powers upon the Minister, Suraj-ul-Mulk, the uncle of the afterwards celebrated Salar Jung. In his order of appointment the Nizam expressly says that he did so on the recommendation of the "undoubted well-wisher of the Nobles of the Court, Major-General James Stuart Fraser Bahadur," thus throwing, as it were, the responsibility for the appointment on the representative of the British Government, so that should it prove a failure he would be able to attribute some part of his embarrassment to their agency. This responsibility the Government of India was by no means willing to assume, and although, as General Fraser suggested, the best plan would have been to openly accept it, and by a cordial promise of support to crush all faction and intrigue, this course was not adopted, "partly by the settled practice of the Calcutta authorities, partly by an accident," and the result was, as reported by General Fraser in July, 1847, "most detrimental to the Minister."

The "accident" mentioned by General Fraser consisted in what the Government of India deemed a breach

of official etiquette. In reporting to the Governor-General his appointment as Minister, Suraj-ul-Mulk addressed him as "the friend and well-wisher." This was a repetition of a phrase used forty years before by the Nawab Mir Allum on his appointment as Minister. There had been no occasion for a similar report to be made subsequently, because the Maharajah Chandoo Lal had never been really appointed as Minister, and, although he was the virtual Minister and was always treated as such by the Government and the Resident, officially he was only the Peshcar or Revenue Minister. At the time when Mir Allum reported his appointment, the relations between the Hyderabad State and the Government of India were very different from what they had become forty years later. At the commencement of the 19th century the Governor-General was actually a tributary of the Nizam, because he paid the Nizam tribute for the provinces he held known as the Northern Circars. He was therefore a subject of the Nizam, and in all communications styled himself "*nizamund*" or petitioner, whilst the Nizam in reply spoke of himself as "*Maba Dowlah*," or "Our Royalty." Since then, however, circumstances had altered. The British Government no longer paid tribute for the Circars, and had become in fact the paramount power in India. The Governor-General was no longer the petitioner of the Nizam, but in reality his superior, and therefore it was improper that the Nizam's Minister should address the Governor-General on terms of equality. But, although an alteration in the form of correspondence had been made when Secunder Jah succeeded in 1828, it had been forgotten to make any alteration in the form of correspondence between the Minister and the Governor-General. Hence when Suraj-ul-Mulk was appointed he merely followed the precedent

of Mir Allum forty years before. It took the Government of India eight months to cut this Gordian red-tape knot, and then they pointed out the reason of the delay in acknowledging the Minister's letter reporting his appointment. No doubt the reasoning of the Governor-General was perfectly correct. The forty years that had elapsed had brought about an enormous change in the relations between the head of the Government of India and the native princes. He was no longer the "petitioner" or suppliant, whose representative had to take off his shoes before approaching a native prince, but he was now the "Paramount Power," whose expressed wish was accepted by every prince as an order, and it was therefore manifestly improper that a subordinate of the prince should address the Governor-General as an equal. Still, the matter was so simple that it could have been easily arranged by a few words of semi-official correspondence, without having had to incur the long delay which ensued before the Government of India recognized the appointment of the new Minister. In India a delay of this kind is always dangerous, and tends to weaken the position and the influence of the new nominee. The Nizam naturally thought that the delay meant a disapproval of his choice, and as this choice had been made at the recommendation of the Resident he reasoned to himself that neither the Resident nor the Minister enjoyed the full confidence of the Governor-General, consequently none of the internal reforms which the Resident was anxious to carry out were accepted by him, and for more than 18 months matters remained as unsettled as they had been before the Minister's appointment. The next step of the Government of India was calculated to continue this impression. One of the Resident's schemes was to appoint a Mr. Dighton as the Commissioner of

one of the districts which it was intended should serve as a model for the revenue administration of the remainder of the kingdom. This appointment was approved of by the Minister and by the Nizam. Mr. Dighton was a gentleman well known, of good birth, of strict probity, and a favourite with all classes. He enjoyed the confidence of the Residency, the Nobles, the Government and of the Nizam. He would therefore seem to have been a most fitting person for such an appointment, but strange to say the Government of India would not sanction this nomination. The very fact of his being intimate at the Residency was deemed an objection, as being likely to raise a suspicion in the Nizam's mind that we wished to interfere in the internal administration of this country. The policy of the Government at this time, which we may safely say has been continued up to the present day, was to refrain from any interference whatsoever with the internal affairs of a native state, unless compelled to do so by a systematic maladministration calculated to produce an outbreak of the people. As long as matters did not reach this point, a policy of "*laissez faire*" was adopted in the dealings with native states, and when at last interference became necessary it was generally done by the means of an armed force, and spelt—annexation. This is a point upon which General Fraser, who seems to have been actuated with a sincere wish to remedy the evils which existed in the Hyderabad State, felt very keenly. His long experience of native princes, and of the change of conditions of affairs in India, induced him to form the opinion that all that was required was to make use of the moral influence which the British rule had acquired in order to suggest improvements. In such a case no armed interference was necessary. A wish would be

regarded as an order, and a required reform would at once be carried out. Of course, this policy would throw a great responsibility upon the shoulders of the Resident, but it was a responsibility which our experience of administration in India shows he is always capable of bearing. Of the moral advantage to the native state of such a policy there could be no doubt. An improvement of the administration would of necessity take place without in any way jeopardizing its independence. On the other hand the "*laissez faire*" policy seemed calculated to pave the way to annexation and annihilation. It almost seems to the student of Indian history that at times the Government of India fostered this policy of non-interference in order to bring about the inevitable result. This seems to have been the impression caused in the mind of General Fraser. The General had the courage of his opinions and did not hesitate to express them with less reserve than was calculated to be acceptable to his superiors. Deeply interested as he was in the welfare of Hyderabad, he was profoundly disappointed at the refusal of the Government of India to support his system of reform. He wrote a private letter to Sir James Lushington, the Chairman of the Board of Directors, which is of such importance that it will be as well to quote it at length. The letter is dated 25th October, 1847, and is reproduced from the work from which we have already so frequently quoted. It runs as follows: "Improvement in Hyderabad has not progressed. I lament that such should be the case as there is no inherent necessity that it should be so. A little decision on the part of the supreme Government and its assent to what I recommended would have been sufficient. It is to this subject I wish to attract your attention and to obtain if possible the assent of the Court

to some policy of their own devising, if not of mine, which may correct the evils of this Government, in the shame of which I may perhaps be made to participate, though I do not deserve it. I wish to induce the Court either to act with some vigour in this matter, or to acknowledge that they do not care to save the Nizam, and that he must be considered as bearing the exclusive responsibility of the ruin to which the Hyderabad State is hastening. The proceedings of the Resident here, to that extent only which has been sanctioned, cannot be of any use. A higher tone must be adopted to be of service. A continuance of its present course by the supreme Government will involve this country in the fate of Mysore.

"We are bound under the obligations of treaties to maintain the independence of this and several other native states, and until the treaties are infringed by the princes themselves, or the safety of our own provinces is in danger, we are bound to uphold them. All that I wish is that this should be done effectually, and in such a manner as to be at once consistent with the prosperity of a native state and with the general advancement of the Indian Empire in the path of good order and reform. It is not possible that so large a portion of India should be in a bad way without the adjacent districts being injuriously affected. We can adhere to our treaties in perfect good faith, and yet insist at the same time that the sustained independence of Hyderabad shall not impede the equally sacred obligations under which we are placed *not to allow our military protection of the Nizam to involve, as a necessary consequence, the misery and helplessness of his people.* We must not allow a barrier to be raised against the advancement of India in general in the ill-regulated condition of this particular State.

In the measures I have continuously proposed, the ulterior object has not only been a better administration for Hyderabad, but beneficial results for our own territory. Unhappily, in almost all instances, I have been prohibited not only from active interposition but from interposition at all. I need not enter into particulars. The evils of the Hyderabad Government and the state of disorder generally prevailing through the country must have been sufficiently well known at the Court of Directors when I was sent here by Lord Auckland. These evils continue as they were to this day. *Can it be the intention of the Court that they should remain so until some crisis arrives, which may afford a pretext for placing the Nizam's country under a Commission, with our train of English judges and collectors?* I cannot believe this to be the intention of the Court, and, if not, surely means ought to be adopted which may avert these consequences. Correction becomes more difficult by every day we remain inactive. The Government of India has in general expressed its concurrence in my views and wishes regarding the Nizam's affairs, but not in the measures which I have recommended as alone likely to accomplish those views. If my suggestions had been objectionable, let others be brought forward. Let me be favoured with commands, which I promise to execute, but let not the only commands be—to do nothing. This deliberate inaction appears to me to be as dishonourable to us as it is injurious to the Nizam."

The interference which General Fraser here advocates would seem to have been especially justified, because the British Government was, to a very great degree, responsible for the financial embarrassments into which the Hyderabad Government had fallen. For about 25 years we had so far interfered with Hyderabad as to compel

the Nizam to maintain, at a cost of 40 lakhs annually, during a time of profound peace, a force which by treaty he was only bound to maintain in time of war. The chances of there being a war which would affect the safety of the Nizam's dominions had long since passed away. Whatever danger might accrue to the country would be from refractory landholders. Any such uprisings it was the duty of the Subsidiary Force to subdue, and for this provision had been made in the treaty of 1800. The Contingent therefore was really unnecessary, but finding a minister subservient enough to their views the British Government had so far interfered with the Nizam as to continue the maintenance of this force at the cost of nearly one-third of the total revenue of the state, entirely for their own purposes. There can be no doubt that the financial embarrassments of the Nizam had commenced with the necessity of constantly providing the funds necessary to pay for the Contingent. But, although no longer required for the purposes of war, no attempt was made to reduce either the numbers or the cost of the Contingent. The evidence on this point is overwhelming; from the Governor-General downwards, the Resident, and the members of the Courts of Directors who were best conversant in Hyderabad affairs, are all unanimous on this subject. General Fraser may perhaps be deemed a prejudiced person in this respect, but in the year 1848 he went away on six months' furlough and during his absence Colonel (afterwards General Sir John) Lowe, acted for him. We will quote from the letter which he wrote and left on record for the General's information on his return: "My opinion entirely coincides with your own respecting the cruelty, as I may well call it, that we have been guilty of towards the Nizam's Government, in keeping up for so many years the continued drain upon

the revenues of his country of no less than forty lakhs of rupees per annum for the pay of the Contingent—in other words for purposes of our own, not of the Nizam's. Ever since 1819 there has been profound peace in the Deccan, and therefore, as it is only during "war between the contracting parties and any other power" that we can claim to be joined by 6,000 infantry and 9,000 horse of His Highness' troops, we have had no right by treaty to demand a single rupee for the Contingent during the whole of that period, upwards of 28 years. In the course of that time, however, we have actually drawn from the Nizam's treasury the enormous sum of 11 crores and 20 lakhs of rupees, of which a large portion has gone out of the Nizam's territory for ever through the remittances of the officers and sepoy, two-thirds of whom are from Oudh, Rohilkund and other parts of India, who annually take away their savings in hard cash to their distant homes, so that this huge drain not only exhausts the Nizam's treasury, but tends to impoverish his people by diminishing the amount of specie in his dominions. ". . . I remember to have pointed out to Mr. Colvin, in 1838, that, since the year 1819, a Contingent of half the strength, costing 20 lakhs of rupees a year, could do precisely the same service for the Nizam's Government as the present force does, which costs forty lakhs."

This is what General Sir James Law-Lushington said on 24th April, 1848: "The great difficulty is the state of the finances in Hyderabad, and something must be done to afford relief or the severe pressure must end in ultimate ruin. I have for some time been of the opinion that we have ourselves been the cause in a great measure of this difficulty, and have made exactions of the Nizam which we were not entitled to do by any treaty." He then alludes to the cost of the Contingent, which really the

Nizam was only bound to furnish *in time of war*, entailing a charge upon the Nizam's Government of forty-two lakhs of rupees every year; and goes on to say, "This demand swallows up nearly one-third of the country's revenues, and the consequence has been that the Nizam is now in debt to the British Government for sums advanced for the payment of the Contingent Force. Considering all these circumstances, I certainly am of opinion that the disbandment of the Contingent is a measure the propriety of which is worthy of the most serious consideration; for it cannot be denied that neither a continued maintenance nor the original organization is provided for by any existing treaty."

One more quotation from Lord Dalhousie himself. It is taken from a letter to General Fraser, dated 17th October, 1848. In it he says: "While I am not one of those who regard the Contingent Force as an oppression and an injustice, I yet think that we do not stand free of blame in respect to the footing on which we have maintained it. And, *whenever the Nizam shall manifest a sincere wish* to enter into an amendment of his administration, I shall be ready on the part of the Government of India to meet his endeavours to reduce the expenditure of his kingdom by entering on the consideration of the means of diminishing the *extravagant costliness* of this force and its appendages."

One example of the costliness of the force may be gathered from the fact that there were no less than five Brigadiers, each with a costly staff, and the force itself was scattered amongst six different cantonments, in each of which was the usual establishment of cantonment magistrate, police, etc.

It would therefore seem that General Fraser was actuated by a sincere sense of justice when he argued that,

having once interfered, with the result of increasing the Nizam's embarrassments, we should now interfere with friendly help to improve the administration, so as to relieve him from those embarrassments. But neither Lord Ellenborough, Lord Hardinge, nor Lord Dalhousie seem to have understood the kind of interference which General Fraser advocated. What he wanted was, by a strong support of the Minister, aided by the Resident's advice, to introduce reforms in spite of the Nizam and of the various intriguers by whom he was surrounded. In the same way as the constant support which we had given to Chandoo Lal, in opposition to the wishes of two consecutive Nizams, had been the means of causing that Minister to play into our hands and offer no opposition to the maintenance of the costly Contingent, so a similar support given to Suraj-ul-Mulk, who was honestly anxious, in co-operation with the Resident, to carry out these reforms, would most certainly have enabled him to do so. But here the Resident was at once met with the answer that "the Nizam is an independent Sovereign and we cannot interfere with the internal arrangement of his dominions." It is significant that this argument never occurred to the Government of India when they brought pressure to bear upon Chandoo Lal to reform the troops which ultimately became the Contingent. A reform of a military body devoted entirely to our own interests was apparently not inconsistent with treaty rights, but a reform of the internal administration by which the Nizam alone would have benefited was so considered. Whenever General Fraser spoke of interference the answer was "we cannot now spare any troops." But troops were not what General Fraser wanted, he did not want an interference by armed force, but the permission to use a moral force, to which the Nizam would

undoubtedly yield when once convinced that it was the wish of the Government of India.

Again, it will be noticed that Lord Dalhousie, whilst admitting the extravagant cost of the Contingent, does not make any attempt at reduction of that cost conditional on the Nizam manifesting a sincere wish to enter into an amendment of his own administration. Now one of the first steps towards such an amendment would have been the disbandment, and reduction in the expenditure, of the large army of mercenary troops which the Nizam still maintained, and which consumed nearly 75 lakhs of rupees annually out of the revenue of the country. It can well be imagined that if, with all the pressure the Resident was constantly bringing to bear upon him, the Nizam allowed the Contingent troops to fall into arrears, it was still more likely that he allowed his own troops to fall into still greater arrears. This was in fact the case, and, since it was impossible for him, without credit, to find the money to pay off these arrears, it was impossible for him to attempt a reduction in the expenditure without causing a mutiny. Of this fact a significant illustration occurred at the period of which we are writing.

Early in 1847, Suraj-ul-Mulk, in pursuance of his promises to the Resident to reduce expenditure, as a first step towards this object, made arrangements to disband about six thousand of the half-disciplined troops maintained in Hyderabad. On the first of May the Minister informed the Resident that these men refused to take their pay or to give up their arms, and that they had been joined by the whole of the rest of the line, who had placed their commandants under arrest, and insisted on being equally paid up their arrears of pay, when, they said, they would all take their discharge if

required. On the third of May, the mutiny being still unabated, and the Minister's own life having been threatened, he applied for military assistance. The Resident at once ordered a force consisting of four companies of H.M. 84th Foot, two regiments of Madras Native Infantry and a detachment of Madras Artillery, with four nine-pounder guns, first to a spot called the foundry, about a mile and a half from the city walls, and then, when the "Line-wallahs" still refused to release their commandants, the General took possession of the very gate of the city. Two days were occupied in inconclusive negotiations and the troops were about to march upon the mutinous troops, when they tendered their submission and returned to obedience on the seventh of May; the reductions were then carried out and the British force withdrawn.

The Government of India were at first doubtful of the expediency of this very decisive action on the part of the Resident, but eventually gave a half-hearted approval. The whole incident, however, was so dangerous an experiment that the Minister scarcely dared to make another one in the same direction. No further reductions were therefore carried out, and the Minister's attempts to reduce the military expenditure appear to have begun and ended with this one incident. To the Nizam's mind, however, this occurrence together with the refusal of the Government of India to sanction the appointment of Mr. Dighton, before alluded to, seemed a proof that not only his Minister but also the Resident no longer enjoyed the support of the Government of India, and he was therefore obliged to remove the Minister, who had been appointed on the Resident's recommendation. This was done in the following year, and Rajah Ram Buksh was appointed in his place.

This appointment, however, was only temporary and was followed by that of a nobleman named Umjad-ul-Mulk, who, in his turn, remained for only one month, when the Nawab Shums-ul-Umra was appointed Minister. The appointment of this nobleman who was of the very highest rank, and who had been married to the sister of the late Nizam, was opposed to the tradition of the country. He was the head of the Paigah force, and as such was supposed to keep aloof from politics and to be exclusively in the Nizam's service. He was a nobleman of undoubted honour and universal esteem, but was thoroughly conservative in his opinions and disinclined towards reform. Matters, therefore, lapsed into their old groove, and financially the condition of the country went from bad to worse.

A curious incident occurred at this time which must be noticed: the Portuguese Archbishop of Goa was the Patriarch of India, and claimed ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the entire continent. He was appointed by the King of Portugal, and the result was that his jurisdiction clashed with that of a great number of Roman Catholic missionaries appointed by the Pope and of the priests who were military chaplains to the British troops. These disputes sometimes took the form of a dispute regarding the possession of a church or chapel. In 1848 a dispute of this kind arose in Secunderabad, the British military cantonment of Hyderabad. A collision took place between the Goanese and the European priests, with whom the coloured Catholics and the Irish soldiers respectively took sides. A riot took place in which no very serious damage was done beyond the wrecking of the chapel in dispute. Some soldiers of the Queen's Regiment and of the Company's artillery had taken part in the riot, and one or two Irish priests

were accused of having incited them to violence by words spoken at the altar ; while the Vicar Apostolic, Bishop Murphy, was blamed for not having either previously forbidden or subsequently blamed the violent acts and words of his curates and his flock. A long enquiry was conducted by the Government of Madras under whose jurisdiction the Secunderabad troops were placed. The result was that the Madras Government called upon General Fraser to expel the bishop and the priests from the Nizam's dominions ; this the Resident refused to do without referring the matter to the Government of India. There would appear to be no object to be gained in giving the details of the correspondence which followed ; suffice it to say that a compromise was arrived at, the bishop was not expelled from the diocese, but was forbidden to enter Secunderabad where were situated his cathedral church, the principal schools, and the charitable institutions under his charge. For two years he could obtain no release from this anomalous state of affairs, but eventually sought redress in London, and then, by instructions from the Court of Directors, the prohibition was removed and he was allowed to return and resume the full exercise of his episcopal functions.

During the year 1849 no improvement took place in Hyderabad affairs. The debt still went on increasing, and now amounted to 64 lakhs of rupees. It is true that the interest which was formerly charged at the rate of 12 per cent. had been reduced to 6 per cent., but this item alone materially helped to increase the debt. Another warning was received from Lord Dalhousie in which it is stated that if early steps were not taken to clear off this debt " the Governor-General will feel himself under the necessity of taking such measures as shall be

effectual both for ensuring those objects for which the faith of this Government is virtually pledged and for maintaining the security of its own interest." In a letter to General Fraser at the same time Lord Dalhousie emphatically repudiates the Resident's policy of friendly interference, to save the state from the ruin to which it was progressing. In a letter dated June 6th, 1849, he says : " I will rigidly act up to the requirements of the treaty with the Nizam. I will give him aid and advice. I will effectually take care that if he chooses to ruin himself in spite of aid and advice he shall not disturb the peace of British territory, or either injure or play with British interests, but I will not contravene the treaty on the pretence of protecting the Nizam, and I disavow the doctrine of our having any moral or political obligation to take the government of his country into our own hands merely because he mismanages his own affairs ; *and I recognize no mission entrusted to us to regenerate independent Indian States merely because they are misgoverned ; when we are invited, or our own interests affected I will act decidedly enough.*"

During this year a body of the Contingent was called upon to suppress a rising of some Rohillas in the Berar Province, a very smart and gallant affair took place on May 6th near the village of Gowrie in which Brigadier Hampton was severely wounded, besides three English and four native officers. There was a brilliant cavalry charge, in which the Rohillas were cut up and dispersed.

The remainder of the year was occupied in a repetition of the same old story. Delays in the matter of payment by the Nizam's Government and remonstrances and warnings from the Government of India. During this time we notice an increased acerbity in the tone of Lord Dalhousie's letters to the Resident, and an increased

peremptoriness in his remarks about the Nizam and his State.

Although we have dwelt upon the Nizam's financial embarrassments, they were not really so great as may be imagined. The total amount of his indebtedness was not more than three years' revenue, and if he had only possessed credit he could easily have raised a loan sufficient to pay off all his debts. But loans in India, especially at this time, could only be made at high interest. He was debarred from attempting to raise a loan from European capitalists and the Government of India could not, or would not assist him. The Nizam therefore was reduced to a continual state of borrowing, and was compelled from time to time to raise money at high interest in one place to pay off the debts he incurred in another. Of course this meant that the interests of the country were neglected, the revenues decreased, and the liabilities swollen by interest and discount went on increasing. The minister, Shams-ul-Umra, found it impossible to carry on the government and in July, 1849, resigned his post. All that he had been able to do was to keep up the current payment of the Contingent, but the old debt had continued to increase.

Rajah Ram Buksh was then appointed, not as a Minister with full powers, but simply as Peshkar; this induced Lord Dalhousie to send another solemn warning in which the Resident was directed to require "that the whole amount should be discharged by the 31st of December, 1850. If on the arrival of that period the Governor-General's expectations were disappointed, his Lordship would feel it his duty to take such decided steps as the interests of the British Government demanded." Those decided steps it was well understood would be the exaction of territorial security for the payment of prin-

cipal and interest ; and, as the Governor-General must have been convinced that the Nizam would be unable to comply with this demand, a correspondence was at once commenced with the Resident regarding the most suitable districts to be handed over.



CHAPTER XV

The period which this chapter embraces, namely, 1851 and 1852, is occupied by a considerable amount of controversial matter. I have endeavoured as much as possible to refrain from entering into the details of this controversy, and have sought to confine myself almost entirely to the actual facts which occurred. The arguments advanced by General Fraser regarding the policy to be adopted towards the Nizam not having been accepted by the Governor-General, no object could be gained by entering into them here. They are all contained in Captain Hastings Fraser's book on the life of his father, General Fraser. To that book I am already largely indebted for the quotations I have made in the two preceding chapters, and, should anyone wish to study this subject in further detail, I would recommend this book for the purpose.



THE first months of 1851 passed without any improvement in the financial condition of Hyderabad.

Nothing was done towards the repayment of the old debt. The period fixed for its payment having passed, the Resident

was busy in preparing instructions to the officers who were to be placed in charge of the districts to be held as security. These officers were Colonel Meadows Taylor, who for some years had, with the permission of the Nizam, been managing the small tributary state of

Shorapur under the Resident's orders, Mr. Bullock and Mr. Dighton. As the assignment was only to be a temporary one and the districts were still to remain under the Nizam's suzerainty, they were instructed to make no radical changes. The Resident sent to the Governor-General the draft of a letter which he suggested should be sent to the Nizam by the Governor-General. This letter was in consistence with his policy of friendly interference and management which by no means conformed to the plan Lord Dalhousie was inclined to adopt; accordingly, some time elapsed before an answer was received. In the meantime, events occurred which brought matters to a crisis. During the march of a detachment of British troops through H.H. the Nizam's Dominions a fracas occurred between them and some of the Nizam's irregular troops. This incident gave the Governor-General an opportunity which he did not allow to escape. As long as the differences between the Government of India and the Nizam referred to matters of finance Lord Dalhousie was inclined to show a certain amount of consideration to an old and faithful ally. But what he considered to be an affront to the head of the Empire, in the person of a detachment of British troops, could not be met with the same equanimity and forbearance. The letter dealt with two subjects, the disputes which had arisen between the Sepoys and some Arab soldiers, and the failure of the Nizam to fulfil his promises regarding the repayment of the debt. The Nizam was told that the former incident rendered him liable to the "indignation of the Government of India, whose power can crush you at its will." These are the words of the English letter, but in the Persian translation they were rendered "whose power can make you as the dust under foot, and leave you neither a name nor a

trace." The letter then went on to call upon the Nizam to make over to the British Government a certain portion of his territory as repayment of the debt due to the British Government on the account of the debt due for the Contingent. He was told that no remonstrances or solicitations would be admitted, and that the Governor-General's determination was fixed irrevocably. (*Blue Book*, "Nizam's Debt," page 43.) It was also pointed out that a Minister should be appointed who would be a fit agent for transacting the important affairs between the Government of India and the Court of Hyderabad. The effect of this letter was like that of a bolt from the blue. No communication from the Governor-General to the Nizam had ever approached to this in severity of tone. Hitherto the Resident complained that the Government of India had not been decisive in the tenor of its despatches, and he was always recommending a policy of friendly interference, which if firmly insisted upon he was sure the Nizam would have agreed to. No doubt he would have done so, but Lord Dalhousie's policy was that an interference of any kind would be a violation of existing treaties, that nothing could be done unless the Government in pursuance of its own interest was compelled to interfere, and that then the steps to be taken should be of a drastic nature. In one way he was certainly right. The letter had the desired effect. The Nizam saw that in order to avoid a serious catastrophe he must awake from his lethargy and take a decided step. Suraj-ul-Mulk was at once appointed as Minister, and when, on the first of the month following (July 1st, 1851) the Resident waited on the Nizam to inform him of the districts which would be taken over, he was told that the Minister would pay the whole debt and also make arrangements for the regular pay of the Contingent.

This time the Nizam kept his promise, at all events in part. On the 15th of August the Nizam's Government completed the payment of the first instalment, more than half, of the debt due to the British Government, namely, Rs. 3,408,485.11.4, leaving the balance of Rs. 3,297,702.9.2 to be paid on or before the first of October, 1851. (*ibid.* page 67.) How the Nizam managed to pay this instalment is not exactly known. Some of it was taken from his private treasure and the balance by pledging some of his jewels to the native bankers. At all events the Nizam had shown himself in earnest, and for the present Lord Dalhousie was content to be satisfied, and matters were allowed to go on. Before long, however, affairs fell into their old groove. The current pay of the Contingent was only irregularly disbursed, and the balance of the debt, instead of being decreased, again began to rise. It was under these conditions that the year 1851 came to a close. The Minister doubtless was in earnest in his endeavours to carry out reforms. In internal matters, acting under the Resident's advice, much was done, but as regards finance he was powerless. There was no money in the country and in the words of the old proverb it was impossible to press blood out of a stone.

The early months of 1852 continued under the same conditions, but an attempt was made by the Hyderabad Government to put in a counterclaim against the British Government as the set-off to the debt due to them. This counterclaim arose as follows. During the forty years which had elapsed since the Contingent Forces had been stationed in separate cantonments, we had neglected to pay over to the Nizam's Government certain excise duties on liquor, which during that time had been wrongly credited to cantonment funds. These duties amounted to about a lakh of rupees a year, and would,

therefore, reach the aggregate sum of about forty lakhs of rupees, which should have, but had not been credited to the Nizam. That this demand was justified is shown by the fact that it was subsequently admitted, and since 1853 these excise duties have been regularly paid to the Nizam's Government. But even General Fraser, inclined as he was to help the Nizam, was not able to admit the validity of this claim under the existing circumstances. The claim was one that was open to argument, whereas the debt was an acknowledged fact. He could not, therefore, admit a claim open to dispute as a set-off to an acknowledged debt. The latter must be paid according to the terms of the agreement, whereas the former might be left open to future consideration. As already mentioned, the claim was subsequently admitted, and has since been regularly paid, but the arrears which had accrued during forty years, and which apparently had never been claimed by the Hyderabad Government during that time have never been paid up to the present day.

The months in 1852 passed on, and not only was no further instalment of principal debt received, but also the current cost of the Contingent again began to fall in arrears, so that it became apparent to the Governor-General that the Nizam would be unable to fulfil his promise. Accordingly, a letter was despatched to the Resident in which the matter of assignment of territory was again dwelt upon. This letter was remarkable for an entire change in Lord Dalhousie's views regarding the status of the Contingent. Hitherto he had always maintained, not only that there was no injustice in the maintenance of the Contingent, but that its constitution was actually based on the treaty of 1800, because under that treaty the Nizam had agreed to furnish 15,000 men in

time of war. In fact, in his letter of the previous year to the Nizam, the Governor-General had pointed out in so many words that the Nizam was bound under treaty to maintain the Contingent. In this letter, however, Lord Dalhousie expresses an entirely different opinion. He says: "If the Nizam should turn round upon us and deny the obligation existing by treaty, I am bound as a public man to say that I could not honestly argue that there was any other warrant than that of practice for upholding the Contingent; I could argue, and have argued, that His Highness's conduct has hitherto given that construction to the treaty and that till it is rejected and resisted there is an obligation upon him to support properly the force which, under that construction, he has allowed us to organize: but, if he were to take his stand upon the treaty, I could not argue that either the letter or the spirit of it bound the Nizam to maintain 9,000 troops of a peculiar and costly nature in peace because it bound him to give 15,000 of his troops on the occurrence of war." He then goes on to point out that either the Contingent is to be maintained in future, in which case it becomes absolutely necessary that an assignment of districts should be made so as to pay off the debt and also to provide for the regular payment of the force, or else it must be disbanded. But, even in this case, it would take some years before so large a force could be gradually disbanded, and therefore it would still be necessary for the Nizam to make an assignment of territory in order to provide, not only for the pay of the troops in the meanwhile, but also for the repayment of the debt; therefore whether the Contingent was retained or abolished, it became necessary for the Nizam to assign territory. The Resident was accordingly instructed to take the necessary steps. General Fraser's

answer was very respectfully worded, but it was evident from the whole tone of his reply that although he obeyed he did not approve of his instructions. Lord Dalhousie had already stated in one of his letters that meekness was not one of his qualities and it is therefore probable that the attitude of the Resident was highly distasteful to him. An opportunity soon occurred for expressing his displeasure. For some time there had been a very disagreeable controversy between some of the senior officers of the Contingent which led to a court martial being held at Bolarum, its head-quarters. General Fraser, by virtue of his position as representing the Nizam, confirmed the proceedings of the court martial, and endorsed its remarks as regards one of the officers concerned. The Government of India in reviewing these proceedings, whilst agreeing with them, remarked that the Resident had appeared to have been actuated by the same party spirit which he blamed in others. It does not seem that this remark was justified, but at the same time it could not be received by an officer in the Resident's position except as a severe reprimand.

At the same time another incident occurred which tended to bring about the catastrophe which had for so long a time been hanging over the Nizam's head. In order to pay off the whole of the debt still remaining due to the British Government, the Nizam had resolved to pawn his jewels up to the value of about half a million sterling. It was contemplated to form a State Bank in Hyderabad, which was to be financed by the leading sowcars, and the managing director of which was to be Mr. Dighton, of whom we have so often spoken. To this bank the Nizam agreed to hand over his jewels, and received in return an advance of forty lakhs of rupees. Contrary to all expectation, not only was the

bank successfully founded, but the whole of this transaction was faithfully carried out : the jewels were handed over and the money was sent to the Nizam. Before, however, he had time to pay it over to the Resident the Governor-General interfered. He refused to sanction the formation of the bank on the ground that, as one of the directors was a European, it would be contrary to the Act of George III, which prohibited all financial transactions between Europeans and native princes. This order, which was entirely unexpected, created a panic in Hyderabad. The Nizam, who had parted with his jewels, naturally held on to the money he had received, whilst the sowcars who had handed over the money to the Nizam in the expectation of being able to recoup themselves from the State Bank saw no way of getting their money back and wanted at all events to get the jewels as some sort of security. Mr. Dighton was thus placed in a very awkward position. He was responsible to the Nizam on the one hand for the safety of the jewels, and on the other hand he was equally responsible to the sowcars for the repayment of the money they had advanced. He managed to extricate himself from this dilemma in a very remarkable and thoroughly Oriental manner. The jewels were all kept in a safe in which were stowed different trays. The safe was locked with three different keys, each of which was kept by one of the persons interested. A meeting was called in order to form an inventory of the jewels to see that all was correct. The safe was opened and each tray was brought before the Committee, the jewels were counted and the tray was then carried back. But before they were replaced in the safe the contents of each tray were poured into a pair of jack-boots, the trays were placed empty in the safe, covered with their respec-

tive cloths and the safe was formally locked by the different members of the Committee, whilst the jewels were carried up to Mr. Dighton's room. That same evening Mr. Dighton started in a palanquin of one of his attendants with a box marked medical comforts. In this way carrying jewels with him to the value of half a million sterling he managed to get out of the Nizam's dominions ; he reached Madras, got on board ship, and safely took the jewels to Europe, where they were deposited with a banking firm in Holland. This firm advanced the money necessary to pay off the sowcars, and eventually Salar Jung redeemed the jewels, had them brought back to Hyderabad and handed over to the Nizam. In this way no one eventually incurred any loss and the honourable conduct of Mr. Dighton and of Salar Jung not only redounded to their renown, but was a foundation of the credit which the new Minister enjoyed for the next thirty years. In order to finish the narration of this episode we have been obliged to somewhat anticipate events, for the transaction was not terminated until about a year later. It is therefore now necessary to revert to Hyderabad.

These two incidents following so close after each other convinced General Fraser that he no longer enjoyed the Governor-General's confidence, and as at this time he received the news of his elder brother's death he resolved to leave India for good. Accordingly he sent in his resignation, which was at once accepted ; he went home and never returned.

Colonel Lowe was appointed to succeed General Fraser, and came to Hyderabad with the draft of a treaty in his pocket, with which we must now deal.



THE NAWAB FAKHR-OOŁ-MOOLK.
(See Appendix No. 2).

CHAPTER XVI

THE BERAR TRUST



It has been shown in the previous chapter how matters in Hyderabad gradually went from bad to worse, and how involved and entangled the finances of the State had become.

The result of Lord Dalhousie's warning in 1850 was that a couple of years later negotiations commenced, which resulted in the assignment to the British of certain districts in the Nizam's dominions.

The assignment of these districts led to much controversy which continued for many years, and which caused much ink to flow. In order to be able to judge impartially of the pros and cons of the question and fully to understand the situation it will be necessary to look

back some years, to see what led up to the discussion and also somewhat to anticipate events by glancing forward, to see how this discussion was partly settled, some fifty years later. This will give a clearer view of the matter than could be obtained by merely confining the narration to the period in hand, and constantly harking back to this argument, which for the next 75 years played so large a rôle in the political foreground of Hyderabad.

It is now necessary to examine how the Berar Trust was created, and how it was administered, and for this purpose it will be necessary to sum up the situation.

It will be remembered that after the fall of Seringapatam in 1799, and the partition of Mysore, the British Government agreed to maintain a standing army of not less than 8,000 sepoy and 1,000 cavalry in Hyderabad, in order to protect the Nizam from his dangerous enemies. At that time he was surrounded by foes of the most ambitious and aggressive character. The Peishwa at Poona, Scindia, Holkar and the Bhonsla Raja at Nagpur were continually trying to filch from the Nizam some portion of his territory, and it seemed very probable that, between them all, the Nizam's dominions, unless protected by a strong army, would eventually be absorbed by one or more of these Mahratta princes. According to the treaty previously mentioned, drawn up in 1800, the Nizam made over the greater part of the territory which had fallen to his share in the partition of Mysore to the British, who, in their turn agreed to keep up, at their own cost, a force of not less than 9,000 men, thoroughly equipped and in every way efficient to defend the Nizam's dominions. This was the origin of the so-called Subsidiary Force. This force was available only to fight against a foreign foe, a special clause had been expressly inserted in

the treaty that it should not be for *sillidari*, or police purposes, or for helping in the collection of revenue. But in the early part of this century the Nizam's dominions were full of turbulent and refractory *zemin্দars*, who, whenever they were strong enough, refused to send their tribute, and commenced disorders among themselves. Hence it was soon found necessary to organize a small but efficient body of troops for the purpose of quelling these internal disturbances. Such a body was formed in the year 1805, but, when two or three years afterwards it was sent into the field against some refractory noblemen in the Berar Province, it behaved in so mutinous a manner that it was evident that to be of any use it must be re-organized. In 1812 the Resident, Mr. Russell (afterwards Sir Henry Russell) undertook this re-organization, as has been shown in a previous chapter. Several regiments were formed and were officered by Europeans. From year to year the force grew in size and efficiency, and was known as the Russell Brigade. About the years 1817-1819 it numbered between seven and eight thousand, and took a very active and honourable share in the Pindari War. It was described by the General as one of the most gallant and efficient brigades of his army. By this time the cost of the little army had risen to over thirty lakhs of rupees per annum. The Nizam paid the troops, but, as we have seen, they were practically under the orders of the Resident, in whose hands lay all the patronage. The actual financing was carried out by the great banking firm of William Palmer & Company, to which were made large assignments of districts in the vicinity of Aurungabad, where the head-quarters of the force was situated. In this way the troops were regularly paid, though at a very heavy cost to the Nizam, since

Palmer's rate of interest was very high, being as much as 23 and 24 per cent. per annum. In 1820, Mr. Russell was succeeded by Sir Charles (afterwards Lord) Metcalfe, who, a short time after assuming office, took up a very hostile attitude towards the banking firm, as likely to become too dangerous a political power in the State. The result was that the pecuniary connection between the firm and the Hyderabad Government was taken over together with other liabilities by the British Government. Altogether the debt thus taken over by the British amounted to one crore and sixty lakhs (160 lakhs), in settlement of which the tribute of the Northern Circars, for which the British Government paid the Nizam seven lakhs, was abolished in perpetuity. Two years after this the firm of Palmer & Co. went bankrupt.

The payment of the Nizam's Contingent devolved, therefore, upon the Nizam's Minister, who, for twenty years from that date was Rajah Chandoo Lal. It was this Minister's policy to do everything in accordance with the wishes of the British authorities. The Resident was allowed a free hand with the Contingent, and he effected such changes and reforms as he pleased. Everything was conducted on a costly scale. There were no less than five Brigadiers, each with a full staff, and the officers received special and handsome allowances. Chandoo Lal, as has been shown, though a man of great ability, was reckless and extravagant. On the one hand he had to supply the Nizam with the necessary funds, and, on the other, he had to meet the constant drain of over three lakhs of rupees a month for the Contingent. In order to meet these liabilities he had recourse to loans. Large sums were raised from the sowcars at a high rate of interest, and assignments of districts were made to them in return. As a natural

result the revenue fell off, and from year to year the Minister found it more difficult to raise the money to pay the Contingent. At length the cost of the Contingent crept up to forty lakhs of rupees, and gradually the pay began to fall in arrears. These arrears kept on growing until at last, in 1840, the British Government claimed fifty lakhs of rupees. For the next thirteen years there ensued a period of undignified squabbling.

In glancing back we find that in 1843 Chundoo Lal was removed as Minister, in which removal the Resident, General Fraser, was instrumental. A rapid succession of Ministers followed, and sometimes, for many months, there was no Minister at all. On the one hand, demands for money were made, and, on the other, excuses coupled with promises. Every now and then a sum would be paid on account, and then matters went on as before. During this time no attempt was made to reduce either the number of the Contingent or its expense. That the cost was far too heavy seems to have been admitted by all : but it was the Nizam's force, and he, knowing that it was efficient, never expressed a wish for its disbandment. We have seen how the debt due to the British Government gradually increased, and in 1849 amounted to 64 lakhs of rupees. Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General, sent orders to General Fraser, the Resident at Hyderabad, to insist upon a settlement. A scheme was drawn up with the Nizam's Government, under which certain districts in the Berars were to be assigned to the British for a number of years until the debt was paid off. The payment of the Contingent was still to continue as before. At the last moment, however, the Nizam made an effort. He almost exhausted his own treasury and succeeded in paying off more than half the debt due to the British in a lump sum. But, this one payment having been made, matters went from bad to

worse. The arrears increased and at length Lord Dalhousie sent a warning to the Nizam that, if by the end of 1852 the matter was not properly settled, he would have to make arrangements for obtaining a material guarantee, not only for the debt, but also for the future regular payment of the force. Still there was no suggestion of reduction of expenses.

General Fraser was now no longer in Hyderabad, and Colonel Low was sent down from Calcutta with a new treaty to which he was to obtain the Nizam's signature. Colonel Low arrived early in 1853, and then followed the negotiations for the treaty, to which reference has been made in the previous chapters.

The first demand was that the Nizam should assign in perpetuity the Berar provinces and the Raichour Doab districts, in consideration of which the debt would be cancelled and the Contingent maintained by the British. This, however, the Nizam utterly refused to do. He was willing to cede the territory temporarily, but not in perpetuity, and it was only with great difficulty that he consented to agree to any cession at all. Negotiations went on, but success seemed as far off as ever.

The Nizam, as predicted by General Fraser, endeavoured to put off what he regarded as a calamity by passive resistance and protracted negotiations. When Colonel Low mentioned the matter of ceding the districts named in perpetuity, His Highness showed a great repugnance to making any such treaty, and replied, "God forbid that I should suffer such disgrace."

Lord Dalhousie had already intimated to His Highness that military force would be used if "His Highness the Nizam should reject the settlement that had been proposed for his benefit; and, if evil should consequently befall his State, the Government of India must stand

acquitted of all blame towards him." On May 14th, 1853, Captain Cuthbert Davidson, then First Assistant Resident, wrote to the Minister Suraj-ul-Mulk, saying "that the Resident wished for the Minister's attendance in order to inform him that his negotiations with the Nizam were at an end, and he applied to the Government to move troops by to-day's post." Further on, in the same letter, Captain Davidson, added, that he had heard from his nephew in Poona "that the European regiment there had been ordered to hold itself in readiness to march on Hyderabad." This had the desired effect. On the same day the Minister notified to the Resident that the Nizam consented to sign the treaty, and this in reality was done two or three days later.

This treaty of 1853 contained a clause that any surplus over expenditure on administration should be handed to the Nizam and that the British Government was bound to furnish accounts. The objects of the expenditure were: (1) the maintenance of the Contingent at a numerical strength of 7,000 men; (2) the liquidation of the debt amounting to 48 lakhs of Halli Sikka rupees; (3) the payment of the cost of administration.

The treaty contained no stipulation regarding what the cost of administration should be, but, as will be shown from Captain Davidson's own words, there was a distinct understanding that the cost should not exceed 200,000 rupees. This statement from one of the principal officers concerned is conclusive as to the understanding between the high contracting parties, and, although the treaty itself contained no such provision, yet in equity this understanding must be taken to form one of the conditions of the trust. Now it will be interesting to watch the way in which these conditions were fulfilled.

From the first year in which the treaty came into

operation the cost of the Contingent was reduced. Whereas in 1853 it is shown as having cost 40 lakhs, two years afterwards it cost only 24. This is a very remarkable reduction, As long as the Nizam was responsible for the payment no steps were taken to reduce the expenditure, but as soon as the Government of India took over the management, and were obliged to make the assigned districts pay, so as to meet the different liabilities, the cost was reduced to a reasonable figure. Nor could this have been done at the cost of efficiency, because, when two years afterwards, in 1857, the Contingent was called upon to take a part in the suppression of the great Mutiny, it did brilliant service, and received the well-deserved thanks of the General commanding the army, of which it formed a part, and the thanks of the Government of India. The question at once suggests itself : Why should not the Residency have been directed to carry out this reduction before, which proved so feasible and easy? Why should the unnecessary burden have been allowed to rest on the shoulders of the Nizam, until the accumulated load of debt threatened to bring the State to bankruptcy and ruin? The Governor-General is found bantering the Resident about his five Brigadiers, but there is no suggestion of economy that can be discovered until the Government of India's pockets are threatened with loss—then the reduction is prompt and drastic. A reduction of this kind effected five years previously would have wiped out the whole of the debt on account of which the Governor-General insisted on the assignment of the provinces.

During the period of 1853-60, the increase of the revenue in the Berars was gradual, but not very considerable, and did not exceed eight lakhs of rupees. The expenditure, however, on the Military Contingent was greatly

reduced, and though it showed a tendency to rise it was in the last year of this period quoted at 26½ lakhs. As may be expected when the province was taken over by the British, it was found to be in a very backward state as regards public works. At first the outlay was very small, not more than 15,000 rupees, but in the latter year of this period it had increased to four and a half lakhs, by no means an extravagant charge. In the civil administration the increase of cost was more rapid, and it rose from eight lakhs in the first to nearly 22 lakhs in the last year. Still the receipts during the seven-year period showed a surplus over expenditure of 35½ lakhs.

In 1860 a new agreement was drawn up between the Nizam and the Government of India. The British Government in recognition of the Nizam's splendid loyalty to them in their hour of need, during the Mutiny of 1857, had resolved to bestow on him a substantial mark of gratitude for his loyalty during the Mutiny. Accordingly, the debt of fifty lakhs was remitted and the Raichur and Doab districts and Dharasoa were restored and only the Berars retained. The small Raj of Shorapur which had mutinied in 1857, and had been annexed, was given to the Nizam in full sovereignty, and some districts to the north of the Godavery were made over to the British in exchange. Under the treaty of 1857 the British bound themselves to render yearly accounts. This does not appear to have been done; at least officially, but under the new treaty of 1860, by authority of which the new assignments and exchanges were confirmed, a clause was inserted in which it was provided that in future no accounts need be rendered. It was in this manner that the new treaty was reconstructed. Presents amounting

to £10,000 were given to the Nizam, and £3,000 to the Prime Minister, and, according to old-established custom, £15,000 were forwarded by the Nizam to the Governor-General, and, according to rule, paid by him to the Imperial Treasury.

As regards the administration of the Berars on the part of the British, much discussion has arisen.

The alleged debt of 1853, on account of which the Berars were assigned, having been cancelled, the Nizam clearly became entitled to the surplus revenue which had accrued during the period 1853-60, and which, as has been shown, amounted to 35½ lakhs, but subsequently the Accountant-General put in a claim for two items of Rs. 1,283,850, and Rs. 2,293,690 for civil and military expenditure respectively. The only explanation regarding these mysterious items, which were large enough not to have escaped attention when making up the accounts, is offered by a foot-note in the administration report, to the following effect :

"These amounts are stated to have been debited in the adjustment of certain area charges communicated by the Accountant-General to the Government of India, in letter No. 2123, 13/1/1865."

What must strike everyone as remarkable is, firstly, that these sums should have been lost sight of during the preliminary negotiations for the treaty of 1860, which occupied about a year, and should not have been discovered until five years afterwards ; secondly, that not having been discovered in 1860, when the treaty was concluded, the surplus as shown by the then existing accounts should not have been handed over to the Nizam in conformity with the treaty of 1853 ; and, lastly, it is a most singular coincidence that these two items, lost sight of for more than six years, should form the exact

amount of the surplus which had accrued during the seven years' administration, and which ought to have been handed to the Nizam. When the arrear charges were discovered in 1865 the accounts had to be readjusted, and the opening year of 1861-62 shows a minus balance of Rs. 3,577,440. This, however, was adjusted by crediting against it the total surplus carried in the previous year. However, the administration of the province was carried out in a fairly economical manner. Only one lakh was spent on public works, nine lakhs on civil administration, and 24 lakhs on the Contingent, leaving an actual surplus of five lakhs.

The revenue went on rapidly increasing, and each year the surplus continued to grow, but still no actual money was paid over to the Nizam until the year 1867-8, when the surplus showed an accumulated balance of twenty lakhs unpaid, i.e., when in 1874-5 a regular annual surplus first began to be paid, there was an accumulated unpaid balance of about 50 lakhs of rupees. Hence, for over 20 years, the British Government had accumulated sums varying from 20 to 50 lakhs of rupees, for which no interest was paid and which the Nizam could not touch. This money nearly corresponds with the amount of the alleged debt due by the Nizam, when he assigned the districts in 1853. The actual amount in 1895 was Rs. 4,202,262. These figures are in round numbers.

As the years progressed the surplus of revenue over expenditure showed a remarkable tendency to shrink. In 1891-2 it was nearly 12 lakhs; then $7\frac{3}{4}$; then $7\frac{1}{2}$; then 5; then 2 lakhs; then, in 1896, 6 lakhs. Hence, the fact remains that, when the revenue was 73 lakhs twenty years before, there was a surplus of 13 lakhs, but subsequently, when the revenue amounted in round

figures to one hundred lakhs, there was only a surplus of six lakhs.

The term "alleged debt" has been used and the reason for this expression must be stated.

For a period of 41 years from 1812-53 the British had levied and retained the excise revenues of the two cantonments of Secunderbad and Jalna. For those sums no accounts had been submitted, and though, in 1851, two years previous to the treaty of 1853, the Hyderabad Government put forward a claim that those receipts should be taken as a set-off against the amount of arrears, General Fraser, the Resident, refused to allow what he called a problematic claim to be credited in the settlement of an actual debt. But, subsequent to the treaty of 1853, it was admitted that those revenues properly belonged to the Nizam, and from that time they had actually been collected by His Highness. Colonel Davidson, writing in 1860, says in reference to this debt: "I have always been of opinion that, had the pecuniary demands of the two Governments been impartially dealt with, we had no just claim on the Nizam for the present debt of 43 lakhs of Company's rupees."

His Highness's Minister, in a note dated 19/8/1851, when pressed on account of arrears, of the Contingent, asked for the surplus of the abkari revenues of Secunderabad and Jalna, which was afterwards allowed to be a portion of the legitimate revenues of the Hyderabad State.

The Government of India carried these revenues, which in 1922 amounted to about one lakh annually, to their own credit from 1812-1853—say for 41 years. The above would have given the Nizam a credit of 41 lakhs of rupees without interest, against the debt claimed. Further His Highness was charged with interest from January, 1849, to May, 1853, at 6 per cent. on advances



NAWAB SIR FARIDOON MULK, K.C.I.F., C.S.I., C.B.E.
(See Appendix No. 3).

for the pay of the Contingent. This charge for interest amounted to 10½ lakhs of rupees, although the Nizam earnestly protested against being made to pay any interest at all. In addition to this, when the Berars were taken over in 1853, part of the revenue consisted of custom duties. These duties were abolished since the province was considered as practically forming part of British India. These revenues, it had been agreed, should be accepted as payment for the Contingent; therefore, by abolishing these, the revenues were reduced *pro tanto*, and the sum of reduction in seven years, which would have amounted to 18 lakhs, should have been carried to the Nizam's credit.

By the foregoing, it can be seen that in 1853 there was really no debt to remit, but nevertheless from 1853 to 1860 the Nizam continued to pay interest, amounting to 18 lakhs, on this alleged debt. In the letter from Colonel Davidson, dated July 6th, 1859, he writes: "There is no doubt General Low allowed the former minister, Suraj-ul-Mulk, and the present one, Sarlar Jung, to suppose that our management would cost about 2 annas in the rupee, or about 12 per cent. of the revenue." As Colonel Davidson had been First Assistant Resident in 1853 and had conducted the negotiations, his statement is utterly unimpeachable.

In 1860, when the second treaty was drawn up, the cost of administration again formed a subject of preliminary discussion. At first the Government of India offered to bear all cost in excess of 2 per cent.—2 annas in the rupee—but the Nizam very generously said that he did not wish the Government of India to be too strictly tied down. The percentage is mentioned in the Governor-General's despatch to the Secretary of State, and is acknowledged by the latter official. Finally, Colonel

Davidson telegraphed and wrote to the Government of India that the cost of administration might be fixed at 25 per cent—4 annas in the rupee—"but this percentage we must engage not to exceed." (12/10/1860.)

At first when the Berars were taken over this tacit understanding was carried out. In the first year the cost of civil administration was eight lakhs out of a total revenue of 30—or a fraction over 3 annas in the rupee. As time went by, however, this proportion was exceeded, so that in 1859 the cost amounted to more than six annas in the rupee. When the obligation to render accounts was withdrawn by the treaty of 1860, we find the expenditure increasing by leaps and bounds. In fact it increased even more rapidly than the revenue. By 1894-5, the expenditure on civil administration alone rose to seven annas in the rupee. *The Pioneer* at the time pointed out that this was a cost out of all proportion to what was spent in the districts in British India, and was due to the extravagant manner in which the machinery of administration was conducted. Though the size of Berar (17,717 square miles) is only equal to two districts in the Presidency of Madras, it had the establishment sufficient to govern a whole Presidency.

The Berars were divided into six districts, officered by a full staff. It was this huge establishment that made the cost of administration so heavy, being more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ times the proportion expended in British India. It is difficult to understand why the cost of administration was allowed to increase until it amounted to four times to what it did when taken over.

It has been shown that the land revenue greatly increased during each decade. The following table will show the increase of expenditure under the heads of Public Works and the Military expenditure :

Year	P.W.D.	Military
1864-5	£49,098	£283,256
1874-5	£74,944	£270,907
1884	£114,198	£301,738
1894	£110,696	£397,472

Hence the reason why the Nizam's surplus showed signs of shrinkage was because the amount spent on Public Works, which should have been included in the amount allowed for civil administration, were charged separately. If the Public Works had been paid out of the Resident's 50 per cent. of the gross revenue, there would have been nearly five lakhs more available for the Nizam. As a matter of fact the Resident's expenditure was not 50 per cent. but 56 per cent.

It is the same story with the Military expenditure. There was, it is true, an increase in the force of the Contingent of 500 men, which about represents the strength of the artillery, which it was found necessary to add, in order to make the little army complete—but the small number in excess accounts in no way for the large annual increase. As *The Pioneer* pointed out at the time :

"The present system is evidently unfair to our ally, and a radical change is required. As long as we administer the trust we should do it in a businesslike manner—in the same way as we administer it in our own districts."

Enough has been said to show that the expenditure of the Berars was lavishly extravagant and it will be well once more to quote an article that appeared in *The Pioneer* summing up the situation :

"We first of all insisted upon the Nizam ceding territory on account of a debt, which afterwards was proved not to exist. We promised that the administration of

the territory should not cost more than 25 per cent., and that we should annually give him the surplus. Relying on this His Highness left us a free hand in the treaty as regards administration and waived the right of asking for accounts.

“ Taking advantage of this position we have increased the cost of civil administration alone to 43 per cent. and have spent about 13 per cent. in addition on Public Works and other items, which should have been included in the Civil Administration and have increased the cost of the Contingent to 41 per cent. In order to provide for what we call a working balance, we retain an accumulated surplus far beyond the amount required, for which we pay the Nizam no interest, and which very nearly represents the amount of the discredited debt for which he was compelled to assign the province.”

In 1881-82 the total revenue amounted to 39 lakhs, but the civil expenditure had risen to very nearly four lakhs—or nearly 50 per cent. In 1891 the revenue was over one hundred lakhs, but the expenditure again amounted to more than 52 lakhs, or more than 50 per cent., and finally in 1901, the year when the accounts were made up, the revenue was 110 lakhs, and the expenditure 130 lakhs. This was the year after the first great famine that had ever visited Berar, and the expenditure, therefore, was abnormal, but, taking the year 1898-99 as a fair test, we find that the normal expenditure under the heads of civil administration,* including the Public Works department, amounted to over 50 lakhs, or more than 50 per cent. of the gross revenue. All this led to much discussion and became a bone of contention. Undoubtedly under the British regime the province of Berar had greatly improved. A larger area of the actually fertile land was under cultivation, hence

the land was yielding larger crops, the ryot was more prosperous, and owing to better road communications criminals of all classes no longer found Berar the happy hunting ground it had been to them before the British took over the administration. In fact, Berar was looked on as the model province, and was spoken of as "the Garden of India."

It has never been suggested that the money used for Berar administration had been wastefully or improperly spent; on the contrary it was universally admitted that for every rupee spent a *quid pro quo* had been obtained. Everything was excellent of its kind. The buildings were fine, the roads admirable, the forest conservancy system good, and administration excellent. The only ground for complaint was that the money spent on administration in Berar was served out with a more lavish hand than was the case in other parts of British India. There were more officials per mile and per head of the population in that province than it was found necessary to maintain in other parts of India under British rule.

Before leaving the problem of Berar and passing on to consider other matters it will be as well to glance ahead and see how the matter was finally settled in 1902 between the Nizam, Mir Mabbub Ali Khan, and the Governor-General, Lord Curzon. As has been pointed out the steady rise annually in the cost of administration led to endless discussion. This was taken up by various papers headed by *The Pioneer*, and finally was the subject of a debate in Parliament. The result of this was that in 1902 an Agreement was executed by the Nizam's Government by which the Hyderabad Assigned Districts were leased to the British Government in perpetuity, in consideration of the payment to the Nizam, by the British Government, of a fixed perpetual rental of 25

lakhs annually, instead of the previous fluctuating surplus revenue, which on the average amounted to nine lakhs per annum. The Nizam's sovereignty was recognized by hoisting a flag and firing a salute annually on his birthday. This arrangement was confirmed by Lord Curzon, in Council, on December 16th, 1902. The British Government now retained the full and exclusive jurisdiction and authority in the Hyderabad Assigned Districts which they enjoyed under the treaties of 1853 and 1860 and were empowered to administer these districts in such a manner "as may seem advisable, and to distribute, organize and control the forces composing the Hyderabad Contingent. Due provision being made as stipulated by article three of the treaty, 1853, for the protection of the Nizam's Dominions. (See Acheson's *Treaties and Engagements and Sunnads*, Volume IX, page 4.)

When it was known that the much vexed question of the Berars had been finally settled, satisfaction was not universal. For the last fifty years endless arguments had centred round this question, greatly due to the fact that the principals most vitally concerned stood aloof while the argument was carried on by outsiders who were not always actuated by impersonal motives. Great disappointment was expressed, in view of the greatly increased revenue, that the annual rental stipulated by Lord Curzon at 25 lakhs, good year or bad year, was not greater. At least double that figure had, according to the calculations, been estimated as due to the Nizam. Under the new arrangement the British Government was no longer compelled to keep up the Hyderabad Contingent, which was abolished, and for the maintenance of which the districts had originally been ceded. Some of the reasons for the disappointment that prevailed

in Hyderabad were due to the fact that just before that period, when the agreement was executed, the finances of the Hyderabad State had been well organized and had revealed a degree of stability which would have ensured the regular payment of the cost of the Hyderabad Contingent. In fact, the Nizam offered to guarantee such payment, if Berar were restored to him, and there is no doubt that this undertaking would have been fulfilled. This proposal of His Highness, however, was not accepted. The question then arose: Was the British Government morally and equitably justified in those existing circumstances of retaining the province? Also was it justifiable permanently to sever from the Hyderabad State one of its most fertile provinces for the annual rental of 25 lakhs of rupees? Since 1902 the revenue of Berar has further largely increased and it shows signs of a steady rise owing to the extension of the railroads and the growing prosperity of India as a whole. The general impression is that the late Nizam reluctantly consented to the Agreement, under pressure brought to bear on him. It was estimated by people who had an intimate knowledge of Berar that, under normal conditions, the annual surplus, after defraying the cost of the Hyderabad Assigned Districts, would be fifty, and not 25 lakhs annually. Therefore it was felt that, if a permanent lease were the only solution, the British Government should have paid to His Highness the annual rental of fifty instead of 25 lakhs subject to periodical revision, in accordance with the growth of revenue, if the sovereignty of His Highness over these dominions was to be a reality and not a mere fiction.

On the other hand, the difficulties attending the return of Berar to the Hyderabad State, in view of the sentiments of its inhabitants, who had become more prosperous

during British administration than they were before, necessarily influenced the problem. There is no doubt that, under the British, Berar, which had been a devastated area, where crime was rampant, was, by judicious handling, converted into one of the most fertile and prosperous provinces in India, where the inhabitants lead the normal life of peaceable citizens unmolested by bandits and dacoits.

This also was the history of Mysore—and has been the history of all native states or courts of wards that temporarily fell under the British administration. The general feeling in the Hyderabad State is that there should be a reconconsideration and revision of an agreement entered into between a powerful Government and its weaker but faithful ally, at a time when through famine the finances of Hyderabad were temporarily embarrassed.

Having traced the history of Berar we must now glance at the conditions prevailing when the Prime Minister, Sarfaraz Jung, took over charge of the administration, and note the changes inaugurated. We shall see from the extraordinary progress made by the State under his guidance how great a debt Hyderabad owes him.

CHAPTER XVII

DEATH OF SIRAJ-UL-MULK—MUTINY IN HYDERABAD—
THE RAJAH OF SHORAPUR
PERIOD 1853-58.

IN 1853 the Prime Minister, Siraj-ul-Mulk died, and his nephew, Salar Jung, with the approval of the British Government, was appointed to succeed him. This was, as we shall see, an admirable choice ; nor was there anyone in Hyderabad who could so effectually have played the *Deus ex machina* as did the new Minister. It has been said that " nothing of him was ever hurried, no reform, however important, was carried out in hot haste. Though his policy was characterized by a wise and wary conservatism, that abhorred extreme measures, yet no man was less tenacious of old systems once their inefficiency had been proved." He was distinguished by a wonderfully retentive memory and a highly subtle, comprehensive understanding. But what most endeared him to the people was that his sympathies were wide and that he was eminently just. The level-headed policy of Salar Jung was shown in many ways, but specially so in 1857 when the spirit of unrest and sedition which pervaded Northern and Central India was manifested in Hyderabad itself. In the early part of that year when mutiny and bloodshed were rife, the Nizam Nasir-ud-Dowlah died and was succeeded by

his eldest son, Afzal-ud-Dowlah. At the accession of this new ruler, the hopes of the dissatisfied were excited, and this led to an insurrection.

Before going further, it will be necessary for a moment to glance at the geographical position of Hyderabad. The actual extent of the Nizam's dominions is 95,337 square miles. In the north the State is bounded by the Central Provinces, in the south-west by Madras, in the west by Bombay, and in the north-west by Scindia, and the river Narbudda. Hyderabad, it will thus be seen formed a buffer between the Northern and Central Provinces where sedition was rife, and the Southern portions of this vast continent, which had not been affected by the insurrection. Therefore, His Highness's sympathy and policy were of the utmost importance. It was generally accepted that if the Nizam joined the mutineers the whole of India would take part in the rebellion. The popular saying was, "If the Nizam goes, all goes." Salar Jung, with his far-seeing policy, realized that the permanency of his sovereign depended on his loyal adherence to the British.

It was at this critical moment that the Nizam Nasir-ud-Dowlah died. The late Nizam had been very popular and his death was much deplored. He had been a ruler who was humane and was remarkable for his religious tolerance and his strict adherence to truth. He had also won the admiration of his subjects by his magnificent physique; he stood over six feet and was noted for his great bodily strength. As the young Nizam was still a minor a regency was proclaimed. The young prince left the Palace on the morning of his enthronement, seated on an elephant and attended by soldiers and all his court nobles. After the arrival of Colonel Davidson at the City Palace the ceremony of instalment began.

A bull had previously been sacrificed across the Nizam's path as His Highness entered the chief palace gate, and this was believed to be a propitious omen. His Highness was led to the *musnud* by the two Regents, Salar Jung and Shamsul-Umra, each holding one of his hands. The Resident then addressed the young Nizam and offered his congratulations. Colonel Davidson had only taken over office a month previously on the death of his predecessor, Colonel Bushby. Both the Regents and the Resident realized that a change of ruler in Hyderabad at this moment was most critical and every precaution was taken against a sudden rising. Nor were these fears groundless. The following month, in June, 1857, the walls of Hyderabad city were placarded with notices signed by some of the leading orthodox Moulvies calling on the "Faithful to murder the Feringhee." Colonel Davidson at once requested the General Commanding (General William Hill) to parade his troops in full marching order. Fortunately a perfect understanding existed between the Resident and the Prime Minister, both of whom were present at the review. The people, impressed by the number of troops and the *moral* of the men, were for a time quieted. This, however, did not last long. Two weeks later a large mob congregated near the Mekka Musjid and urged on by Moulvie Akbar raised the green flag, known as the holy standard, and proclaimed themselves ready to engage in a Jihad, or holy war, which had for its object the extermination of the Feringhee, or infidel. The cry "Din" was raised and urged on by their religious leaders, the mob were soon in a state of hysterical frenzy. On hearing this, Salar Jung immediately despatched a corps of Arab mercenaries and posted soldiers at each gate of the city. By this prompt measure the Prime Minister quelled the

rising and life once more resumed its normal course. Superficially peace was restored, but below the surface sedition and discontent were surging. News from the outside world filtered in. Victories gained by the British were carefully concealed, and all the massacres of Cawnpore, Lucknow, Jhansi and Agra were discussed with grossly exaggerated reports among an inflammable people, among whom were interspersed adventurers from all parts of India, who were averse to any foreign custom or government. The following month, some thirteen Rohilla sepoy deserters from Buldana because some of their seditious companions had been shot. They sought an audience with Salar Jung, who insisted on handing them over to the Resident, much to their disgust. The Moulvies at once took up the cudgels in their defence and declared that Salar Jung had been guilty of an act of violation of sanctuary. This was made the excuse to again call on the people to engage in a Jihad. Some of the Moulvies actually pronounced Hyderabad *Darb Haram*, or an infidel country, where Mahomedans may wage a holy war. Once more a large mob collected outside the Mekka Musjid and marched on to the Residency. Here, everything was in readiness to meet their attack. The advancing mob was met with a charge of grape from the newly erected ramparts, followed by seven shots from the three big guns and a charge of the Nizam's troops. This caused the mutineers to flee in abject confusion and disorder. Thanks to the excellent understanding which existed between the Resident and Salar Jung, a serious catastrophe was averted. Had the Prime Minister not acted so promptly, and had the mutineers been given time to corrupt the city of Hyderabad, a general conflagration would have ensued. The results would have proved disastrous not only to the

Europeans but also to Hyderabad itself. For retribution would not have been long in coming, and, indeed, the history of Hyderabad as a separate state might never have been written from that date. As events turned out, however, it was proved that His Highness the Nizam and his Government had remained a staunch ally to the British throughout the Mutiny. This service rendered in the hour of need was not forgotten. The Nizam and the British Government realized from Salar Jung's master-stroke that in him they had a strong man and they were not slow in recognizing his worth and the following year, honours were awarded, first to the Nizam and then to Salar Jung.

Shortly after the mutiny in Hyderabad, it was decided to send a brigade formed of troops of the Hyderabad Contingent to act with the British troops in quelling the rising. This was an antidote to local irritation, and the success obtained by the Hyderabad soldiers greatly pleased their relatives, who promptly transferred their sympathies to the campaign in which their kinsmen were engaged.

No chieftain, except the Rajah of Shorapur, saw any reason to question the Nizam's judgment in this matter. The Rajah was a youth who had squandered his capital, financial, mental and physical, in orgies of wild dissipation and debauch. A rumour reached him that the British were about to disarm his state, and, intoxicated by promises held out to him by seditionists, the Rajah resolved to raise an army of rebels, levying Rohillas and Arab mercenaries for this purpose. On hearing this, Salar Jung issued an order that anyone taking service under the Rajah of Shorapur did so at the peril of losing any property he possessed in Hyderabad. The Resident at the same time sent an expeditionary force commanded

by Major Hughes, to watch the western frontier, while another force was sent under Captain Wyndham to occupy Lingsagur. Captain Rose Campbell, one of the Resident's personal assistants, was also sent to endeavour to save the young Rajah from his own folly. Captain Campbell's efforts, however, proved useless, and he received messages from the Rajah's relatives that his life was in imminent danger, as a plot was on foot to assassinate him. Therefore he joined Captain Wyndham and ordered him to march to Shorapur. According to the usual custom the Rajah sent out emissaries to meet the troops, and point out to them a favourable site for encampment. The spot indicated was a narrow valley surrounded by hills and rocks, but suspecting treachery Captain Campbell preferred an open plain. That night he, with 400 men and two guns, was attacked by a force of 7,000 men. Fortunately for him fresh reinforcements arrived in the morning and the mutineers were dispersed and overcome. The Rajah, realizing that the odds were against him, fled to Hyderabad and sought the protection of Salar Jung, who handed him over to the Resident, by whom he was tried.

In 1842 the Rajah's father had become so financially embarrassed that he could not fulfil his obligations to the Nizam. Consequently on his death the administration of the State temporarily passed into the hands of the British Government, during the minority of the young Rajah. The State was subsequently handed over to the heir when he attained his majority, in a flourishing and prosperous condition. Colonel Meadows Taylor had been intimately connected with Shorapur and knew the young Rajah from his childhood. Between the Colonel and his young ward there existed a sincere bond of affection. The Rajah always addressed the Colonel as "Appa"



THE NAWAB SIR SAADAT JUNG I,
DIED 1883, PRIME MINISTER 1853-1883.

(my father). Things might have been different for the young chieftain had he remained under the wise and sympathetic guidance of Colonel Meadows Taylor, but unfortunately this officer's services were required elsewhere, and the young man, surrounded as he was by many who had their private axes to grind, soon drifted into zenana intrigues and wild debauch. Added to this, liquor and opium constantly consumed in increasing quantities soon affected the stability of his mental balance. On hearing that the young Rajah was a prisoner in Secunderabad, in the barracks of the Royals, Colonel Meadows Taylor obtained permission to visit his former ward. In the Colonel's reminiscences (*Story of My Life*) we are given an account of this interview, which is full of human interest and colour.

"The Rajah had deliberately rebelled against the British Government, and was to be tried for his life by a military commission, which would shortly assemble. As may be imagined he was deeply affected on first seeing me. Though handsome, his features showed unmistakable signs of dissipation and excess which I was sorry to see.

" 'Oh, Appa, Appa,' was all that he could cry, or rather moan as he sat at my feet, his face buried in my lap and his arms clasped tightly around me. 'Oh, Appa, I dare not look into your face. I have done every crime. I have even committed murder.' "

At a subsequent interview the Colonel asked the Rajah if he wished see the Resident, but the young man shook his head.

"No, Appa," he replied, "he would expect me to ask my life of him, and this I will not do, for I deserve to die for what I did. And I will not ask my life like a coward, nor will I betray my people."

This speech, which the Colonel repeated to the Resident, pleased the latter greatly. At the final interview between Colonel Meadows Taylor and his former ward the Rajah asked what his fate would be.

"What do you think, Appa? Shall I have to die?"

"I think so," replied the Colonel gravely. "It would be wrong for me to give you false hope."

"It was not my own will, when I was in my senses, Appa," replied the youth.

The Colonel was deeply moved. "I do not reproach you," he said, "for I know all, but those who will try you do not. Speak the truth, as you have done to me."

"I will," he answered calmly, "but I would rather die than be imprisoned always."

"If you have to die," said the Colonel, touched at the nobility in his speech, "die like a brave man."

"I shall not tremble," he answered gravely, "when they tie me up to a gun. If you could be near me at the last I should be happier. Only, Appa, do not let me be hanged like a robber. Go now, Appa, I shall never see you again. Tell them all that I was no coward."

The guard on duty was touched at this scene so full of pathos, and spoke to the Colonel about the Rajah.

"He was like a child to me," answered the Colonel, "until evil people came between us, and temptations proved too strong for him."

When Colonel Davidson had the details of this interview he seemed deeply moved.

"Taylor," he said, "we will try to save the boy."

The trial took place and the Rajah was condemned to death, but, by special intervention on the part of the Resident on his behalf, the sentence was commuted to transportation for life. Shortly after this it was declared that the Rajah should be imprisoned in a fortress in

Chingelpet, in Madras, and he was told if he showed signs of reform his state, liberty and his power would be returned to him after four years' time.

Colonel Meadows Taylor was at Shorapur conveying to the senior Rani Rungama, and the other ladies of the zenana, the good news of the reprieve of the Rajah. Great joy prevailed in the palace, and the young wife asked the Colonel to come and visit her in her apartments. When he was announced, the young Rani, quite regardless of etiquette, first threw herself into his arms and then proceeded to dance round the room, overcome with joy at the idea of seeing her husband again. There was only one in the palace who shook his head in sorrow. It was the old *Shastri* (Hindu divine). The reason of his sorrow, he explained, was that some years previously the Rajah's horoscope had been taken, in which the statement was made that the Rajah would die before his 24th birthday and forfeit his State. This paper had been given into the hands of Captain Rose Campbell, who had carefully preserved it. The *Shastri* maintained, that, as his master's birthday was so close at hand he could not help feeling apprehensive until that date was over.

The ladies of the zenana laughed at this and continued their preparations for their long journey, as they had permission to join the Rajah at Chingelpet Fort. Many arrangements had to be made, for a journey to Madras in those days of slow transit was no light undertaking. Tradesmen bearing silks and embroideries for the Rani's adornment were waiting in the palace courtyard. An air of festivity was abroad. Suddenly the bells of an express runner were heard and excitement again rose to fever heat within the zenana, when it was made known that the runner had brought a despatch for Colonel Meadows Taylor from the Residency. The old *Shastri* was with

the Colonel when the despatch arrived and watched every movement of his face as he read the message. Then suddenly leaning forward, with his quick intuition, he seized the Colonel's arm.

"Sahib, Oh Sahib," he wailed, "you need not tell me, my young master is dead."

This proved to be the case. The young Rajah at his first encampment had possessed himself of his escort's revolver and had shot himself. Though the general verdict was suicide, Colonel Meadows Taylor, from his intimate knowledge of the young man, maintained that it was not so, but that the Rajah impelled by curiosity had examined the weapon and had inadvertently pulled the trigger. However that may be, the strange prophecy had been fulfilled to the letter. By his presence and his extraordinary gift of insight and sympathy Colonel Meadows Taylor was able to prevent any further rising.

The young Rani, whose hopes had been raised only to be shattered in so tragic a manner, received a generous pension and provision was also made for the other ladies of the zenana.

The following year, in 1858, Queen Victoria's proclamation was read in all parts of British India, and also in Hyderabad. In this promises were given to all classes to respect the observation of their religious rites compatible with justice.



THE NAWAB SIR SALAR JUNG,
GRANDSON OF THE EMINENT STATESMAN
AND PRIME MINISTER.

(See Appendix No. 4.)

CHAPTER XVIII.

REFORMS INSTITUTED BY SIR SALAR JUNG PERIOD 1853-83

IN order to understand the value and nature of the service rendered to the Hyderabad State by the Nawab Salar Jung, it is necessary to glance at the administration of the State as it was when he became Prime Minister.

As we look back to the year when Salar Jung assumed the reins of Government, and compare the administration of the State in 1853 to thirty years later, it seems more like looking back several centuries than merely three decades, so great was the progress wrought by his genius for organization. In fact, as we become acquainted with some of the details of the administration of those days, especially in the Mofussil, it reads more like a tale from the Arabian Nights than a statement of facts that occurred within the last fifty years.

Owing to the chaotic state of government in Hyderabad, it was evident to all that things were in a very grave and critical condition when the Nawab Salar Jung, like the *Deus ex machina*, appeared on the scene of action. Drastic reforms of a very extensive nature were imperative, but the difficulty was to know at which end the tangled skein should be unravelled. Hyderabad, the capital, was by no means abreast of the times, and, in the

Mofussil mismanagement, oppression and crime were universal. Bands of marauders and highway robbers ruled by force of might, and were allowed to pursue their nefarious trade unhindered, for the simple reason that those in authority were in abject fear of them. In those days no police force existed, neither were there any courts of justice in the districts, so that the people had no means of redress.

The only Government officials in charge of the districts were the *talukdars* appointed by Government, who were mostly men of influence and position. According to custom, they were allowed two annas in the rupee for the expenses of collecting revenue. In most cases, owing to the unsettled state of affairs in the Mofussil, the *talukdars* preferred to live in the capital itself, and leased out their rights to irresponsible and inefficient subordinates, elected at their own instigation, men who were in no way answerable to Government and whose powers were not defined.

Other *talukdars*, again, by official misrepresentation, obtained sepoys in the army to collect their revenue. In both cases the money allowed by Government, for the sole purpose of collecting revenue, was not spent on the purpose intended. While the *talukdars* profited, their subordinates oppressed the people by fraudulent assessment. The *raiat* being without means of redress, became so impoverished that numbers of cultivators, rather than subject themselves to tyranny and oppression, left their hereditary lands, seeking a living in districts where conditions were more favourable. Thus hundreds of villages became depopulated and land formerly productive became barren. Consequently, it was evident that, under the conditions prevailing, both the interests of the State and also of the individual were endangered.



COLONEL R. NEVILL,
COMMANDING H.H. THE NIZAM'S TROOPS.



A. J. DUNLOP, Esq., C.I.E., C.S.I.,
MINISTER OF REVENUE.
(See Appendix 5-6).

The first reform inaugurated by Salar Jung was by far the most important of all those introduced by him, namely, the abolition of the farming-out of revenue. Salar Jung, with his far-seeing policy, realized at once that the erratic revenue administration was indirectly responsible for the whole chaotic state of the Government. The talukdars were gradually dismissed and others appointed in their stead on smaller salaries, each man equipped with a staff of subordinates chosen by and directly responsible to Government. Owing to this new reform the rapacious policy of the talukdars collapsed. The people, no longer unduly taxed, were able again to make a living by cultivating the land, and deserted villages became inhabited once more. However, the dismissal of the old talukdars was by no means an easy matter. Some still had specified leases to run, while others, who were military chiefs, often set up a claim of *Fazilat*, or money advanced to Government, during pecuniary embarrassment. Government again set up counter claims for money levied by the contractors which had neither been remitted to the Treasury nor accounted for. These disputes caused lengthy and tiresome litigation. Hence, it is easy to understand that both tact and time were required to upset the old abuses and establish a system worked on lines that were sound and practical.

Up to the year 1853 the Government suffered from what might be described as a chronic state of financial embarrassment, consequently the man who was ready to lay down the largest sum as an advance to the state was in most cases the recipient of a taluka. As it often happened that, before the talukdar had held his post for more than a couple of years, he was ousted from it by a higher bidder, it naturally followed that his first object

was to recoup himself for the money advanced. That this was done and a fair profit derived as well, is evident, or the competition for the charge of a taluka would not have been so keen.

For some time the land revenue had shown signs of a steady decrease owing firstly to the lack of a proper system of assessment, secondly to the gross mismanagement to which we have referred, and thirdly to the fact that Government had instituted a system of demanding revenue from the farmers in advance, to tide over the chronic financial difficulties which prevailed at that time. By demanding the revenue in advance the land could not be farmed out on such favourable terms. To show how great the loss to Government was from this topsy-turvy system we need only consider the instance of Pangal, which in twenty-five years showed a steady decrease in revenue during each successive change from Rs. 23,871 to Rs. 17,000. Under the old system each village was assessed collectively, any deficiency due to the relinquishing or desertion of fields by cultivators being made good by taxing other cultivators in excess, in order to recover the stipulated amount. This, however, was not the only vagary practised by those in authority, for the Government Agents, or rather their subordinates, had an elastic conscience. Assessment was constantly being enhanced and the terms agreed upon were not adhered to, but when these Agents were guilty of breach of trust no redress was available to the cultivator. Under this pernicious system, though the claims of the Government were limited, the claims of the talukdar on the unfortunate cultivator were unlimited, and there was no contact between the Central Government and the *Raiat*. Extensive and costly irrigation works which had formerly existed had been allowed to fall into

ruin, for the talukdars, having only temporary power in the land, would not spend the necessary money, and the *Raiat*, already overtaxed, could not command the capital necessary for the purpose.

Having started the system of gradually dismissing the old talukdars, thus abolishing the farming-out of revenue, His Highness's Dominions were divided into five *subahs* (or counties), with 14 districts and 73 *tahsils*. A regular system of measuring each field separately and assessing it was also introduced. Under the new system, instead of making the assessments at harvest time, when the harvester was not allowed to touch his crops until assessment had been completed, assessment was made on a fixed scale at a certain date, and the harvester could dispose of his harvest when and how he chose.

A system known as *Takdama*, by which the cultivator was forced to advance a part of his revenue on pain of losing his crops was abolished. This also applied to another pernicious system known as *Batai*, which meant that Government fixed the price of grain at a price advantageous to the Treasury, making all *bunyas* buy at this rate and recoup themselves as best they could. It is easy to understand how this again fell heavily on the *Raiat*.

It was not long before the benefit of the revenue reform made itself felt all over the dominions. Not only did the revenue increase, but the cultivator once more became prosperous, barren lands became fruitful, and villages, some of which had been deserted for over a hundred years, again became inhabited.

The next step was to introduce a system of revenue survey through which the Government undertook to deal with the *Raiat* directly. Somewhat later a school for the training of revenue officers was temporarily established. This was done at the suggestion of the Director

of Revenue, Mahdi Ali, and proved to be a great success. Pupils were selected from the nobility and well-to-do classes and after theoretical training were sent into the districts to learn the practical work. By this means the required number of revenue officers was obtained and the school having completed its object after about a year was closed. This new system of reform proved to be so excellent that, thirty years later the revenue of the State was nearly three times as great, while in Hyderabad city itself it had been more than trebled.

Having organized a sound system of land revenue Salar Jung next turned his attention to the administration of justice. During Chandoo Lal's ministry, in 1832-43, there were in the capital three Courts of Justice—the first in which civil and criminal cases were tried; the second, the Kotwali, or police court; and third, the court where religious disputes were heard. In all these courts, however, judgments were given orally, all proceedings were very brief and no record of litigation was filed. Hence, all depended on the personal integrity of the judge, and naturally under this regime many abuses crept in. Many of the nobles, for instance, declined to submit to these courts, and refused to appear when summoned, preferring to hold their own courts, where justice was administered by one of their own retainers, according to his individual ideas on the subject. Special cases, again were settled by direct appeal to the Minister. Under these conditions, naturally the rich man, with money and influence at his back, could do much as he pleased, without coming under the power of the law, while the poor man, who had neither of these powerful aids with which to press his cause, had little chance of obtaining justice. Bad as things were in the capital, however, they were much worse in the districts, for there

neither rules nor courts for the administration of civil and criminal law existed. In large towns like Aurungabad *Kazis* and sometimes *Amils* heard some of the cases, while in the villages disputes were settled by *Panchayats* (or village councils), consisting of *Patels* and *Patwaris* (head men of the village).

The merchants trading in His Highness's dominions were another source of terror to the people living in the Mofussil. Not only did they sell their wares at fabulous prices, demanding interest bonds after a few days, but these claims were enforced by lawless Arab retainers who were in their pay. This gave rise to much tyranny and oppression for the debtor was made responsible *nolens volens* for the maintenance of these wild, lawless retainers, who often on their own authority confiscated any household property that particularly took their fancy. The Afghan creditors, however, were infinitely worse, for they thought nothing of branding the bodies of their debtors and otherwise illtreating them. Here again the talukdars were fully aware of these proceedings, but having no police force at their back they dared not interfere, because of the possibility of a revengeful retaliation. For it was not an unknown thing for *Zemindars* and *Desmukhs* to be confined for some time in small houses, until they had executed fictitious bonds, for debts which they had not incurred.

Even worse was the fate of any unfortunate man who had been suspected of a crime, for he was forcibly seized and cast into prison, where he often lay for years awaiting his trial, and not infrequently died in prison, before he had been tried for an offence which he had not committed. Those, again, who were suspected of minor offences were often fined for years on end, whether they were guilty or innocent. It is not, therefore, surprising

that dacoity and plunder were everyday occurrences, for the punitive force sent out to punish such offenders, not being trained, was as a rule quite inefficient to deal with these outlaws, or, if by chance the plundered booty was seized, the owner fared no better, for it only changed hands from the robbers to their pursuers, who usually looked on all such booty as their rightful perquisites. It was indeed a case of set a thief to catch a thief! Nor can we marvel at this when we read that the rank and file in such punitive forces received the munificent salary of Rs. 3 *per mensem*!

Thus it happened that those that wielded power were tyrants in every sense of the word. When those under them had cause to complain to the *Amil* they were often referred back again to the very person against whom they had complained, and it does not require much imagination to surmise that then the last state of the complainant was a great deal worse than the first! In most cases, therefore, people considered that discretion was the better part of valour and refrained from litigation, such as it was.

In the days of Siraj-ul-Mulk, the barbarous custom of mutilating prisoners was abolished, and, where it had been customary to amputate a hand, seven years' penal servitude was prescribed, and in the graver cases, where a hand and a foot would have been amputated, fourteen years were allotted. What the sufferings of these prisoners must have been, in those days, when neither antiseptics nor anæsthetics were known, seems to us almost impossible to contemplate, living in these days when anæsthesia is produced for the slightest operation. A decree forbidding *Suttee* had also been promulgated in Siraj-ul-Mulk's time, and both these reforms were studiously carried out by Salar Jung.

We have now seen the primitive state in which the great statesman found matters when he assumed the ministry. The extent of the reforms inaugurated, and the able manner in which they were carried out in thirty years' time by his administration represent a stupendous task. Hyderabad, at that time, was much like a noble ship tossed on a tempestuous sea, and nearing perilous breakers, when suddenly the master-hand of an expert mariner took her helm and slowly and surely steered her to a haven of safety.

Another important and far-reaching reform was the establishment of additional courts in the capital and the appointment in the districts of *Mir Adls and Munsifs* to administer justice there. A regular customs service was also introduced and the salt department organized.

The next noteworthy reform was the inauguration of a regular police service. This naturally could not be done in a moment, and as a temporary measure *Zillidars* were appointed to quell the turbulent state of the districts. These consisted of Arabs, Sikhs, Rohillas, Linemen, Peons, etc., some of whom were placed directly under the newly appointed talukdars, while others received their orders from a Central Committee.

As we saw in the last chapter, the districts of Raichur, Lingsugur, and Shorapur were restored to His Highness by the British Government in 1862. Now, in these districts an excellent police system had been instituted, and this was taken over and continued without any change until the year 1865 when the whole police force of the Nizam's dominions was reorganized. Then a separate force was provided for the city and for its suburbs and one for each district of the Mofussil. Though it was at first uphill work, the police gradually proved themselves equal to deal with the wild raid of the lawless

Rohillas, and a marked decrease of crime was very soon apparent. At first the police worked under the Board of Revenue, but later an Inspector of Police with the usual staff of superintendents was appointed.

Seeing the state of pecuniary embarrassment into which His Highness's Government had lapsed in 1853, it is not surprising to find that the Government treasury that used to exist had fallen into disuse. There was, in fact, no Government Treasury at that date, Hindu bankers being permitted to fulfil that function. The natural result of this was that the State had no credit and Government servants received their salary most irregularly. All this was changed and not only was a treasury instituted, but Government servants were paid regularly.

A Secretariat under the Prime Minister and later a Board of Revenue were instituted in order to divide the *Divani** into civil divisions. So far the only divisions were *talukas*, which did not happen to coincide with the territorial division. The numbers of these *talukas* fluctuated annually, some years showing a record of forty, other years of sixty. This arose from the fact that no definite limit was assigned to each *taluka*. Finally, the restored districts were amalgamated and the whole country was divided into *subahs*, *talukas*, and *tahsils* on similar lines to the divisions which existed in British India. Each division was then classed into a grade according to its annual revenue and Government treasuries established in every division throughout the dominions. The result was that this scientific organization soon bore fruit. The country, hitherto depopulated and denuded of its rightful income, became fertile and prosperous once more.

* *Divani*—territory directly administered by Government, as opposed to *Sarf Khas*, i.e., His Highness's private estate, and to *Sagu*, a private estate of individuals, and *Paigah*, i.e., lands held on military tenure by certain noblemen. The word *Divani* is often used in Indian history. There is no English equivalent.

In 1853 there was practically no educational system for the public, though in the days of the kings of Golconda and Bidar, several *Madrassas* or Colleges were founded at which students were not only taught but also clothed and fed by the State. Owing, however, to constant campaigns and general mismanagement, the financial embarrassment, from which the Government was constantly suffering, caused these institution to lapse from want of necessary funds. Consequently, instead of instructing the students in Law, Theology, Logic and Philosophy, as had been done in former days, the boys were only taught the Koran and a few sayings of the Prophet, combined with a little penmanship. For the soldier in those days was of more service to the State than the scholar.

Sir Salar Jung saw how much the State was losing by this short-sighted policy, and the year after he assumed control he started an educational system on sound and practical lines similar to that established in other parts of India. Four years later an order was issued for the opening of two schools in every taluka, one to be conducted in Persian, the other in the vernacular. In all these schools History, Geography, Mathematics and Grammar were added to the usual curriculum. In addition to this, there were five branch schools situated at the five gates of the capital. At first all the schools were under the direction and control of the Board of Revenue, but later a separate Board of Education with the usual staff was instituted, and English was gradually introduced everywhere in the higher grade schools. There were a couple of independent schools as well as the State-aided ones. One of these was first started for the purpose of providing a sound education for the two sons of Sir Salar Jung and a few of the

sons of the other leading nobles. An English University master was engaged and in a short time the results were so excellent that the numbers of the students increased rapidly and a larger staff of highly trained European masters had to be employed to meet the demand, in addition to a large staff of learned Moulvies and Indian scholars. This school eventually developed into a college now known as the "Nizam's College," and to the present day most of the sons of the nobles receive their education there. Another school for the people was founded by a philanthropist, Somasundrum Moodaliar, one of the enlightened Tamil Mudaliars that migrated to Hyderabad from Madras. In this school (which at the present day is known as the Mahbub College) Hindus, Mahomedans and Christians receive an excellent education and work in with each other quite harmoniously.

Female education was at this period totally unknown in Hyderabad, and if anything it was looked at rather askance. The Wesleyan Mission were one of the first to start a large training school for girls, but since then the *Patsala*, started and endowed by various Hindu philanthropists and entirely in the hands of Hindu management, has been one of the foremost to lead the way. The Church of England and Roman Catholic Mission also have done, and are doing, a splendid work in the educational line. Whether in State-aided, private, or mission schools, it was noticeable that the Hindu part of the community was always the first to profit by the new advantages offered, while the Mahomedans for some time were very apathetic.

As regards medical education, Hyderabad was not so far behind in this respect as might have been thought. A medical school had been started as early as 1845. Yet the women, both Hindu and Mahomedan, were

at a great disadvantage medically, for both were rigorous observers of the *purdah* system, and though there were in Hyderabad many fully trained medical men, both European and Indian, yet these were not admitted into the zenanas and consequently women and children were almost entirely in the hands of incompetent, unqualified women, who worked their cures by a combination of drugs and incantations. The result was obvious. Hundreds, nay thousands, of women and children endured endless agony, dying of comparatively simple ailments, for want of skilled medical attendance, for, though this was practically at their doors, custom prevented them from availing themselves of it. It has been said that a Nation's strength consists in its Workers, its Thinkers, and its Mothers. Sir Salar Jung realized this, and saw how great a drain preventible illness is on a nation's physique, and it was through his efforts that special medical aid was provided for the women of Hyderabad. Two of the first lady doctors were Miss Boardman (later Mrs. Belgrami), and Miss Dora White (later Mrs. Fellowes). The latter was at the Afzul Gunj Hospital for many years and did admirable work. *Purdah Nashins* flocked to her wards and in 1884 we read of no less than 3,000 new admittances and over 2,000 operations among the *gosha* women of Hyderabad being performed in that ward. Since that day the work has extended and there are now several European as well as Indian women doctors practising in the city, with a staff of English and Eurasian nurses under them.

Having considered at some length the principal reforms inaugurated by Salar Jung, we must now turn our attention to other matters of general historical interest. The year 1860 saw the awakening of Hyderabad to the necessity of a better means of transit. Until then the

journey from Hyderabad to Bombay, or 'Madras, took many days to accomplish. The natives of small means still elected to travel in the old-fashioned bullock cart screened off by curtains, the value of which more or less betokened the status of their owner. Native nobles and Europeans, usually preferred to travel by tonga or on horseback, but the journey was a tedious affair, not unaccompanied by danger and dragged through many weary days. Indeed, we read in General Fraser's *Memoirs* that, on leaving Hyderabad in the year 1853 for Madras, General Fraser started in the first week in January, hoping as he expressed it "to arrive in Madras towards the end of the month as we are going down in slow marches."

From Bombay the Great Indian Peninsula Railway had extended as far as Wadi, some 121 miles from Hyderabad. In 1850 the Nizam decided to connect Hyderabad with Wadi by means of a railway. Consequently negotiations were commenced, and His Highness ceded certain territory to the British Government, who undertook the construction and working of the new line, which was to be known as the Nizam's State Railway, and was to be worked on the same lines as all the Government State Railways in India. Ten years later this arrangement was slightly altered, the British Government undertaking to manage the railway on behalf of the Nizam, who, with shareholders, provided all the capital and was to receive the profits. In connection with the railway the Nizam had granted to the British Government full jurisdiction within that portion of territory which was occupied by the Nizam's State Railway in the Southern Mahratta, the Dhond and Munmad or the Hyderabad Godavery Valley Railways, including lands taken up for stations and outbuildings and for any railway purposes. The introduction of the railway into

Hyderabad proved an invaluable asset to the State. Not only did it provide an easier means of communication in times of famine, but it gradually opened out the whole country, bringing the most benighted parts of the *Mofussil* into daily contact with a more advanced civilization. In consequence, agriculture and trade received a great impetus.

In 1861 a disagreement arose between the Nizam and the Prime Minister, the Nizam expressing a wish to remove Salar Jung from office and appoint another Minister. At this point, however, the British Government interfered, refusing to countenance this step. Some six years later fresh differences again occurred, but were amicably settled. On this occasion the British Government took the opportunity of impressing upon the Nizam the importance of giving his entire confidence to his Minister, pointing out what serious consequences the lapse into misrule would entail. The Nizam saw the truth of this argument. Shortly afterwards His Highness was created a G.C.S.I. It is curious to note that, when this honour was conferred on the Nizam, he was very loth to accept it, the reason being that the order was of a Christian origin, and the Nizam, being the leader of Islam in India, felt it unbecoming to his dignity to accept any Christian decoration. The Resident had much difficulty in persuading His Highness that this honour would add to rather than diminish his prestige. Eventually on hearing that the list of G.C.S.I. was headed by no less a person than the Prince Consort himself, His Highness decided to accept the new honour, but it did not give him as much gratification as had been anticipated. Three years later the same honour and a salute of 17 guns were conferred on the Prime Minister, Salar Jung.

In 1862 His Highness received a *sunmad* guaranteeing that the Nizam's succession should be maintained, provided it was in accordance with Mahomedan law. This greatly pleased His Highness.

In 1868 an attempt was made to assassinate the Minister while on his way to a Durbar. He was fired at in the streets of the city while seated in his Sedan chair. The culprit was immediately seized by the infuriated crowd who would have killed him had not the police intervened. The Minister serenely continued his way to the Durbar, where he was warmly congratulated by His Highness on his narrow escape. The prisoner, who had been taken to the palace, was condemned to death, but the Minister interceded for his life. To this, however, the Nizam would not accede, and the man was executed.

In the beginning of 1869 an important change took place in the affairs of Hyderabad. On February 26th, His Highness the Nizam died, and his son, Mir Mahbub Ali Khan, then not three years old, was placed on the *Musnud* by the British Resident. During the minority of the young prince the administration of Hyderabad was entrusted to Sir Salar Jung and Shams-ul-Umra. The British being anxious about the young prince's education, Captain John Clarke was appointed tutor to the Nizam, and he was succeeded by his brother, Captain Claude Clarke four years later.

In 1871 a further honour was bestowed on the Minister, who was created a K.G.S.I. by the Resident.

An exchange of villages was negotiated between the British and the Nizam in 1871, as Scindia had ceded to the British certain villages that he owned in the Nizam's dominions.

The following year Sir Salar Jung attended a Durbar held by Lord Northbrook, in honour of the Prince of



NAWAB IMAD-UL-MULK, SYED HUSSEIN BILGRAMI

Wales' (later King Edward VII) arrival in India. On this occasion His Royal Highness presented the Minister with a sword and scabbard and a belt, set with precious stones, also with various personal mementoes of his visit in the shape of a gold ring and a gold medallion with the Prince's photo and motto on one side. Various valuable gifts were also sent to His Highness the Nizam, including some finely finished rifles and handsome pieces of jewellery.

A few years later in 1876 Sir Salar Jung received an invitation from His Royal Highness to visit England, and after having attended a Durbar held in honour of the arrival of Lord Lytton in Bombay, where he represented the young Nizam, the Minister sailed for Europe. He first visited Rome, where he had audiences both with the King of Italy and the Pope. Unfortunately during this time as the result of a slight accident Salar Jung broke his thigh-bone and in consequence he was delayed at Rome. As soon as he was able, he proceeded to England, where he was received with due honours by Queen Victoria, and attended an entertainment specially arranged for him by His Royal Highness. Everyone was impressed by the personality of Sir Salar Jung; not only was he attractive to all, as an Oriental nobleman and a foreign statesman, but also as a genial and cultured man of the world, whose conversational talent made him an honoured and welcome guest wherever he went. The freedom of the City of London was conferred on him, and he was created a D.C.L. of Oxford. In fact, it was said that during this visit the Minister evoked an enthusiastic reception in England which was unprecedented.

In 1875 Shams-ul-Umra died and was succeeded by his half-brother, the Nawab Vicar ul Umra.

In 1877 the young Nizam attended by Sir Salar Jung

and Shams-ul-Umra attended the Durbar at Calcutta, on which occasion a salute of 17 guns was conferred on the latter.

During the Nizam's minority the two administrators endeavoured to regain the province of Berar, offering efficient security for the debt, and basing their appeal on the distinct understanding with Colonel Low that the districts were only made over "temporarily," as long as the Nizam might require the Contingent; but the appeals were not successful.

Of the various Residents with whom Sir Salar Jung worked, none were in more cordial relations with him than Sir George Yule. To show in what high repute Sir Salar Jung was held and how highly the British Government appreciated his work, it will be well to consider, verbatim, a despatch from Sir Richard Temple, dated August, 1867: "In the Deccan of late years," he writes, "the constitution, system and principles of the Nizam's Government are really excellent. This much is certain. That the results must be more or less beneficial to the country, is hardly to be doubted. Whether full effect is given to the intention of His Highness's Government throughout the Deccan; I cannot yet say, but independent testimony is constantly reaching me to the effect of great improvement being perceptible." (*Papers British and Native Administration of 1869*, page 69.)

It can be said with truth of Sir Salar Jung, that he introduced into every department a system which was practical and as near perfection as it could be, but naturally it was an impossible thing to expect that, to use Sir George Yule's words: "full effect should be given to the intention of His Highness's Government throughout the Deccan." Mistakes and delays in administration were bound to occur, but the mere fact of

bringing so large a State as Hyderabad from a state of chaos into one of order and routine was in itself an Herculean task, and it required a great statesman to carry it out. We must remember that the Prime Minister was surrounded by intriguers, each ready to grind his own axe, and it required an extraordinary amount of discernment to differentiate between the sycophants and the well-wishers of the State.

Also in the annual return of *Moral and Material Progress*, 1867-8 (page 113), compiled at the India Office, we find the following :

"The efforts made towards reform have now placed the financial credit of the Nizam's Government on a satisfactory footing. It enjoys the confidence of the moneyed classes, and it can now raise money at very moderate rates instead of the usurious charges of former days."

Regarding assessment (*ibid.* page 114), we read that : "Pains have been taken more and more to render the annual settlements equitable and moderate," also "that all classes high and low connected with land or trade continue to flourish."


Referring to the new class of magistrate in the same annual (*ibid.* 1869, page 117), we read : "All these officers are well educated, though all have not done well, several had received their training in one of the British Provinces. Many discharged their duties with more or less efficiency, and many have by their firmness and uprightness brought credit to their department."

Again, Mr. C. B. Saunders, Resident, in 1869-70, thus speaks of the improvements of the previous years :

"It is hardly too much to say that the Hyderabad with which I became acquainted in 1860 was to the Hyderabad which was described, for example in the

despatches of my predecessor, Sir Charles (afterwards Lord) Metcalfe, as the England of the present day is to the England of the Stuarts—a result essentially due, as the Government is aware, to the beneficent administration and sound policy of the present Minister, Sir Salar Jung, and to the support afforded him by my previous predecessor. Not only was the public treasury full, but the *annual income of the State exceeded the annual expenditure by about eight lakhs of rupees* (Rs. 800,000), while the credit of the Government stood proportionately high. Owing chiefly to the abolition of the baneful system of former times, by which the collection of revenue was farmed out to contractors, disturbances in the interior of the country became rare. The Hyderabad Contingent has not fired a shot, except on their own parade ground, since the suppression of the Mutinies. In no respect does the recent administration of His Highness's country contrast more favourably with the State of things prevailing twenty years ago, than in the regard to revenue matters."

Sir Richard Mead in 1880 after the inspection of the public offices wrote as follows to Salar Jung: "Now that I understand we have finished all that Your Excellency wished me to see in connection with the affairs here, I think I may assure you in this way of the very great gratification that has been afforded me by this opportunity of observing their condition and working. The work and records of the Survey Department appear to me to be admirable and leave nothing to be desired, and the care that has been bestowed on everything in this department was very striking. The Settlement operations are, of course, quite distinct from the Survey work, but I gathered that they are being conducted with equal care."



MIR ALAM LAKE, HYDERABAD.

Statistics such as these (collected by the Imperial Famine Commission) show a remarkable improvement in the agricultural classes. People were not compelled to contribute to an income tax, a licenser or any such taxes, which in other countries have given rise to so much dissatisfaction among the agricultural and depressed classes. In General Fraser's *Memoirs* we read that: "The Berar districts certainly prospered under British Government and this proved an incentive to the Hyderabad State, if judged alone by land revenue, due to increased cultivation, by orderly conduct and the absence of crime among the inhabitants. The provinces ruled by the Hyderabad Ministry made quite as much progress as those under British rule."

In 1882 the Minister visited Simla and Lady Ripon in her diary records this visit and speaks of the personal pleasure that the Viceroy and herself had derived from meeting the Prime Minister of Hyderabad. Again reference is made to the charm of his personality.

It was proposed that Sir Salar Jung should accompany the young Nizam to England, but a sudden catastrophe prevented this plan from materializing. In February, 1883, the Grand Duke John of Mecklenburg arrived in Hyderabad and stayed at the Residency. With his usual hospitality Sir Salar Jung had arranged a series of fêtes for the distinguished visitor. On February 7th, a picnic had been arranged at Mir Allum lake. As usual His Excellency was in the best of health and a delightful and entertaining host. This was destined to be the last time that Sir Salar Jung appeared in public. After the picnic the Prime Minister returned to the palace and worked until midnight, and then retired to his private apartments. At about 2 a.m. he was seized with cholera. Medical attendance was at once

secured and everything possible was done and the Minister seemed to be progressing favourably. The following day a panther hunt and a banquet had been arranged, and at Sir Salar Jung's express wish neither of these entertainments was postponed. He made a splendid fight for his life, but in spite of all efforts he suddenly grew worse and as the guests for the banquet arrived they were surprised to see the palace courtyard filled with mourning courtiers and retainers, who as is their custom beat on their chests and wept and wailed. The guests were shocked to learn that His Excellency had just died. There was great consternation all over the city as the news became public. Everyone was distressed at the death of one who always stood for justice and had in every sense been a friend of the people. His Excellency left two sons, the Nawab Mir Liak Ali and Saadut Ali, who on February 12th attended a Durbar to receive from His Highness the mourning *khillats* (white shawls). On this occasion His Highness completely broke down and was overcome with grief. Telegrams from all parts of India and from Europe poured in, deploring the death of one who had won the friendship of all with whom he had come into contact.

It is interesting to note that the family of Sir Salar Jung is descended from Sheikh Omar Karman of Medina, who settled in India in 1656. Sir Salar Jung was the 33rd descendant in the 9th generation. The Sheikh's son married into a noble family, espousing the daughter of Mulla Ahmet Nait, by whom he had two sons.

During his boyhood Salar Jung's family suffered from pecuniary embarrassment. He was a very delicate child, but became stronger as he grew up. As a boy one of his great amusements was to ride a captive giraffe. It is said that, when Salar Jung was seized with typhoid

fever, his grandfather, Munir ul Mulk, became very much alarmed and performed the *Tasad* ceremony, praying that any evil that should befall the child be transferred unto the grandfather instead. Shortly after this the grandfather died, but the child recovered.

Sir Salar Jung was accorded a great State funeral with military honours, but the regal pomp of the obsequies was not so impressive as the genuine grief of the people. Arabs and Rohillas followed in the procession weeping. On the third day the usual custom of placing flowers on the grave was carried out, but on this occasion the crowd appropriated every flower as they were anxious to keep some memento of the great man whose bounty they had known and whose personality they had loved.

The Resident in his letter to the Government of India says :

"Every British officer who has had the honour of his acquaintance feels his death as he would that of a friend. No royal master ever had a better servant.

"His name has been inscribed on the roll of India's great men. Of this illustrious man the whole country is a tomb. He was for thirty years the trusted adviser and friend of His Majesty's representative. His example has done much to make society here quite different to what it is anywhere in India. He was in the best sense the foremost gentleman of the place. In no place in India are benevolent institutions of all kinds endowed so largely.

"I shall always consider it an honour and privilege to have been associated with him. Nothing in him was ever hurried. No reform, however important, carried out in hot haste. Wise and wary conservatism and abhorrence of extreme measures characterized the Minister."

Sir Salar Jung was known to be fond of poetry and

art, and particularly of reading history and pursuing any study which led to practical results in statecraft.

Centralization was a great distinguishing feature of his administration. In his personal life he was religious though without having a narrow sectarian spirit. He observed daily the prayers and fasts prescribed to be followed by those of Shiah persuasion. His Excellency was in his 57th year when he died.

In many ways this great statesman reminds one of the Controller-General of Finance in France at the time of Louis XVI—the famous Turgot. Both were men of the highest moral integrity gifted with an extraordinary power of organization. Both found themselves surrounded by a veritable network of corrupt and degrading conditions, which they proceeded to tear away, if not with ease, at least with determination. Again, in both cases the people whom they had to manage had for some time been suffering cruel and grievous wrongs at the hands of the nobles and men of position. Owing to their extravagance, the people were ground down, unduly oppressed and unjustly taxed. Both men in a short time worked wonders and inaugurated very far-reaching reforms. The difference was that, in the case of Sir Salar Jung, he was fortunately allowed to work out the reforms he had advocated; whereas Turgot after a while found himself hampered on all sides. Had Louis XVI been a minor and Turgot been Regent, or had he been able to carry out his programme with all it involved, those terrible pages of the French Revolution, so red with bloodshed, might never have been written. But alas! for France, though Turgot was recognized by a large party as a champion reformer, and loved by the people, a weak, extravagant King, surrounded by a corrupt Court, became tired of the words "*reduce expenditure*,"

and Turgot was dismissed. Gradually the reforms which he had advocated so strongly were forgotten and the country lapsed again into mismanagement, extravagance and misrule, resulting in one of the most stupendous and dramatic of revolutions.

If Sir Salar Jung had not been allowed to carry out his reforms, as he did, it is difficult to say what the fate of Hyderabad might have been. For oppression and misrule are inevitably the forerunners of a revolution. Therefore, in estimating the services which Sir Salar rendered to Hyderabad, we must not only consider the benefits which the State has derived from his administration, but also the evils which his sound policy averted.

In the *Gazette* His Highness speaking of Salar Jung says :

“ His generosity, courage, justice charity, kindness and modesty were known to all ; his faithfulness and attachment to his Sovereign were unequalled. He was ever willing to sacrifice self to the well-being of his country and fellow-subjects. He was one who was beloved by all.”

This was His Highness's tribute to the Minister who had so faithfully served his royal master and had steered the barque of State through many storms into calmer waters.

Sir Salar Jung was not only one of the most eminent men that Hyderabad has ever produced, but one of the greatest of India's sons.

APPENDIX

No. 1.

AFSUR-UL-MULK.

Name : MIRZA MAHOMED ALI BEG. *Religion :* Mohammedan.

Titles : Received the titles of Afsur Jung and Khan Bahadur, 1840 ; Afsur-ud-Dowlah, 1895. Raised to Afsur-ul-Mulk after Delhi Durbar, 1903 ; C.I.E., Jubilee Honours, 1897 ; K.C.I.E., 1911 ; M.V.O. ; A.D.C. to H.E.H. The Nizam.

Services : Afghan War, 1879-1880 (medal) ; Black Mountain Expedition, 1888 (medal, mentioned in despatches) ; China Expedition, 1900 (medal).

Appointments Held : Raised and commanded 1st and 2nd Lancers, Hyderabad Imperial Service Troops ; Hon. Colonel 20th Deccan Horse ; Hon. A.D.C. to Lord Hardinge, Viceroy of India, 1911 ; on Staff of Count von Waldersee during Boxer Rebellion, 1901 ; on Staff of Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade, Indian Expeditionary Force, Egypt, 1915 ; on Staff Indian Cavalry Corps, and A.D.C. to Sir John French, 1915-16 ; Commander-in-Chief, His Exalted Highness the Nizam's Regular Force and Imperial Service Troops, 1917. As A.D.C. to H.H. the Nizam, Sir Afsur represented Hyderabad at the Coronation of King Edward VII, 1902.

N.B.—Sir Afsur introduced Tent-pegging and Polo in Hyderabad, and was Captain of the famous Palace Polo Team. He has raised the system of beating for tigers into a veritable science.

No. 2.

Title : NAWAB FAKHR-UL-MULK BAHADUR.

Name : MIR SAFARZ HUSSAIN. *Born :* 1858. *Religion :* Mohammedan (Sect Shiah).

Additional Titles : SAFDAR JUNG, MASHIR-UD-DOWLAH.

Appointments Held : Moin-ul-Maham (Assistant Minister) in the Judicial Police (Postal and Educational Department) ; Member of the Cabinet Council from 1893-1917.

No. 3.

Title : NAWAB SIR FARIDOON MULK BAHADUR.

Name : FARIDOONJI JAMSEDJI. *Born :* September, 1849. *Religion :* Parsi.

Additional Titles : K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.B.E., Jung and Dowlah.

Appointments Held : Officer in the Revenue Department ; First Taluqdar of Aurangabad ; Commissioner of Survey and Settlement ; Private Secretary under Sir Sarlar Jung II ; Private Secretary to Sir Asman Jah, Prime Minister, Sir Vikar-ul-Umra, Sir Kishan Persad, and Sir Sarlar Jung III ; Private Secretary to H.E.H. the Nizam ; Member and Vice-President of the Executive Council.

The son of Sir Faridoon, Mr. Rustomji Faridoonji, is Commissioner in the Central Provinces. Two brothers, Nawab Burzoo Jung and Mr. Sorabji Jamsedji, held the rank of Subadar in the Hyderabad Service.

No. 4.

Title : SIR SARLAR JUNG III.

Name : MIR YUSUF ALI KHAN BANADUR. *Religion :* Mohammedan.

Son of Sir Sarlar Jung II. *Born :* 13th June, 1889.

Titles : Sarlar Jung.

Appointments Held : Prime Minister to H.E.H. the Nizam, 1912-14.

No. 5.

Name : COLONEL R. NEVILL, C.I.E.

Appointments Held : Entered the Nizam's service, 1874; became Commander of H.H. the Nizam's Troops; Appointed C.I.E. for services rendered to the Colonial and Indian Exhibition in 1886, as the Nizam's representative. Died in 1897.

No. 6.

Name : A. J. DUNLOP, Esq., C.I.E., C.S.I.

Appointments Held : Minister of Revenue, entered the Nizam's service from the Berar Commission, 1883; 1885, Inspector-General of Revenue, Imam Commissioner, Chairman Board of Irrigation, Survey Settlement Commissioner, Senior Member Board of Revenue; 1889, Famine Commissioner, Administrator Court of Wards, Customs Department, Administrator Abkari Department (Liquor, Opium, Ganja). Retired 1912.

Increase in State Revenue during his 31 years' of service, Rs. 14,270,853.

Born : 7th April, 1848. *Died :* 1919.

Son of Henry Dunlop, Craigton House, Lanark.

N.B.—Mr. Dunlop was appointed by Sir Sarlar Jung I. and his work has been the foundation of the prosperity of Hyderabad. The ryots who had formerly no security of their holdings now cannot be disturbed. Land formerly unsaleable now realizes 10 to 20 times the assessment.

No. 7.

Title : NAWAB IMAD-UL-MULK.

Name : SYED HUSSAIN BILGRAMI. *Born :* 1844. *Religion :* Mohammedan.

Educated Bhagalpur, Patna, and Calcutta. Matriculated from Hare Academy in 1861, and graduated in 1866 with distinction.

Appointments Held : Professor of Arabic at the College, Lucknow; Personal Assistant to Sir Sarlar Jung I, 1873-76; appointed Private Secretary to Sir Sarlar Jung I, 1876. Subsequently Director of Education to H.H. the Nizam; Member of India Council, London. In 1911 was appointed Private Secretary to H.E.H. the Nizam.

Titles Held : Imad-ud-Dowlah, Imad-ul-Mulk, Ali Yar Khan Bhd; Motoman Jung.

INDIAN NAMES AND THEIR MEANING

- ASKARI.**—Duty levied on alcohol, Excise Customs.
- AMIL.**—Governor, Collector of Revenue, Finance Administrator.
- BATAL.**—Rent of land paid in kind, division of crop between Aikwater and Zemindar or Government.
- CHOUTH.**—A fourth, a tax levied by the Mahrattas on the lands raided or conquered, quarter of the regular Government assessment.
- DEISHMUKH.**—A Mahratta official in charge of a group of villages.
- FAUJDAR.**—A military term, an officer in charge of a considerable body of troops.
- INAM.**—A gift, land granted in fee simple free of all conditions.
- JAGHIR.**—Land granted by the Mahomedan rulers to one at the head of a body of troops of varying numbers. The Jaghir was granted for the upkeep of the troops.
- KAGIS.**—Judges.
- KHILLAT.**—A dress of honour conferred by Mahomedan Princes on deserving officials and others. It might include in addition to the dress, jewels horses, elephants and arms.
- MADRASSAS.**—Mohammedan College.
- MUSNAD.**—Throne.
- NAZAR.**—An offering made by an inferior to a superior, in token of fealty, submission, congratulation, etc. Under the name of an offering it is sometimes a heavy exaction, imposed on appointment to office or succession to property, at other times merely a formality.
- PANCHAYAT.**—A Village Council, generally of five, to assist the Patel in deciding the cases.
- PAIGAH.**—Lands held on military tenure by certain noblemen.
- PATEL.**—A head man in the village—in all matters except accounts.
- PAKIVARI.**—One of the head men in the village whose business is to keep the accounts.
- PESHKASH.**—Tribute.
- PURDAH.**—A veil or curtain. **PURDAH NASHIN.**—Veiled Woman.
- SHASTRI.**—A Hindu divine.
- SANAD.**—Originally a Royal ordinance.
- SAGU.**—Private estates of private individuals.
- SURDESHMOOKI.**—A tax similar to Chouth, consisting of one-sixth over and above the chouth.
- SARFI-KHAS.**—H.H. The Nizam's private estates.
- SEBUNDY.**—Three monthly or quarterly payments in connection with irregular native troops, used in the collection of revenue or police work.
- SILLIDARI.**—Police.
- SOWCAR.**—Moneylender.
- SUTTEE.**—Widow burning.
- TAKDAMA.**—Cultivator advances revenue to Government on his crop.
- TALUKDAR.**—Collector of Revenue.
- TASAD.**—A religious ceremony whereby the petitioner prays that illness may be averted from some person specified and that it may instead be borne by the petitioner.
- ZEMINDAR.**—A large landowner, the Mahomedan equivalent to the Mahratta deishmukh.
- ZILLIDRA.**—An officer in charge of a Zillah or district.



THE AUTHOR,
JAMES D. B. GRISHAM, I.C.S.,
DIED 1906.



EDITOR AND COLLABORATOR,
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